

The

CIA

in the

Dock



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The
CIA
in the Dock

SOVIET
JOURNALISTS
ON INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM

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FROM THE PUBLISHERS

This present collection of articles by Soviet writers on foreign affairs tells about the secret role played by the CIA in many tragic events that have occurred in different parts of the world over recent years.

We would first remind the reader that from the beginning of 1981 American foreign policy has been based on the assumption that the 'vital interests of the USA' are threatened by international terrorism, a phenomenon identified with national liberation movements throughout the world. The doctrine of the 'struggle against international terrorism' reflected attempts by the USA to pursue its imperialist interests and justify the increasing American military presence in various parts of the world.

If one recalls the notorious myth about 'the hand of Moscow' allegedly directing terrorist activity in various flash points, then it becomes clear, in the light of what has been said above, that this myth was created in order to discredit the consistent, peace-loving policy of the USSR by linking it to the activity of extremists of various political hues and colours. This myth was also intended to justify US expansionism and 'diplomacy of strength' by presenting them as a means of resisting 'Soviet aggression'.

The authors of this present collection have set themselves the double task of revealing American manipulation of the term 'international terrorism' and drawing a clear distinction between the terrorists and their victims. They furnish a detailed and circumstantial account of the secret workings of the CIA and its attempts to penetrate into almost every sphere of life in a number of countries, extending its influence as far as the upper echelons of power.

The CIA, with its deliberately fostered aura of omnipotence and mystery, is in no way a 'state within a state', but the obedient tool of US ruling circles and of American imperialism. Having assumed the role of world policeman, the USA uses terrorist organisations as part of its 'strategy of tension' in order to pressure certain governments into adopting a position that meets the interests of American imperialism, and also in order to discredit and even eliminate political figures who have dared to pursue a policy that answers the national interests of their own countries. The international terrorism that has been erected by the USA into the guiding principle of its foreign policy and which is implemented primarily through the CIA is claiming entire nations and peoples as its victim, as is clearly demonstrated by events in Central Ameri-

ca, and in particular in El Salvador. The fascist coup in Chile, the 'undeclared war' against Afghanistan, and the attempts to strangle the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua are all related phenomena.

In its struggle against national liberation movements, imperialism uses mercenaries both against insurgents and as assault forces that invade newly independent states. The unscrupulousness revealed by the 'dogs of war' (to quote the title of one of the articles in the present collection) in the methods they use reflects a similar lack of scruple in those who hire them. In the autumn of 1981 a detachment of 100 mercenaries landed on the Seychelles led by 'Colonel' Michael Hoare, who was to win notoriety for his punitive actions in Africa. This military operation, whose aim was to overthrow the government of a republic which had adopted a policy of non-alignment, ended in failure. However, the identity of the paymasters was discovered. In their evidence given before a court in Johannesburg, the hired killers named their 'masters'—the special service of the Republic of South Africa and the American CIA.

This collection also describes another form of sabotage—ideological—which is part of the subversive activity conducted by the CIA against the socialist world and the national liberation movement. These 'champions of the idea', whose weapons are the pen and the microphone, are paid from the same purse as those whose hands are stained with blood.

This collection is based on documentary material—on evidence given by high-ranking officials of the CIA and by CIA agents, on material published by the Western press, on court records, etc.

Special mention must be made of the material gathered by US Senate commissions investigating the activity of the CIA, which provides clear evidence of the hypocrisy of a number of American politicians. These commissions were set up to create the impression that the law had triumphed in the USA. The authors of this present collection emphasise that 'the law' triumphed only within an area whose limits were set by an invisible hand, and that, 'by a strange coincidence', only that was revealed which it proved pointless or impossible to conceal.

However, if the evidence that was allowed to surface is compared with facts that have become known objectively, so to speak, it becomes apparent that the activity of the CIA has the blessing of American imperialism, whose offspring it is.

The authors who have contributed to this collection are prominent Soviet writers on international affairs who are well known not only in their own country but also to readers abroad, and whose comments and articles are published by the press of many countries around the world. Their wide-ranging professional talent has enabled them to produce not only striking reports, pamphlets and articles, but also to write research studies and publish highly

successful novellas and plays.

Widely travelled, they have themselves been witnesses to many events of international importance, and their articles reflect pain, irony and indignation. However, while their style reveals that they are far from indifferent to what they describe, their evaluation is sober and objective, as is confirmed by the documentary evidence upon which it rests. We hope that the reader will discover this for himself.



YURI ZHUKOV

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Zhukov is a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and also a member of the Presidium of the World Peace Council.

A STORY ABOUT DIRTY TRICKS

Perhaps the reader will remember the fanfare surrounding the then bellicose US Secretary of State Alexander Haig's announcement on January 28, 1981, that the United States was declaring war on international terrorism which, the Secretary alleged in his usual categorical way, is organised by the Soviet Union.

That announcement was clearly aimed at the average American citizen, who is denied access to correct information and bombardment by an endless stream of propaganda in newspapers and on the radio and television from early in the morning until late at night.

However, those who are acquainted with the real facts of the international situation cannot help but be horrified by the audacity of the leaders in Washington who, without batting an eye, call black white and seem totally unconcerned about the consequences of their unseemly actions for United States prestige. In actual fact, terrorism is one of the sinister everyday practices of the USA and not of the Soviet Union.

As Secretary of State Haig should have known that the problem of international terrorism was discussed ten years ago, in 1972, at the 27th session of the UN General Assembly. In the Department of State files there must be a verbatim account of the speech of USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko, in which he stated:

'On the basis of positions of principle, the Soviet Union opposes acts of terrorism which disrupt the diplomatic activities of states and their representatives, transport communications between them and the normal course of international contacts and meetings, and it opposes acts of violence which serve no positive end and

cause loss of human life.'

American delegates to the 27th UN General Assembly attempted to divert the discussion of terrorism in a direction which was in no way related to the main problem being discussed. Even then, under the guise of fighting international terrorism, the USA was trying to take action against peoples who were fighting for national liberation. However, the majority of UN General Assembly delegates rejected Washington's draft Convention on the prevention of specific international terrorist acts and on sanctions against offenders.

Now, ten years later, American diplomats are again trying to bring the old myth about 'international terrorism' back to life. Denouncing that manoeuvre at the 36th session of the UN General Assembly, Andrei Gromyko stated, 'The intent here is simple—to label as "terrorism" the struggle of nations against colonialism and its remnants. In other words, the oppressor policy which has been cursed by nations and which is based on the refusal to take into account the right of nations to settle their internal affairs as they see fit and the refusal to accept the social changes taking place in the world—this is presented as a struggle against terrorism.'

With the help of indisputable documents and facts, representatives of a number of governments who spoke at a recent session of the UN General Assembly proved that American foreign policy makers were attempting to confuse matters in order to divert attention away from genuine acts of international terrorism committed by the government of the US itself and first and foremost by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Italian magazine *Panorama* made public a US document entitled 'FM 30-31', confiscated during the arrest of the daughter of the leader of the secret Masonic Lodge 'P-2', Licio Gelli, in which the use of 'terrorist movements in friendly countries' is discussed.

The document openly and unequivocally recommended 'the creation of para-military subversive groups'; 'the participation of agents provocateurs in demonstrations to create disorder and confusion and bring about clashes with the police'; 'the organising of actions directed at discrediting judicial power and the police'; 'the infiltration of the government apparatus'; 'the setting of explosives'; and 'the murder of policemen'.

But that is not all. Document 'FM 30-31' ordered American secret service agents to launch 'special operations' to 'convince the HC [host country] governments and public opinion of the reality of the insurgent danger' of communism if these HC governments 'show passivity or indecision in the face of Communist or Communist-inspired subversion'.

What the authors mean by 'convince' is not hard to imagine if one recalls, for example, the fascist coup in Chile and the murder

of President Allende, the assassination attempts on Cuban leader Fidel Castro and the murder of the former Prime Minister of Italy, Aldo Moro, who was killed because he supported the inclusion of Italian Communists in the government.

Political life in the United States in 1975-76 was marked by disclosures which were devastating for the CIA. It was a period in which Congress was allowed to examine the details of the CIA's by now routine terrorist activities.

In my library there is a book entitled *Thirty Years in the CIA*, first published in Paris in June 1978 by Presse de la Renaissance. Next to it is another one with an even more interesting title—*Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA*—which was published in Rome. They are both one and the same book, which has been translated into many languages and distributed throughout the world. Its author is William Colby, former director of the US Central Intelligence Agency, who suddenly found himself with all the free time he needed to launch a literary career. In November 1975, President Ford asked Colby to resign as a result of the disclosures of crimes the CIA had committed under its supposedly impenetrable cover of secrecy.

This period was a time of great turmoil and confusion in Washington. After the scandalous disclosures, the first victim of which was Vice-President Agnew and then President Nixon himself, the US found itself for the first time in its history with both President and Vice-President—Gerald Ford and Nelson Rockefeller—who had not been elected. The new presidential elections were drawing near. In November 1976 Americans would go to the polls to elect a new president and vice-president, a new House of Representatives and a third of the Senate.

Gripped by campaign fever, political figures joined in a desperate battle against one another and began to 'hit below the belt'. Senators and Congressmen were concerned with improving their popularity on the eve of the elections and took it upon themselves to launch new and increasingly sensational investigations, in which no one was spared. The main concern was that the investigation, and more importantly, those conducting it, make the front pages of the newspapers.

It was in the midst of these troubled times that several CIA secrets which had been carefully concealed from the public eye came to light.

The chain of disclosures began when opponents of the Administration then in power published data which revealed that the CIA had disregarded its charter restricting it to intelligence activities conducted abroad, and had, upon White House orders, spied on Americans considered suspect by the Administration. In this

respect, the Agency was duplicating the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The disclosure that the CIA had broadened its sphere of activities to include the US itself resulted in a tremendous scandal and high CIA officials came under sharp criticism in the press and in Congress.

The higher-ups in the secret service realised that, given the prevailing atmosphere, it would be impossible to cover up all of the Agency's activities, and therefore they adopted a flexible course. They decided to 'let off some of the steam' by acknowledging certain facts concerning the past, expressing 'regret' that such abuses had occurred, firing some Agency employees, and announcing that such practices would not be repeated. And then, when things cooled down it would be possible to continue as before....

As was expected, soon after the November 1976 elections the furor surrounding the illegal CIA activities subsided and the American press reported that the highly praised investigation into the activities of the CIA had already been buried in oblivion. The Agency had successfully come through the scandal and had retained its secret operations intact.

The then all-powerful William Colby never dreamed that he himself would fall victim to the feverish investigations and would be forced to resign after having worked for the secret service since 1944. However, he has survived the disgrace, is quite well off and continues to do what he can to help the Agency.

His memoirs serve that purpose. He regretfully admits that the CIA committed some abuses in the past but adds that today everything is as it should be. Yet the little that Colby was forced to acknowledge, and his sometimes venomous comments directed at the Administration, whose clumsy actions resulted in the disclosure of several of the CIA's dirty tricks, are of interest, especially if one compares his confessions with facts and documents which were published during those memorable days.

Let us now take a look at Colby's book and try to clear up, with the help of documentary facts, the acts committed under his leadership which he glosses over.

How Ford 'Let the Cat out of the Bag' and What Came of It

'The CIA crisis suddenly exploded far beyond Hersh's* charges.... In late January, not long after the formation of the Rockefeller Commission, President Ford hosted a luncheon at the White

* Seymour Hersh, a *New York Times* correspondent. During the Vietnam War the press published evidence of the massacre of the villagers of My Lai by American troops led by Lieutenant Calley. Hersh was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of the massacre. On December 22, 1974, the

House for the publisher and top editors of *The New York Times* Ford is reported to have replied that he had chosen the membership with extreme care because he had learned from me ... that there were CIA activities that the members might come across in their investigations that were a lot more sensitive than those Hersh had reported on and that, in the nation's best interest, he felt had to remain secret.

"Like what?" hard-driving managing editor Abe Rosenthal is said to have asked. "Like assassination," the President is said to have responded, "off the record".

But it was impossible to expect that *The New York Times* editors would keep silent on that kind of news. Sensational rumours went around New York and Washington and events developed further.

Colby sorrowfully writes that the information leaked to 'Daniel Schorr of CBS, who in the middle of a background interview with me on February 27, said that the President had told *The New York Times* that he was concerned about CIA assassinations and then asked me whether the CIA has ever killed anybody in this country. I was so stunned at the President's opening up this topic that I retreated to the long time practice of answering only the specific question asked, "Not in this country," I replied to Schorr.

'To his follow-up questions I limited my remarks to simply pointing out that assassinations had been formally barred in the "jewels" exercise in 1973, partly because I didn't know how far the President had gone and partly because I had long decided that denying that CIA had ever assassinated anyone (which is true) immediately evoked the question whether it had tried (which of course it had ...). But in my unease I compounded the President's mistake in this instance....

'There was no stopping the press or Congress now.... A hysteria seized Washington.... The Rockefeller Commission decided that it was duty-bound to look into the matter and immediately demanded full access to all of the CIA's documents on the subject—and it wanted them unsanitized....

'The Rockefeller Commission's mandate, even with the two-month extension, ran out before it had completed its investigations.... And much to my dismay and over my vigorous protests, the White House passed over to the Church Committee all the unsanitized documents we had turned over to the Rockefeller Commission, and it set off on an investigation into assassinations of its own. This lasted some six months and generated endless sensational headlines; and in the end it came to the conclusion I had predicted: It convinced the world that the United States and CIA

article 'Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Anti-War Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years' appeared in *The New York Times*.

had used this tactic widely....

'The launching of the various investigations had a devastating impact on the normal work of the CIA.... [Hundreds of employees were taken] from normal intelligence operations to handle the mechanical and clerical chores of locating requested documents....'

Further Colby, doing all he can to present the CIA in the best possible light and to cover up most of the Agency's crimes, writes in detail of several American secret service operations. One of these occurred in Angola in 1974 and involved agents such as the venal adventurers Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi.

Colby complains that the CIA did not receive sufficient funds for the operation directed against the lawful Angolan government. He again blames the American press and Congress which, supposedly, made it impossible for the Agency to successfully complete the operation.

'So, I requested an addition,' he writes, 'to our appropriation [to meet the needs of the subversive FNLA led by Holden Roberto and UNITA, another subversive organisation led by Jonas Savimbi—Y.Z.]. And in the course of this, the operation exploded into the public print a few months after the fall of Vietnam and in the middle of the Congressional investigations and hearings on the CIA and was sensationalized to suggest that a new terrible Vietnam-like American involvement, not mere assistance to black nationalists..., was being cooked up in far-off Africa. The Congress turned down our requests for more aid, and in a short time the MPLA's [the movement led by the head of the Angolan government, Agostinho Neto,—Y.Z.] victory over its opponents was plain.'

Colby complains about the fact that in October 1974, after the CIA participation in the coup in Chile became known, 'a law had been passed requiring the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] to report on all CIA covert-action operations to the "appropriate" Congressional committees....' He adds:

'Sadly, the experience demonstrated that secrets, if they are to remain secret, cannot be given to more than a few Congressmen—every new project subjected to this procedure ... leaked, and the "covert" part of the CIA's covert action seemed almost gone.'

Here Colby is clearly at odds with the facts. Future events in many foreign countries showed that the Agency enjoys the same freedom it had earlier and that Congress and especially the press, closely cooperating with the CIA, remain silent when the real rulers of America, operating behind the scenes, order them to do so. They conveniently close their eyes and act as if they know nothing.

The furor which surrounded the investigations into CIA activities in 1975-76 served a definite purpose. It was necessary to discredit and oust an administration which had not lived up to the hopes of the military-industrial complex and bring about the election of a new administration.

To achieve this, certain sacrifices had to be made by the CIA—a few of its ‘family secrets’ had to be disclosed. Nevertheless each of these secrets was so awesome and frightening that their disclosures rocked America.

Colby could not avoid referring to some of these in his book, albeit briefly. I will now quote several passages from his memoirs, adding documentary evidence from American sources.

How the CIA Planned the Assassinations of Foreign Government Leaders

‘On May 21, I made my first appearance before the Church Committee.... But barely had I been sworn in than it looked as though all our preliminary talk about sweet reason was going right out the window. The Committee’s counsel, Frederick A.O. Schwarz, set out to clarify just what the Committee wanted to know, and he proceeded to read off a series of all-encompassing definitions, which included everything from any direct participation by the Agency in a plot to most of the CIA’s paramilitary operations... I confess I was angered, but I did my best to maintain my cool and told Schwarz that ... I thought it would be more useful for me to outline the CIA’s relationship to the cases included in the “jewels” and the others about which we had been asked, such as Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam...

‘The Church Committee stayed with assassinations throughout the summer, calling me and others to testify several times and then, in the fall, brought out an interim report on the subject. Despite its strong rhetoric, it really vindicated the position I had taken at the outset. For example, its second “finding” was that “no foreign leaders were killed as a result of assassination plots initiated by officials of the United States” (Castro is still alive and the CIA’s few steps in regard to Lumumba had nothing to do with his death)... In two cases, that of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic and René Schneider in Chile, the report confirmed that the CIA had provided weapons to the groups that assassinated these men but concluded that those weapons were not in fact used in the killing. And the report noted Helm’s directive of 1972 and mine of 1973, against any CIA involvement in assassinations...

‘For all of this, though, I was not happy with the report.... I was specifically unhappy about the inclusion of individuals’ names, and protested that those identified might be subject to retribution or at the very least held up to public opprobrium for things they had done years ago under the direction of their superiors ... and in the end the Committee relented with respect to some twenty of the thirty-odd names they had originally included. And I must accept that the Committee’s position was not unreasonable with respect to the remainder, since they were either very senior CIA

officials..., or in the one category that I was most uncomfortable defending—members of the Mafia. Because during the efforts against Castro some CIA officers had the godawful idea that the Mafia still had contacts in Cuba and would be happy to try to get him out of the way; a collaboration had been set up to do the job. It failed, in part because it was ineptly planned, but in part also because Mafia greed is not the stuff of which self-sacrificing revolutionists are made. It brought the predictable ... complications in its train: requests to call off prosecution of Mafia hoods because the CIA operational background might be revealed.’

In his book this is all Colby has to say about the most disgraceful and shameful pages in the history of the CIA, to which he gave 30 years of his life and which he directed during those stormy days. This is understandable. He has not the slightest desire to reveal the *whole truth*, even about the few facts which were included in the Church Committee report.

It should be pointed out that Church was preparing to announce his candidacy for president in 1976 (he tested his popularity in the primaries and, realising that his chances against Carter were slim, later withdrew) and spared no one in his efforts to uncover the sensational. Because of this, Church did not wait for the Committee to complete its work and on November 20, 1975 published his own interim report. Colby briefly mentions this report but I would like to examine it more closely. It is entitled ‘Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders’.

Pointing out that the committee had compiled a massive record comprising over 8,000 pages of sworn testimony taken from over 75 witnesses during 60 days of hearings and numerous staff interviews, the report’s authors express regret that they had been unable to investigate all of the abuses.

‘Unfortunately,’ the report states, ‘the working papers relating to that investigation were destroyed upon the completion of the Report [on assassination plots against Castro, Trujillo and Ngo Dinh Diem], pursuant to instructions from [the then] CIA Director Richard Helms (Memorandum for the Record, 5/23/67).’ These notes were destroyed because they contained sensitive material.

‘Some ambiguities in the evidence result from the practice of concealing CIA covert operations from the world and performing them in such a way that if discovered, the role of the United States could be plausibly denied. An extension of the doctrine of “plausible deniability” had the result that the communications between the Agency and high Administration officials were often convoluted and imprecise.’

The report continues:

‘The Committee finds that the system of executive command and control was so ambiguous that it is difficult to be certain at

what levels assassination activity was known and authorized. This situation creates the disturbing prospect that Government officials might have undertaken the assassination plots without it having been incontrovertibly clear that there was explicit authorization from the Presidents. It is also possible that there might have been a successful "plausible denial" in which Presidential authorization was issued but is now obscured. Whether or not the respective Presidents knew of or authorized the plots, as chief executive officer of the United States, each must bear the ultimate responsibility for the activities of his subordinates.'

And more:

'Covert action is activity which is meant to further the sponsoring nation's foreign policy objectives, and which is to be concealed in order to permit that nation to plausibly deny responsibility.

'The National Security Act of 1947 which established the Central Intelligence Agency did not include specific authority for covert operations. However, it created the National Security Council, and gave that body authority to direct the CIA to "perform such *other functions* [My italics—Y.Z.] and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct". At its first meeting in December 1947, the NSC issued a top secret directive granting the CIA authority to conduct covert operations....

'This directive instructed the CIA to counter, reduce and discredit "International Communism" throughout the world in a manner consistent with United States foreign and military policies. It also directed the CIA to undertake covert operations to achieve this end and defined covert operations as any covert activities related to propaganda, economic warfare, political action (including sabotage, demolition and assistance to resistance movements) and all activities compatible with the directive. In 1962, the CIA's General Counsel rendered the opinion that the Agency's activities were "not inhibited by any limitations"....'

Thus, it appears that the organisation of plots to assassinate foreign government leaders is completely legal if it is carried out in accordance with a directive of the US National Security Council.

Having made this Freudian slip, the authors of the report nonetheless emphasised that they gathered enough factual evidence to confirm that the CIA had been directly involved in the preparation and execution of terrorist acts against several foreign heads of state and concluded that such practices are reprehensible.

To be more precise I will quote from the section of the Church Committee's report entitled 'Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Plots'.

'The Committee investigated alleged United States involvement in assassination plots in five foreign countries:

Country	Individual involved
Cuba	Fidel Castro
Congo (Zaire)	Patrice Lumumba
Dominican Republic	Rafael Trujillo
Chile	General René Schneider
South Vietnam	Ngo Dinh Diem

'The evidence concerning each alleged assassination can be summarized as follows:

'*Patrice Lumumba (Congo/Zaire)*—In the Fall of 1960, two CIA officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba..., some exploratory steps were taken toward gaining access to Lumumba. Subsequently, in early 1961, Lumumba was killed by Congolese rivals. It does not appear from the evidence that the United States was in any way involved in the killing.*

'*Fidel Castro (Cuba)*—United States Government personnel plotted to kill Castro from 1960 to 1965. American underworld figures and Cubans hostile to Castro were used in these plots, and were provided encouragement and material support by the United States.

'*Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic)*—Trujillo was shot by Dominican dissidents on May 31, 1961. From early in 1960 and continuing to the time of the assassination, the United States Government generally supported these dissidents. Some Government personnel were aware that the dissidents intended to kill Trujillo. Three pistols and three carbines were furnished by American officials, although a request for machine guns was later refused. There is conflicting evidence concerning whether the weapons were knowingly supplied for use in the assassination and whether any of them were present at the scene.

'*Ngo Dinh Diem (South Vietnam)*—Diem and his brother, Nhu, were killed on November 2, 1963, in the course of a South Vietnamese Generals' coup. Although the United States Government supported the coup, there is no evidence that American officials favored the assassination. Indeed, it appears that the assassination of Diem was not part of the Generals' pre-coup planning but was instead a spontaneous act which occurred during the coup and was carried out without United States involvement or support.

'*General René Schneider (Chile)*—On October 25, 1970, General Schneider died of gunshot wounds inflicted three days earlier while resisting a kidnap attempt. Schneider, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and a constitutionalist opposed to military coups, was considered an obstacle in efforts to prevent Salvador Allende

* Here the authors distort the truth. There is proof of the CIA's responsibility for the ruthless elimination of Lumumba. We will return to this subject later.

from assuming the office of President of Chile. The United States Government supported, and sought to instigate a military coup to block Allende. U.S. officials supplied financial aid, machine guns and other equipment to various military figures who opposed Allende....

'Assassination capability (Executive action)—In addition to these five cases, the Committee has received evidence that ranking Government officials discussed, and may have authorized, the establishment within the CIA of a generalized assassination capability....

'Similarities and differences among the plots—The assassination plots all involved Third World countries, most of which were relatively small and none of which possessed great political or military strength....

'The Castro and Lumumba cases are examples of plots conceived by United States officials to kill foreign leaders.

'In the Trujillo case, although the United States Government certainly opposed his regime, it did not initiate the plot. Rather, United States officials responded to requests for aid from local dissidents whose aim clearly was to assassinate Trujillo. By aiding them, this country was implicated in the assassination, regardless of whether the weapons actually supplied were meant to kill Trujillo or were only intended as symbols of support for the dissidents.

'The Schneider case differs from the Castro and Trujillo cases. The United States Government, with full knowledge that Chilean dissidents considered General Schneider an obstacle to their plans, sought a coup and provided support to the dissidents. However, even though the support included weapons, it appears that the intention of both the dissidents and the United States officials was to abduct General Schneider, not to kill him. Similarly, in the Diem case, some United States officials wanted Diem removed and supported a coup to accomplish his removal, but there is no evidence that any of those officials sought the death of Diem himself.'

It is clear that the authors of the report have told far from everything and that, under enormous pressure from the government and the CIA, which William Colby himself writes about when discussing his 'battles' with the Committee, they have tried to soften their own accusations. But there is no getting away from the facts, and when they summarise the factual evidence they gathered, the justifications they advance lose all meaning.

Let us turn to the section of the report entitled 'Assassination Planning and the Plots'. Because of the extraordinary importance of this section, I will quote it almost in full.

Congo. 'The Committee has received solid evidence of a plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. Strong hostility to Lumumba, voiced at the very highest levels of government, may have been intended to initiate an assassination operation; at the least it engendered such an operation. The evidence indicates that it is like-

ly that President Eisenhower's expression of strong concern about Lumumba at a meeting of the National Security Council on August 18, 1960, was taken by Allen Dulles [then CIA Director], as authority to assassinate Lumumba...

'The week after the August 18 NSC meeting, a presidential advisor reminded the Special Group of the "necessity for very straightforward action" against Lumumba and prompted a decision not to rule out consideration of "any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba". The following day, Dulles cabled a CIA Station Officer in Leopoldville, Republic of the Congo, that "in high quarters" the "removal" of Lumumba was "an urgent and prime objective". Shortly thereafter the CIA's clandestine services formulated a plot to assassinate Lumumba. The plot proceeded to the point that lethal substances and instruments specifically intended for use in an assassination were delivered by the CIA to the Congo Station....'

The plot to assassinate Lumumba. 'In the summer of 1960, DDP [Deputy Director for Plans] Richard Bissell asked the Chief of the Africa Division, Bronson Tweedy, to explore the feasibility of assassinating Patrice Lumumba. Bissell also asked a CIA scientist, Joseph Scheider, to make preparations to assassinate or incapacitate an unspecified "African leader". According to Scheider, Bissell said that the assignment had the "highest authority". Scheider procured toxic biological materials in response to Bissell's request, and was then ordered by Tweedy to take these materials to the Station Officer in Leopoldville. According to Scheider, there was no explicit requirement that the Station check back with Headquarters for final approval before proceeding to assassinate Lumumba....

'In late September, Scheider delivered the lethal substance to the Station Officer in Leopoldville and instructed him to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. The Station Officer testified that after requesting and receiving confirmation from CIA Headquarters that he was to carry out Scheider's instructions, he proceeded to take "exploratory steps" in furtherance of the assassination plot. The Station Officer also testified that he was told by Scheider that President Eisenhower had ordered the assassination of Lumumba. Scheider's testimony generally substantiated this account, although he acknowledged that his meetings with Bissell and Tweedy were the only bases for his impression about Presidential authorization. Scheider's mission to the Congo was preceded and followed by cables from Headquarters urging the "elimination" of Lumumba transmitted through an extraordinarily restricted "Eyes Only" channel—including two messages bearing the personal signature of Allen Dulles.

'The toxic substances were never used. But there is no evidence that the assassination operation was terminated before Lumumba's

death.'

Cuba. 'The Assassination Plots. We have found concrete evidence of at least eight plots involving the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960 to 1965. Although some of the assassination plots did not advance beyond the stage of planning and preparation, one plot, involving the use of underworld figures, reportedly twice progressed to the point of sending poison pills to Cuba and dispatching teams to commit the deed. Another plot involved furnishing weapons and other assassination devices to a Cuban dissident. The proposed assassination devices ran the gamut from high-powered rifles to poison pills, poison pens, deadly bacterial powders, and other devices which strain the imagination.

'The most ironic of these plots took place on November 22, 1963—the very day that President Kennedy was shot in Dallas—when a CIA official offered a poison pen to a Cuban for use against Castro while at the same time an emissary from President Kennedy was meeting with Castro to explore the possibility of improved relations....

'Efforts against Castro did not begin with assassination attempts. From March through August 1960, during the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA considered plans to undermine Castro's charismatic appeal by sabotaging his speeches. According to the 1967 Report of the CIA's Inspector General, an official in the Technical Services Division (TSD) recalled discussing a scheme to spray Castro's broadcasting studio with a chemical which produced effects similar to LSD, but the scheme was rejected because the chemical was unreliable. During this period, TSD impregnated a box of cigars with a chemical which produced temporary disorientation, hoping to induce Castro to smoke one of the cigars before delivering a speech. The Inspector General also reported a plan to destroy Castro's image as "The Beard" by dusting his shoes with thallium salts, a strong depilatory that would cause his beard to fall out. The depilatory was to be administered during a trip outside Cuba, when it was anticipated Castro would leave his shoes outside the door of his hotel room to be shined. TSD prepared the chemical and tested it on animals, but apparently abandoned the scheme because Castro cancelled his trip....

'Accident Plot. The first action against the life of a Cuban leader sponsored by the CIA of which the Committee is aware took place in 1960. A Cuban who had volunteered to assist the CIA in gathering intelligence informed his case officer in Havana that he would probably be in contact with Raul Castro....

'The cable from the Havana Station was received at Headquarters on the night of July 20. The duty officer, who was summoned to Headquarters from his home, contacted Tracy Barnes, Deputy to Richard Bissell, CIA's Deputy Director for Plans and the man in

charge of CIA's covert action directorate. The duty officer also contacted J.C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division within the Directorate for Plans.

'Following their instructions, he sent a cable to the Havana Station early in the morning of July 21, stating: "Possible removal top three leaders is receiving serious consideration at HQS." The cable inquired whether the Cuban was sufficiently motivated to risk "arranging an accident" involving Raul Castro and advised that the station could "at discretion contact subject to determine willingness to cooperate and his suggestions on details". Ten thousand dollars was authorized as payment "after successful completion", but no advance payment was permitted because of the possibility that the Cuban was a double agent....

'Use of Underworld Figures. The Initial Plan.

'In August 1960, the CIA took steps to enlist members of the criminal underworld with gambling syndicate contacts to aid in assassinating Castro. The origin of the plot is uncertain....

'Bissell testified:

"I remember a conversation which I would have put in early autumn or late summer between myself and Colonel Edwards [Director of the Office of Security], and I have some dim recollection of some earlier conversation I had had with Colonel J.C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, and the subject matter of both of those conversations was a capability to eliminate Castro if such action should be decided upon."...

Schneider. 'On September 4, 1970, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens won a plurality in Chile's Presidential election. Since no candidate had received a majority of the popular vote, the Chilean constitution required that a joint session of its Congress decide between the first and second place finishers. This constitutional requirement had, in the past, been pro forma. The Congress had always selected the candidate who received the highest popular vote. The date set for the Congressional joint session was October 24, 1970.

'On September 15, 1970, President Richard Nixon informed CIA Director Richard Helms that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable to the United States. The CIA was instructed by President Nixon to play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'état in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to the presidency. The Agency was to take this action without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and without informing the U.S. Ambassador in Chile....

'Between October 5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero (police) officials in Chile. Those Chileans who were inclined to stage a coup were given assurances of strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, both before and after a coup.

'One of the major obstacles faced by all the military conspirators in Chile was the strong opposition to a coup by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General René Schneider, who insisted the constitutional process be followed.... Unable to have General Schneider retired or reassigned, the conspirators decided to kidnap him. An unsuccessful abduction attempt was made on October 19, 1970, by a group of Chilean military officers whom the CIA was actively supporting. A second kidnap attempt was made the following day, again unsuccessfully. In the early morning hours of October 22, 1970, machine guns and ammunition were passed by the CIA to the group that had failed on October 19. That same day General Schneider was mortally wounded in an attempted kidnap on his way to work....'

Later in the section 'Summary and Conclusion', the authors cite interesting details connected with the murders of those who were put in power by the Americans but proved to be unsatisfactory—President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam and President Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.

'American officials encouraged or were privy to coup plots which resulted in the deaths of Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider.

'American officials clearly desired the overthrow of Trujillo, offered both encouragement and guns to local dissidents who sought his overthrow and whose plans included assassination. American officials also supplied those dissidents with pistols and rifles.

'American officials offered encouragement to the Vietnamese generals who plotted Diem's overthrow, and a CIA official in Vietnam gave the generals money after the coup had begun....

'As Director Colby testified before the Committee, the death of a foreign leader is a risk foreseeable in any coup attempt. In the cases we have considered, the risk of death was in fact known in varying degrees. It was widely known that the dissidents in the Dominican Republic intended to assassinate Trujillo. The contemplation of coup leaders at one time to assassinate Nhu, President Diem's brother, was communicated to the upper levels of the United States Government.'

These are the facts which for obvious reasons William Colby chose to avoid when he lightly touched on the conclusions of the Church Committee's report in his book.

As expected, the publication of the Church Committee Report caused a tremendous uproar in the United States, in spite of the fact that its authors carefully chose their words and tried to tone down the accusations against the CIA by alluding to attendant circumstances. Newspapers, radio and television widely publicised the report, continually adding details unearthed during the investigation but not published in the final report.

This is what the November 22, 1975, editorial of *The New*

York Times had to say. It is eloquently entitled, 'Murderous Diplomacy... and More Than Murder'.

'The massive, bipartisan report by the Senate's special committee on the Central Intelligence Agency's covert plots against foreign leaders removes all doubt that this arm of the United States Government was involved in activities which are inexcusable by any standards of international morality and diplomatic expediency—and which must be eliminated from all future intelligence operations.

'Blame for the criminal activities exposed in the report cannot be assigned to any one Administration or political Party. The plotting against leaders of the Dominican Republic, the Congo, Cuba, South Vietnam and Chile spanned a period of more than ten years and four Presidencies. Its common denominator was the existence of an amoral secret bureaucracy that operated with the full knowledge of the C.I.A. high command.

'As these agents of conspiracy and murder used or dispensed their lethal weapons, they were never given the slightest reason to doubt that they enjoyed the sanction of the highest authority within the C.I.A. and beyond.

'In the aftermath of these outrages, it matters little that, as the agency claims, no actual deaths were attributable to direct C.I.A. actions. Even if native dissidents actually pulled the trigger, the encouragement and support given to such political murders by American agents clearly implicates the United States and undercuts its moral authority in international affairs. It is disingenuous to say that the guns given to members of a military junta in Chile were intended only to facilitate the abduction, but not the murder of General Schneider. Placing weapons in the hands of political goons constitutes complicity in murder.

'American officials who entered into an alliance between the C.I.A. and the Mafia were guilty of nothing less than subverting the Federal drive against organized crime. It is inconceivable that those who engaged the underworld as hired guns in foreign intelligence would not realize that such an assignment would give the Mafia's high command at home a kind of implied security blanket for its own domestic operations....

'It is particularly disconcerting that President Ford and the C.I.A. have seemed more intent on preventing the publication of the Senate committee's report than in reassuring the American people that the "aberrations" it documents are to be purged from any future intelligence operations.

'Surely, a self-proclaimed "open Presidency" should not be a party to a continuing cover-up of outrages committed in the name of the American people. Senator Frank Church, the committee's chairman, exposed the emptiness of the Administration's claim that it merely wanted to safeguard the persons cited in the report

when he showed that, except for the Mafia connections, all names at issue had long been in the public domain.'

Someone inexperienced in American politics might read these lines and say, 'How courageously and forcefully *The New York Times* criticises the CIA!' However, one should not forget what the magazine *Rolling Stone* wrote about the newspaper's connections with the Central Intelligence Agency and about the fact that its boss, Sulzberger, signed a statement promising to preserve the secrets of the Agency. So how does it all fit together?

Quite simply, in fact. *The New York Times* was, in effect, dancing at the bedside of the dying Republican administration. To help guarantee the Democrats' (whom the newspaper supported) success at the polls, it was necessary to discredit the outgoing administration, including the CIA leadership which had been appointed by Nixon. 'The worse the better' was the motto of the well-orchestrated political campaign in which *The New York Times* played a prominent role.

However, throughout all this, as Colby mentioned in his book, they prudently spoke only in the past tense. True, they said in Washington, there were some terrible things done in the past, but when the Democrats come to power the mistakes will be corrected and 'dirty tricks' won't be repeated. As future developments showed, however, nothing changed in the CIA's activities after the Democrat Carter became President. The notorious political cloak-and-dagger methods continued.

What Happened Then? Everything Continued as Before.

The furor surrounding the disclosures of the CIA's sinister practices quieted down. The replacement of one administration by another had been accomplished, and as soon as new people appeared in the White House and among the leaders of Congress, a powerful, unseen hand cut the thread of investigations and silenced the press.

Under the leadership of its next director, Admiral Stansfield Turner, the CIA began new 'dirty tricks' and there was no more talk of reforms. The only change was that the CIA figures whose reputations had been damaged during the disclosures were removed and replaced by others, and the CIA machine continued to roll along the well-worn track.

In fact, the investigations over which the American press raised such a fuss were conducted in a manner calculated to conceal the inner workings of this sinister agency. In this regard, it is enough to mention the frank confession of *The New York Times Magazine*, published on September 12, 1976:

'The collapse of the C.I.A. investigations had been due largely to ineptitude, poor judgment and lack of will on the part of the Congressional Committees. But the agency also played a role. Its strategy was flawless. "Those guys really knew what they were doing," says a staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chaired by Frank Church. "I think they defended themselves just like any other agency would, except they're better. They had a whole office set up to deal with us, and I sometimes had the feeling that they ran operations against us like they run them against foreign governments. It was like a C.I.A. station for the Congress instead of for Greece or Vietnam." The story of how they came out ahead of their investigators says a great deal about both the Congress and the agency, and about the problem of reconciling the demands of the superspy with the democracy he is supposed to protect.'

The New York Times Magazine noted the following facts. In the spring of 1975, the Church Committee worked for several months without success. In taking on the job of investigating the activities of over ten intelligence organs (and studying the 'tricks' of just one of them, the CIA, was an immense task), the Senators became bogged down in arguments over how to conduct the work of the Committee. The intelligence organs were persistent in their attempts to draw the legislators' attention away from their secrets.

But then Ford let it slip that the CIA was involved in assassination attempts. That news caused an immediate sensation and the Committee jumped at it. For five months it concentrated all of its efforts on studying those facts. Investigations into other matters were put aside.

In November 1975, the Committee published its interim report, sections of which have been quoted above.

'...Senators and staff alike', wrote *The New York Times Magazine* on September 12, 1976, 'were proud of it. As an exploration of the Machiavellian underside of American foreign policy, it was, in fact, a tour de force. Yet it failed to build public support for investigating or controlling the C.I.A.'

The findings of the investigation were given extensive coverage both in newspapers and on television, but interest was short-lived. The media concentrated on specific sensational details: plots in which the Mafia was involved, revelations about President Kennedy's intimate relations, and certain colourful spy projects which read like cheap detective novels. As far as the investigation of more serious and dangerous CIA covert operations was concerned, everything was done to complicate matters and cover up the fact that highly-placed Washington officials were involved in plots to assassinate foreign leaders. This is what *The New York Times Magazine* had to say on this subject in that same September 12 article:

'...the C.I.A. benefited from a general impression that it came out of the assassination inquiry with clean hands. This impression is false.

'Certainly many thousands of people have died as a result of secret C.I.A. paramilitary interventions in countries ranging from Laos to Cuba, to the Congo. (The Church Committee obtained some casualty figures but did not publish them at the agency's request.) And, in the case of selected killings detailed in the report, the line between involvement and actual murder is often shadowy....

"By the time we finished the assassination report," recalls the leader of one of the Committee's task forces, "we had lost three things—the public's attention, much of our own energy and will power, and our leadership. Quite candidly, we had lost Frank Church." The Senator, according to this investigator, had given up hope of achieving major reforms in the prevailing atmosphere. Public interest was down.... With investigations of the other intelligence agencies, including the F.B.I., still ahead of them, five crucial months had been lost—along with much of the Committee's momentum. The Senate's February 1976 deadline for the completion of all work loomed large. And Church wanted to wrap up his investigative chores in order to begin his own Presidential campaign....

'The C.I.A. approached the Congressional investigations with one central objective: to protect the means and practice of covert action. It was in line with this strategy that Colby and Rogovin gave ground on the marginal issue of assassination, cooperating with the Church Committee, turning over more information than the Committee could digest, helping the Committee use itself up. Then, when the assassination report was completed, Rogovin became tough about information to be granted for the remainder of the investigation—especially in regard to covert action. The Committee was floundering; Rogovin pressed his advantage. "We agreed with the Committee that they could have access to information for six case studies in covert action", he says, "provided they would go public with only one of them. They swore all kinds of secrecy oaths that they would not even let the names of the other five countries leak." *

Using voluminous factual material to show how Colby and his associates managed to conceal the CIA's more serious crimes, *The New York Times Magazine* came to the following conclusion:

'...The C.I.A. has shown itself to be quite adept at managing the political climate. The agency began these searching investigations hanging on the ropes, and clearly emerged the winner. Its powers, so unique and still largely hidden, remain essentially un-

* Rogovin allowed the Committee to publish only a few details of the CIA's covert activities in Chile, and mainly those which were already public knowledge.

challenged.'

That the CIA's criminal practices have remained 'essentially unchallenged' has been shown by many facts which came to light over the next two years (1977 and 1978) as a result of other scandalous failures in the Agency's activities. Even the assassination of foreign leaders, which US officials denounced with feigned indignation in 1975 and 1976, promising that those practices would never be repeated, continued.

A CIA operation in India was uncovered in April 1978. In the autumn of 1965, mountain climbers hired by the CIA ascended the Himalayas with a device to be used to spy on China. The operation ended scandalously. Unable to reach the top of the Himalayas (where the device was to have been installed) due to poor weather conditions, the climbers hid the device, which was run by a nuclear generator, in a secluded nook on the southern slope of the mountain, planning to return in the spring and complete the assignment. But when they reached the spot in 1966, they discovered that a winter avalanche had carried off the nuclear device.

A third covert expedition was organised in 1967 to search for the device, but was unsuccessful. There was the danger that the river Ganges would be contaminated with radioactive plutonium. If this had occurred, it would have been an unprecedented violation of the unwritten international nuclear code. But the CIA remained silent until the incident leaked to the press.

The CIA continued its widespread policy of payoffs to foreign leaders. Colby's replacement, Admiral Stansfield Turner, cynically announced that he did not see anything reprehensible in such a practice. Speaking before millions of viewers in a television interview with CBS reporters on March 20, 1977, the Admiral, in answer to a question about CIA bribes to foreign leaders and whether or not he considered that policy abhorrent or illegal, said that in examining the question one must take into consideration that the United States had given its friends and allies throughout the world hundreds of billions of dollars in aid over the previous thirty years. Only a minute part of those funds was paid secretly. The practice of supplying covert aid to foreign governments could be dated back to November 29, 1776, when Benjamin Franklin went to Paris to negotiate with the King of France over secret aid for George Washington.

From Turner's answer it was clear that aid to foreign governments in the form of secret payments to their leaders is a commonplace and legal instrument of US foreign policy.

At this point one of the reporters openly concluded that it was acceptable for the government of the USA to secretly pass money to foreign officials and there was no reason to cease this practice.

No further comment is necessary.

The vote in the US House of Representatives in early 1977

on an intelligence appropriations bill again showed that the CIA is bound by no law. In effect, the Congressmen voted blindly and signed a blank cheque. Nor is this an exaggeration. The bill read '..... dollars'. What is more, it was passed by a large majority: 323 'for' and only 43 'against'. Congress is very generous, indeed.

According to the press, the blank before the word 'dollars' was roughly interpreted to mean 'more than ten billion'. This was the astronomical sum (which, by the way, was not a ceiling figure) that was appropriated to finance the activities of the CIA, the National Security Agency and other intelligence services, including several departments of the FBI.

One more observation: the facts show that the CIA enjoys the unlimited support of the highest circles in Washington, where they love to make eloquent and dramatic speeches about defending human rights and democratic freedoms. However, such speeches are apparently forgotten when American intelligence's 'dirty tricks department' flagrantly violates these rights and freedoms.

On August 18, 1978, President Carter set aside his urgent affairs and went to CIA headquarters to personally raise the morale of the Agency, shaken by the misadventures I mentioned earlier when commenting on Colby's memoirs.

The President complimented the CIA on its excellent work and demonstratively thanked its employees. He announced that the Agency must broaden the scope of its activity, noting that until then, the main work of the CIA had been to appraise (only appraise?—Y.Z.) the actual and possible activities of the Soviet Union. However, in the future, he added, its functions would also involve analysis (only analysis?—Y.Z.) of situations in almost every part of the world, in almost every country, including close allies and friends of the US.

The smooth wording of his speech fooled no one: it was designed to maintain the respectability of the highly-placed orator. But the directive to broaden the CIA's activities on such a global scale was very serious. In this way the CIA received a direct command to spread its activity to every part of the world, sparing not even 'allies and friends' of the United States.

The story of 'dirty tricks', begun by William Colby, one of their inventors, under the pressure of circumstances, still continues. Its new authors are his successors and in the future we will probably learn quite a bit more about these deeds which reek of blood and gunpowder.

Today the present US administration is 'tightening the screws' and has begun returning to the CIA the unlimited powers to organise international terrorism that it enjoyed before the Nixon scandal.

In December 1981, the Reagan Administration signed an order restoring complete freedom to the CIA.

The new head of the CIA, William Casey, does not conceal his intention to use any methods which he deems necessary 'to protect US national interests' and does not consider himself in any way limited.

The West's unrestrained build-up of military budgets and arms, its cult of force, dictat and threats in international relations, its whipping up of hatred towards socialist countries and liberation movements, and its persecution of all progressive parties are already today having serious consequences for the peoples of the world.

The US Central Intelligence Agency is a key instrument of this exceedingly dangerous policy.



GENRICH BOROVIK

GENRICH BOROVIK—journalist and playwright. His most popular books include *The Tale of the Green Lizard*, *Your Special Correspondent Interviews...*, *The Year of the Restless Sun* and *May in Lisbon*, while his plays *The Revolt of the Nameless*, *Three Minutes of Martin Crol* and *Interview in Buenos Aires* (awarded the State Prize of the USSR) have been staged in the Soviet Union and abroad.

Borovik is also a holder of the Vorovsky Journalists' Award.

THE TRAGEDY OF CHILE

I first heard of the tragic events in Chile on the evening of September 11, 1973, when, still unaware that anything had happened, I was twiddling the knob of my radio. I do not remember either the station or the language, though I think the broadcast was in Spanish, for the Spanish *golpe* (coup d'état) still rings in my ears. I seized a pencil and a piece of paper and jotted down what I heard:

'On the morning of 11th September ... coup d'état in Chile... the presidential palace La Moneda is under attack.... Salvador Allende has been arrested.... A battle is in progress in the streets of Santiago.... Aeroplanes are bombing residential areas in Santiago.... The coup was organised by the military ... by the commanders of all the armed services and the Carabineros... A military junta has been formed....'

I still have that piece of paper. It is of no importance in itself, but I cannot bring myself to throw it away.

The communiqués issued by the news agencies were brief, confused and contradictory, but two voices could be heard—one tragic, the other triumphant.

Something dreadful was happening in Chile.

Details were still unclear; it was still not known whether Salvador Allende was alive or not (according to some sources he had been arrested, according to others he had committed suicide), but it was already evident that Chile was the scene of bloody events, perhaps the bloodiest in the history of Latin America.

I listened to the radio until well into the night. As the hours passed there were more and more details of the coup that had

taken place in that distant part of the world, a country possibly the farthest removed geographically from the USSR but whose name had always had a happy ring to it, like the chirping of birds—Chile. That night, however, I suddenly realised that this word also had a tense, questioning ring to it. During the months, weeks, days prior to the coup, the word 'Chile' had become an implicit or explicit question addressed to ourselves and others. It was obvious that the situation there was critical. Would the government stand or fall? Only time can answer such questions.

Around midnight I heard once again that Salvador Allende had committed suicide, and once again I refused to believe it. I also heard the voice of the military junta broadcasting from Mendoza, an Argentinian city on the border with Chile, the closest foreign city to Santiago.

As usual, having seized hold of broadcasting stations, the insurgents hurried to inform their own people and the whole world that 'the entire country is returning to normality, and in every province new administrative organs are assuming their responsibilities.' Meanwhile tanks, bristling with infantrymen armed with submachine-guns, were moving along the streets of Santiago ready for action, churning up the asphalt, shooting at the upper storeys of buildings along their route. Having reached Plaza de la Constitución with its flower gardens, they fired shell after shell at the presidential palace—a large, majestic grey-white building erected during the period of Spanish rule. Here in this building was the Chilean President elected by the people. The thunder of shell-fire and rattle of tanks mixed with the deafening roar of planes and the explosion of bombs and air-to-surface missiles, drowning the shots that ended the life of President Allende and his comrades-in-arms....

In a voice reminiscent of a boxing commentator, almost trembling with excitement, the broadcaster read out the list of those who, on the order of the military authorities in Santiago, 'are to present themselves voluntarily at the Ministry of Defence before 16.30 today'. If the situation had not been so tragic, the words 'are to present themselves *voluntarily*' might have provoked laughter, as they might also have done were they not so familiar.

Similar instructions were issued thirty years ago by nazis who had seized Soviet cities. The notices ran: 'The following are to present themselves *voluntarily* at the Commandant's office...'

I listened to the list of names: Luis Corvalán, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Chile; Laura Allende, sister of President Allende; Luis Figueroa, Chairman of the Amalgamated Trade Union Centre of the Workers of Chile.... How many more would not be called upon 'to present themselves voluntarily'? How many had already been shot or would be shot on the streets!

'Total calm now reigns in Chile,' insisted the broadcaster, his

words coming quickly as if he feared that he would not be allowed to finish. 'Total calm now reigns in Chile'.... This phrase recalls another broadcast almost forty years ago in Europe: 'The sky above Spain is cloudless'.*

I twisted the knob of the radio, hoping to find out what had happened to the others who had been in the palace with Allende. Had anyone come out onto Constitution Square to defend the President? Had the workers and peasants been armed so that they could resist the junta? What had happened to General Prats, Allende's Minister of Defence who had apparently given his wholehearted support to the Popular Unity Government? Where were the other officers of the army and navy who had supported Allende? Had the army been united in its anti-constitutional actions? Was this not the army that many in Chile had viewed as the shield of the constitution and the law, as virtually the sole obstacle blocking the path of reaction, should that reaction attempt to overthrow by force a president elected by the free will of the people!

A few hours later I learned that contact with Soviet correspondents in Santiago had been cut off by the junta in the first few minutes following the coup. A few days later it was learned that the Novosti and TASS agencies in Santiago had been closed down, and that TASS correspondent Ruslan Knyazev, together with his wife and young child, had been held all night under armed guard. All this was learned later. That morning, after an almost sleepless night spent listening to the radio, I went to Novosti in the hope of gaining some additional information. However, the long strips of teletype pouring out of the teleprinters of the largest press agencies in the world rather like silk ribbons out of a magician's pocket added little to what I had learned from the broadcasts of the night before.

Late on September 12 I was informed that I was to be sent as quickly as possible to Latin America in order to gather information on the events in Chile. 'It is unlikely that you will be able to get into Chile itself,' I was told. 'They won't let you in. Try to get hold of information in Peru and Argentina. We can assume that there will be more information about Chile there than anywhere else. Moreover, refugees fleeing from the junta may start arriving in neighbouring states.'

The news coming from Chile became increasingly depressing. It was interesting and revealing to listen to the Western broadcasts and read the main bourgeois newspapers. A poet once said, 'A revolt cannot succeed, for if it does it is not called a revolt.' Having 'succeeded', the revolt of the Chilean military was no longer

* The code signal broadcast over the radio in July 1936 and which marked the beginning of the fascist putsch.

called a 'revolt' in the bourgeois press. The stock exchange did not trouble to express regret at the murder of the President of Chile and several thousand others. The reaction was a sharp increase in the world price of copper registered in London and New York within a few hours of the revolt. The market does not deal in justification but in trade.

US monopolies, which in 1970 had subjected the lawful government of Popular Unity to an economic blockade, declared in the course of the first day following the anti-constitutional coup that they were prepared to deal with the junta, prepared to 'return'. They did not conceal the fact that the coup had not, to put it mildly, caught them unawares. Despite the serious deterioration in relations between the USA and Chile following the advent to power of the Allende government, despite the economic blockade organised by US monopolies, cooperation between the USA and Chile flourished in one area—military. The United States continued to train Chilean officers, and US allocations for this purpose remained at the same level. In 1973 the US Congress confirmed these at ten million dollars. The training of Chilean army, airforce and naval officers continued, and the US and Chilean fleets still held their annual joint manoeuvres. In 1973 these manoeuvres were to begin on September 11. Instead of manoeuvres there was a revolt.

On September 12, answering journalists pressing him to tell them whether the US government had had any advance knowledge of the coup being prepared in Chile, an official spokesman for the US State Department declared that over the previous month they had received many controversial reports from various sources that some form of military intervention would take place in Chile. Soon however, the journalists learned that high-ranking officials of the US government had received advance reports that a coup was being prepared in Chile, and that the last such report was handed into the US embassy in Santiago by a Chilean officer the day before the coup itself.

During the first press conference held in the State Department after the coup journalists naturally wanted to know whether the US government had informed the government of Salvador Allende about the possibility of a coup. They were informed that the official policy of the USA was not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. However, as one former White House official remarked, people sometimes forget that to do nothing is also a political act. Later it would become clear that the US government not only did not 'do nothing', but was the top-level organiser of the coup.

The staff at the Chilean embassy in Lima stared at me in amazement. Señor is surely not really planning to go there? Señor will

not be given a visa, that is obvious—*claro!* Moreover, even if Señor is given a visa and manages to get to Santiago, he (the speaker dropped his voice to a whisper) will not be able to send out any information.

The first group of foreign correspondents flew into Santiago on September 20, on the ninth day after the coup. The group included about thirty European and American journalists who had hurriedly flown to Buenos Aires the day after the coup, and had bombarded the junta for a week with telegrams requesting entry visas. A Boeing hired by the journalists was waiting at the Buenos Aires airport ready to take off at a moment's notice.

At last, nine days after the coup, the journalists received permission to enter Chile. It took them only a few minutes to get ready, for everything had been prepared in advance—paper, film, cheese, tins of food, whisky. Only an hour later the Boeing was winging its way across the Andes.

The journalists landed at a military airport at 4 o'clock in the morning and were told that they would have to wait four hours until the curfew ended. The guard around the airport had been tightened, but the military behaved correctly, and the journalists were not searched, though their luggage was given a cursory examination. They were then taken to the hotel Carrera, and were told that they could stay either here where the junta had set up what might be called its press centre, or at the hotel Crillón.

The press centre and all the junta's propaganda activity was run by Federico Willoughby, a tall, thin, abrupt man known to the foreign correspondents who were in Santiago at the time of the coup. Willoughby was one of the leaders of the 'Patria y Libertad' organisation, that is, a man of patently fascist views. As for his profession, the journalists knew only two of his previous positions: he had at one time been the head of the department dealing with press relations at the Chilean subsidiary of Ford Motor Co. and prior to that he had worked for the Chilean section of USIA—US Information Agency.

Immediately following the coup the junta had broken off all contact between the foreign journalists in Santiago and the outside world. Subsequently this contact was restored, but all information leaving Santiago had first to be censored. The correspondents could send their reports by telegraph, but not by telephone. The censors were military men and acted accordingly. If they saw the word 'revolution' they struck it out; if they saw 'murder of Allende' they also crossed it out. A few such crossings out, and the article ended up in the wastepaper basket. Soon these baskets were replaced by files on each correspondent in which were kept copies of all his reports, both those that passed censorship and those that did not. The journalists complained to Willoughby, but he only shrugged his shoulders and smiled: 'You expect too much, gentle-

men. We aren't politicians, only colonels and generals.' At last the correspondent of the US magazine *Time* managed to see General Pinochet and told him that the savage censorship was losing the junta the sympathy of even those journalists who had been hostile to the Allende government. Shortly afterwards the system of censorship was reorganised.

'That was what you wanted, gentlemen,' said Willoughby at the next meeting, 'and so we have ended pre-censorship and will adopt post-censorship. Each of you will give us a copy of the report he has dispatched—a signed copy, gentlemen. We will read it, draw the appropriate conclusions and take the appropriate measures, should that be necessary.'

'What measures, Señor Willoughby?' inquired one of the correspondents. 'Expulsion?'

'Not necessarily,' smiled Willoughby. 'He may stay—permanently.'

Someone laughed, but no one else followed suit. The journalists knew that Willoughby was capable of more than just joking.

Through Willoughby the junta kept a tight control over the journalists, deciding where they could go, what they could see, with whom they could talk, and what they could write.

Rumours about the brutal massacre at the National Stadium were circulating in Santiago. The journalists had heard them, but no one dared to report them. News about the massacre crossed the border with those who managed to leave the country. Following the publication in newspapers abroad of reports about the massacre at the stadium, Willoughby announced that a group of foreign correspondents would soon be allowed to visit the stadium 'to see for themselves that these stories of a massacre are nothing but slander'. The journalists were taken through the gates onto the football field. It was empty. The hundred journalists stood in the middle. In front of them, in the stands, were the prisoners. Not five or seven thousand, as the journalists had expected, but around five or six hundred. They were behind barbed wire, guarded by soldiers with machine guns pointed at the prisoners and at the journalists. A cinder track and half the football pitch lay between them.

The junta officers accompanying the journalists warned them to stay on the football field, not to cross the cinder track and not to talk with the prisoners. However, the journalists were not to be put off quite so easily. After a few minutes had passed they began to cross the cinder track, ignoring the shouts of the officers, and approached the soldiers who formed a chain along the barbed-wire fence. No one, however, risked approaching any closer. By now the journalists were only a few yards from the barbed wire and were able to take a close look at the prisoners—gloomy, thin, pale and some obviously weak. However, there were no signs of

beating, torture or blood.

'Where are the rest?' shouted one of the journalists.

The prisoners said nothing, but some of them pointed downwards to where they were standing. The journalists understood. The rest were under the stands.

Despite the orders they had been given, some of the journalists shouted more questions, but the prisoners were obviously afraid to answer. Someone threw them cigarettes and they rushed to pick them up.

The journalists were then taken back to the centre of the football field. Colonel Espinoza, the commandant in charge of the stadium or, more precisely, the concentration camp set up in the stadium, came out to meet them. He said that he would first read out a statement, and then answer any questions. He delivered a long speech, the main burden of which was that it was very pleasant to be a prisoner in the National Stadium.

Someone interrupted the Colonel to enquire about the rest of the prisoners. 'Some love the sun, others, the shade,' answered the Colonel calmly. 'One must assume that those who have remained under the stands prefer the shade.'

There was no time for any more questions. The colonel was still delivering his speech when an officer ran out onto the field signalling to Espinoza. The commandant broke off his monologue in mid-sentence, said 'That's all!' and ordered the journalists to leave the stadium. A few minutes later they were already being accompanied out of the gates. At that very moment some lorries drove up and soldiers began unloading people in handcuffs, some of them with their legs bound. The guards kicked them to their feet and pushed them towards the gates with their rifle butts. It was a new batch of prisoners. Obviously there had been a miscalculation. The journalists should already have left. A flash bulb went off—it was already dusk—and an officer rushed up, snatched the camera out of the photographer's hands, opened it with practised speed, exposed the film and only then handed it back.

At the beginning of October the junta decided to organise a visit by foreign journalists to the residence of the murdered President. Before being taken to Allende's residence on Tomás Moro, the journalists were shown the house of his private secretary. 'Here, señores, was the guerrilla school,' said the officer conducting the journalists around the building. 'Here, on Allende's instructions, the guerrilla detachments preparing the coup that was to have taken place on September 17 received their training. You know that they intended to eliminate all our generals and officers, destroy the army and trample underfoot our Chilean constitution and democracy.' The officer spoke energetically, confidently, almost with conviction. 'Thousands of Allende's men passed through this school. Here, for example, is a rope,' and he pointed to a piece of

cord that might easily have been part of a washing line. 'This is what they used to train in scaling walls.... And here is the room where they slept.'

'How many can this room hold?' asked one of the journalists.

'I don't know,' replied the officer.

'Not more than two or three, I should say,' said the journalist.

'Which means that the detachments were small,' rejoined the officer. 'Two or three men. For mobility. That way it would be easier to carry out Allende's plans.'

Next the journalists were taken to Allende's residence. The same officer provided the explanations. He had obviously been given the task of impressing the journalists with the 'luxury' that had surrounded the President. He did his best to fulfil his task, conducting the journalists around the ruins of what had been a comfortably and tastefully furnished but fairly modest house.

'Notice, señores,' rang out the sonorous voice of the officer, 'that Allende had two bathrooms!' A pause followed. 'Here is his wardrobe. In it there were more than ten costumes, gentlemen!' Another pause. 'Here is where the President listened to music! A President who called himself a Marxist listened to music in this special room in which he kept his tape recorder!' The officer seemed to be genuinely convinced that music and Marxism are incompatible. 'I will not even bother to tell you how many books he possessed!' the officer continued. 'A magnificent library such as many a wealthy man cannot boast!' In the former library the journalists did indeed see a large number of books. They lay in disordered heaps, trampled, torn, charred.

Quite by accident a Spanish correspondent found a book by François Mitterand, First Secretary of the French Socialist Party (now the President of France) lying under a fallen stone. The book contained the draft Government Programme of the Socialist Party. The soldiers had obviously overlooked the first page of this ill-fated book, and one could still read Mitterand's signature....

I wrote these lines in my room in the Maury Hotel. In front of me on the table, alongside sheets of paper covered with writing, lies the charred book from the ransacked library of the murdered President. I remember how a narrow band of sunlight fell onto the charred edges, and they seemed to burn with that colourless flame produced when the sunlight is concentrated in a magnifying glass. The charred edge of the book seemed to spell out a warning: don't touch, searingly hot—an open wound.

The last unforgettable photograph of Allende taken on the morning of September 11. He had come out onto the balcony and saw the tanks surrounding Constitution Square. He obviously realised that he could expect no help. Below the balcony there were a few dozen people in civilian clothes, probably those who had managed to reach the palace before the tanks cut off access to

the square in order to defend the President and, if necessary, fight alongside him. Possibly they shouted to him when he came out onto the balcony; perhaps they asked him what they should do, offered to help or told him to leave as quickly as possible or else he would be killed. He gave a brief smile in reply, shook his head and waved his hand. With this smile and wave of the hand he advised those standing below to leave, for they could do nothing to help him, and would only lose their own lives for nothing, and also told them that he himself could not and would not leave.

He waved his hand once more, went inside and closed the doors of the balcony for the last time.

Allende was not seeking a hero's death, nor yet did he intend to commit suicide. He simply believed that he must defend his country and its laws, which he had always zealously observed, seeking to carry through even socialist change within their bourgeois framework. The people had brought him to this palace, and it was his duty as President to stay there and to defend the palace, the presidency and the will of the people against treachery. This was his duty and his alone—his duty as he, Allende, understood it.

One of those who saw Allende's body said that the palms of his hands were black with gunpowder. He fought against the traitors up to the moment of his death.

Often people ask whether Allende really did not expect the coup, did not suspect the treachery of his generals. I talked with many people who had fled from Chile. From what they said I came to the conclusion that he had foreseen the possibility of a coup, but could not bring himself to believe that among those who surrounded him there were such base traitors. General Pinochet himself had telephoned him at 2 a.m. on September 11 and assured him that everything was in order and that the President had nothing to worry about. Allende was himself too decent a man to believe that others could descend so low.

The President had already become a legend. No doubt many articles and reports will be written giving a detailed account of each moment of that fateful day, of the calculated and brutal crime committed against the lawful government of Chile. However, this crime was only part of one far greater in its proportions. The generals' plot was merely the last and decisive factor in a much wider, and more far-reaching conspiracy preceding the events of September 11.

Let us therefore return to the events that occurred before the coup.

'The coup in Chile was inevitable as a result of the economic chaos created by the government of Salvador Allende.' Such is the majority verdict of bourgeois correspondents writing about the counter-revolutionary revolt in Chile. I do not know whether any external elements directly participated in the coup, but they were

actively involved in creating the economic crisis that preceded it. It was the work of international imperialism, with US monopolies playing the major role.

We are told that the 'tough' economic policy adopted by the USA towards Chile was put into action only after the government of Salvador Allende had refused to pay compensation to US copper-mining multinationals whose subsidiaries in Chile had been nationalised. This is a lie: the economic aggression against Chile by the US monopolies began as soon as Allende came to power in 1970, before the question of compensation for expropriated US property had been decided (the Chilean Congress voted unanimously in favour of expropriation only in July 1971). As early as the middle of 1970 the Import-Export Bank of the USA refused a request by Chile for credit of 21 million dollars to finance the purchase of three passenger planes by the Chilean government airline. In August 1971 the US Export-Import Bank informed Chile that no more loans would be granted, and that the bank would no longer guarantee the loans to US commercial banks and exporters trading in Chile. The bank also suspended direct loans agreed upon under the preceding Frei government.*

In 1970 the Inter-American Development Bank suspended examination of a request by Chile for a loan of 30 million dollars to build a petrochemical complex. In 1971 this bank stopped all loans to Chile. Similar action was taken by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in which US monopolies hold a predominant position. From 1972 onwards private banks followed the example of the international loan organisations. The US monopolies justified their action by declaring that it had become too risky to loan money to Chile since Allende had come to power.

The Chilean armed forces, however, continued to receive American money, the flow of which was uninterrupted. In 1971 the Chilean generals received credit to the value of 5 million dollars to purchase C-130 transport planes, and in December 1972, they received extra credit to the value of 10 million dollars 'for military needs'.

A week before the coup, Washington rejected a request by Santiago for credit to purchase 300,000 tonnes of US wheat. A week after the coup, the USA offered the junta credit to the value of 24 million dollars 'for humanitarian reasons'.... In March 1972, when visiting the Tierra del Fuego, I was shown empty shelves in the warehouses used to stock spares for the oil industry. More and more shelves emptied with each passing day, and more and more machinery ground to a halt. Meanwhile the spare parts purchased and paid for by the government of Chile lay in sealed

* Eduardo Frei—head of the Chilean government from 1964 to 1970.

storehouses in New York and, in defiance of all laws on trade and commerce, were not delivered.

Spare parts could have been purchased elsewhere, but this required currency. In Chile, copper is currency. However, the US copper monopolies had artificially depressed the international price of copper from 70 cents a pound to 40 cents a pound in order to stifle the Chilean economy, for every cent more or less for a pound of copper means 5 million dollars profit or loss for the Chilean economy. (Following the coup, the price of copper rose to 90 cents a pound.)

However, all this is already known. What we are discussing here is the politico-economic sabotage of the government of Popular Unity in the months preceding the coup. Let me now turn to some of the evidence I obtained or learned about in Lima.

THE TESTIMONY OF THE WELL-KNOWN PERUVIAN JOURNALIST FRANCISCO MONCLOA (in a conversation with me in Lima on September 22, 1973).

'One doesn't have to be 007 to work out who was financing the strikes that preceded the coup. One only needs to analyse the market. By this I mean the black market. In Santiago, the black market was trading in dollars. Up to three-four months before the coup, the black market price for the dollar was ten times more than the official rate of exchange. However, when the transport workers' strike began, the black market rate of exchange for the dollar fell sharply. Why? Did this indicate a stabilisation in the price of the Chilean escudo as a result of the instability of the dollar on the world market? Or had the Chilean economy improved as a result of the crippling transport workers' strike? No. The answer is far simpler. Dollars were pouring into the country to finance the strike, and therefore the demand for dollars fell.

'Sometimes, as you see, evidence of a crime can come from a most unexpected quarter.

'Here is another interesting fact. You are aware that the Chilean fascist organisation "Patria y Libertad" had been sabotaging the Allende government for quite some time. However, more often than not these acts of sabotage were organised on an amateur basis, so to speak. Attempts are made to blow up an electricity pylon, but the attempts fail; a telegraph pole is sawn in two, but as it falls it crushes one of the saboteurs; a factory wall is dynamited, but three of the five engaged in the operation are wounded, and so on. They were fascists, but were not sufficiently "professional" in their sabotage activities. Then, about a month before the coup, they started to organise a series of sabotage attacks, each of which was technically perfect. What had caused this sudden improvement in "professional skill"?

'I do not think it is very difficult to answer this question, and therefore I do not have to dot the i's myself....'

The testimony of a prominent Chilean trade-union leader whose name, for obvious reasons, I am not in a position to give (in a conversation with me in Lima, on September 21, 1973):

'1972/73 was a good year for agriculture and we harvested 1,200,000 tonnes of wheat as planned. In order to help the peasants, the government raised the price of wheat to 500 escudos a centner (100 kg), which was about 60 per cent higher than the price previously offered by private purchasers. The peasants were extremely happy. Then, when the purchasing season began [the Chilean autumn—March, April, May—G.B.], private purchasers appeared who offered the peasants up to 1,000 escudos a centner. We started to investigate these people, and discovered that they could not possibly have such resources. They were being financed by a third party in order to buy up the wheat and then destroy it—tossing it into the sea, setting fire to it, poisoning or hiding it....'

No foreign Marines were to be seen on the streets of Santiago or other Chilean cities on September 11, 1973. There were no foreign soldiers—Marines or ordinary infantry—in Chile on the day of the coup, nor, as far as is known, during the days that followed. (In Buenos Aires I was told of a group of fairly young Americans who had flown in from the USA, refuelled and left for Santiago. This was some time after September 20 and, according to their documents, these young people were specialists in some strictly non-military field. However, even if they were soldiers, the coup had taken place without their participation). No special troops arrived in Chile on September 11 by land, sea or air, as happened in Guatemala in 1954, or in Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, or in the Dominican Republic in 1965. However, imperialist intervention in Chilean internal affairs was no less decisive, and the results no less tragic for the Chilean people.

The Argentinian embassy in Peru gave me an entry visa for Argentina and I flew to Buenos Aires, and from there to Mendoza, a town on the border with Chile. Here I was able to gather considerably more information about events in Chile than I had in Peru. Here, it seemed, one could hear the reverberations of the tragic events taking place in Santiago.

Every morning in every city in Latin America young boys sell newspapers. They do not shout out the headlines, for they are illiterate. They simply cry 'Newspapers! Newspapers!' The headlines shout for themselves. Every morning I bought newspapers and searched for news about events in Chile. Shortly before midday local Argentinian newspapers started to appear in the kiosks, and

here, too, I looked for any news about Chile. After midday the newspaper stands carried the heavy editions of *The New York Times* and *The Wall Street Journal*, both two days old, and *The Miami Herald* from the previous day. I also bought these to read in my hotel. However, with each passing day, news about Santiago grew less and less. The more 'respectable' the newspaper, be it in Buenos Aires, Miami or New York, the less information it carried about events in Chile. The flow of information was drying up. The foreign correspondents, only recently prepared to storm across the Chilean border in order to get to Santiago, were on their way home. Only a short while ago they had hired aeroplanes standing ready at airports nearest to Chile; each piece of information sent out from Chile had been worth its weight in gold and had been printed on the front page. Now the newspapers and television companies were beginning to recall their reporters. The coup is over, the President dead, the presidential palace lies in ruins. Everything has been described and photographed. The 'sensation' is over.

There is nothing more dangerous or terrifying than fascism, fascism devoid of sensation, everyday fascism. There is no greater tragedy than that of 'becoming used to' fascism, even if that fascism is a long way away, somewhere between the Magellan Straits and the Atacama desert.

Therefore we must not allow the editors of 'respectable' newspapers to inure their readers to fascism, even if that fascism is a long way away, say, in Chile.

Therefore we must not allow ourselves to become used to murder, even if it is committed by people a long way away, for example, in Chile. We must not become accustomed to fascism, even if it is on the other side of the world and does not yet affect our own lives and those of our children. We must not allow fascism to become a commonplace, ever!

* * *

Three years after my trip to Peru and Argentina, I went to the USA as a special correspondent. By that time the direct participation of the CIA and the powerful US monopolies in the organisation of the coup in Santiago on September 11, 1973, had been proved and confirmed, and had become yet another entry on the list of imperialist crimes. I arrived in America in September 1976 in order to write about the Americans, but my first report sent back to Moscow contained a reference to Chile. On the very day that I arrived in Washington, the remarkable Chilean Orlando Letelier was murdered.

Prior to the fascist coup in Chile, Letelier was Minister of De-

fence in the Allende government, and before that he had served as the Popular Unity Government's ambassador to the USA and Minister of Foreign Affairs. On the day of the coup he was arrested by the junta and taken, along with thousands of Chilean patriots, to a concentration camp, first on the island of Dozón, and then in Ritoque. After detaining him for a year, during which he was subjected to torture, the junta finally gave way to international pressure, released him and expelled him from the country. First Letelier went to Venezuela, and then, shortly afterwards, he left for the United States and settled in Washington, where he became a lecturer in economics at the Transnational Institute.

I met Letelier at sessions of the International Commission set up to investigate the crimes committed by the Chilean military junta, and was impressed by his mildness of speech and strength of conviction. He had the shy smile of a youth and the eyes of a sage. Aged 45, he was then in his prime, and was devoting all his energies to the cause of liberating his homeland from fascist rule. He was aware that this struggle was fraught with danger, and that DINA agents were on his track. While still in Venezuela he had told a *New York Times* reporter that the junta would certainly attempt to kill him, but he had nonetheless continued the fight. An internationally-renowned economist and expert on financial affairs, he was attempting to use his influence to end financial aid to the junta by at least some of the US monopolies.

In March 1976, a bomb went off near the house where he lived in the suburbs of Washington; he had been 'warned'. Letelier continued his fight.

At the beginning of September, the Chilean fascists deprived Letelier of his citizenship (as if citizenship was something over which fascists have control). A brilliant public speaker, he responded to this move by the junta with a magnificent speech delivered in Madison Square Garden in New York. 'I was born a Chilean, I am a Chilean, and I will die a Chilean. They, the fascists, were born traitors, live as traitors, and will be remembered forever as fascist traitors.'

This speech was made on September 10. On September 21 Letelier was killed by a remote-control bomb in his car. A colleague from the institute where he worked was also killed and her husband was seriously injured. New names had been added to the list of thousands of Chileans persecuted, executed, tortured to death or gunned down.

The terrorism of the Chilean junta had long since crossed the borders of Chile. In 1973 General Prats and his wife were killed in Buenos Aires by machine-gun shots fired from a passing car. In Rome an attempt was made on the life of the Vice-President of the Chilean Christian Democratic Party, Bernardo Leighton. Now an assassination had taken place in the very centre of Washington, the

capital of a country that bore a great deal of the responsibility for the preparation and execution of the fascist coup in Chile, and which was giving its support to the inhuman Pinochet regime. Reactionary forces in the USA were responsible for this murder committed by DINA agents who, it would appear, felt free to act in the US capital.

The assassination of Letelier provoked indignation among many Americans. However, shortly after the assassination *Newsweek* reported: 'After studying FBI and other field investigations, the CIA has concluded that the Chilean secret police were not involved in the death of Orlando Letelier, the former Chilean Foreign Minister who died in a bomb blast in Washington, D.C., a fortnight ago. The agency reached its decision *because the bomb was too crude to be the work of experts and because the murder, coming while Chile's rulers were wooing U.S. support, could only damage the Santiago regime*' (My italics—G.B.).

Every word in this 'explanation' offends basic common sense. This was precisely the 'proof of innocence' advanced by the junta itself immediately after the murder (and then echoed by *The New York Times*). Was it necessary to conduct an investigation merely to affix the stamp of the CIA to the words of Pinochet? Is it not perfectly obvious that 'experts' can make a 'crude' bomb precisely in order to divert suspicion away from themselves, and that a murder can be deliberately committed at an 'inconvenient time' so that the murderer can then argue, 'Surely you don't think I am such an idiot as to murder Letelier at *such* a moment right in the centre of Washington and not far from the residence of the Chilean ambassador?'

One does not need to be an expert from the CIA to unravel this simple example of the rule of contraries. Letelier, who had managed to persuade the Dutch government to cancel its loan of 63 million dollars to the junta; Letelier, who had used his connections in London to achieve a reduction in aid to Chile from Britain; Letelier, who had used his moral authority to achieve cuts, albeit only slight, in US support for the fascist junta; Letelier, this active, energetic, honest, courageous patriot and anti-fascist, was, of course, far more dangerous for the junta than any bomb, crude or sophisticated, which might put an end to his life. A hundred times more dangerous.

Then there is the fact that he was deprived of Chilean citizenship by a decree signed by General Pinochet on September 10, eleven days before the murder.

Then there are the threatening telephone calls to his house (which, by an ironic twist of fate, had previously belonged to a CIA employee and which was next door to the house of a high-ranking official of the FBI). 'Are you the wife of Orlando Letelier?' 'Yes'. 'No, you are not his wife, you are his widow!'

Then there is the arrival in Washington on August 25 of several DINA agents travelling on a Lufthansa flight from Santiago.

Then there is the letter which Letelier received in the middle of that summer from a friend in Chile who had access to government circles and who wrote to warn him that in Santiago 'the question of your assassination is being discussed at the highest level'.

Surely these are all links in the same lethal chain? Surely *this* alone is sufficient for even inexperienced people to realise that the 'conclusion' arrived at by the CIA flies in the face of the evidence? But could the conclusion have been other than it was? What other result could come out of such an 'investigation'? The CIA versus DINA is in effect the same as the CIA versus the CIA. The political equivalence of these two acronyms has been shown more than once, and the CIA conclusion that the Chilean secret police 'were not involved' in the Letelier murder is yet another illustration of this fact. It was crude work, but the work of experts, as was the murder itself.

* * *

In January, 1979, the murderers of Orlando Letelier and his secretary, Ronnie Moffit (who died when a bomb placed in their car by Michael Townley, a CIA agent who had also become a DINA agent, exploded), went on trial at the federal court in Washington.

The lawyer asked the witness (for Townley appeared as a witness, not as a defendant), whether he regretted having murdered Orlando Letelier.

'Not at all, Sir!' answered the 36 year-old American. The combination 'US agent of DINA' may at first appear unusual, but only at first. In fact, the CIA and the DINA have been intimately connected for so long that it is not always easy to determine the origin of any particular agent-assassin. This is the case with Michael Townley. Townley was born in the small town of Waterloo, Iowa, and is 'an all-American boy'. When his father was appointed to the position of head of the Chilean subsidiary of the Ford Motors Co. the family went to live in Chile and Michael Townley was recruited into the CIA. He was given an important task—selecting young people from rich bourgeois families and organising 'a firework display of violence'—explosions, acts of terrorism, gunfire from an unknown source, etc. The CIA had taught him how to construct sophisticated radio-bombs and other explosive devices from material that could be bought in shops. It was necessary to create chaos in Chile, and Townley was one of those who helped create this chaos, which the bourgeois press then blamed on the government of Popular Unity. His 'work' was not unlike that of Graham Greene's hero, the 'quiet American', except that Townley

was far from 'quiet'. He was responsible for quite a number of 'exploits'. In 1972 he placed a bomb in the television broadcasting station of Channel 7 Santiago. In 1973, during the famous lorry owners' strike organised by the CIA, his commandos threw home-made bombs in buses whose drivers did not want to join the strike. However, his greatest achievement, from the point of view of the CIA, was that he became the CIA representative in the fascist organisation 'Patria y Libertad' and exercised considerable control over its activities. It was in this capacity that he organised, on the instructions of the CIA, an attack by his fascist thugs on the telecommunications centre in Concepción in 1973, during which he killed a guard. Wanted for murder, he fled—naturally—to the United States. (In Miami with the help of the CIA, he strengthened contacts between Chilean fascists and Cuban counter-revolutionary emigrants). Shortly afterwards the fascist coup took place in Chile, also organised by the CIA, and Townley returned to Santiago as a conqueror. Together with his wife he became an agent of the DINA, the Pinochet gestapo, while still remaining an agent of the CIA.

However, now the CIA appeared to be merely on the sidelines, and Townley was nothing more than a witness who, for his part in the murder, received three years in a privileged jail, a sentence which seems to mock the memory of Orlando Letelier and General Prats, the American secretary Ronnie Moffit and many others who fell victim to this terrorist.

The so-called 'trial' of the murderers of Letelier, yet another victim of the terror organised by the Pinochet secret police and the CIA, was the usual farce. Pinochet, naturally, did not hand over the offenders. Nor did the CIA intend to punish them, or its own agents who had undoubtedly taken part in the organisation of the murder of Salvador Allende's comrade-in-arms, Chilean patriot Orlando Letelier. Everything went according to the same old hackneyed script that is by now so familiar to all. However, this script is still used by the CIA as propaganda cover when it proceeds to its next act of terror.



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I WAS AN AGENT OF THE CIA

A Documented Reconstruction of the Trial of the Bolivian Minister of Internal Affairs, Antonio Arguedas.

From the Author.

It would be no exaggeration to say that the CIA is behind every imperialist event that takes place in the countries of Latin America. This secret organisation stops at nothing in its attempts to chain down the peoples of Latin America, using not only its own agents, but also a wide range of Latin American sources ranging from corrupt ministers and insolent journalists to power-hungry generals. It is events in Latin America that have served as the most vivid illustration of the criminal activities of the CIA. The Italian magazine *L'Europeo*, referring to information obtained from former CIA agents, wrote that the CIA had been involved in many tragic events across the world, leaving a clear trail from Guatemala to the Bay of Pigs, and from Chile to Asia.

However, the route that led from Guatemala and the overthrow of the legal government of Jacobo Arbenz in the mid-fifties to the armed intervention at the Bay of Pigs was strewn not only with roses, but also with thorns. The CIA-organised landing at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961 ended in total disaster. At Playa Girón the Cuban people showed that the intrigues of the CIA are powerless when confronted with the will of a people ready to defend its revolutionary gains. After the defeat at Playa Girón President John Kennedy threatened to 'tear the CIA to pieces'. However, this

hasty threat was a condemnation not of the intervention, but of its failure, and proved to be so many empty words. The assassination of Kennedy himself revealed that the CIA was willing to sacrifice the life of a US President rather than lose any of its privileges.

In the years that followed, the CIA brought about the overthrow of the governments of Bolivia and the Dominican Republic, of Uruguay and Chile, all unacceptable to imperialism, and each time the consequences proved tragic for the peoples of these countries. Nonetheless, the tragedy of Latin America must inevitably have an optimistic finale, for oppression cannot continue forever. Clear evidence of this is the increasing struggle being waged by the people of Latin America, from the Rio Grande to the Tierra del Fuego, against imperialism and reaction and in support of human dignity and social progress.

Victory, however, is always won at great cost, and any progressive social change requires considerable vigilance on the part of the people, as is shown by the whole history of the war waged by the CIA against the peoples of Latin America. The past and present history of Latin America has confirmed that the CIA is an extremely dangerous weapon of imperialism.

The subversive activity of the CIA represents the inner sanctum of imperialism, but sometimes the veil of secrecy is lifted and the world shudders involuntarily at the hypocrisy of those who claim the role of universal judge and who strive to present themselves as 'defenders of human rights' and 'opponents of international terrorism'. In this article we will describe how just one of the most treasured secrets of the CIA bosses, their masters and their Latin American henchmen was brought to light—but even a drop of water mirrors the ocean.

DRAMATIS PERSONAE

Ernesto Che Guevara

Antonio Arguedas

Executioners: Colonel Joaquín Zenteno, Federico Arana, Lieutenant-Colonel Andrés Selich, Captain Harry Prado and others.

CIA agents: Felix Ramos, Eduardo González, Gabriel García, Major Ralph Shelton ('Pappy'), Colonel Edward Fox, William Culeghan, Hugo Murray, Larry Sternfield, Nicolás Leondiris and others.

Presidents of Bolivia: Generals René Barrientos, Alfredo Ovando, Juan José Torres, Hugo Banzer and others.

IN LIEU OF A PROLOGUE

On October 8, 1967, a guerrilla detachment led by the famous Latin American revolutionary Che Guevara, who had played a prominent role in the Cuban revolution, was destroyed in the El Juro canyon in south-east Bolivia. The following day the wounded Guevara was murdered in the village school at Higuera.

Eight months later the *Diary of Che in Bolivia* was published in Havana, and subsequently in other countries, including the USSR. This moving historical and personal document is the last written testimony left by Guevara and contains an account of his eleven months as a guerrilla fighter. The first entry in his field diary, dated November 7, 1966, is optimistic in tone: 'Today a new stage begins. During the night we arrived at the ranch. The journey was fairly uneventful.' The last entry was made on the eve of the capture of 'Major Ramón', the name Guevara used in Bolivia. His small and exhausted detachment was vainly struggling to break out of the net that was closing in around it. The entry reads: 'At five o'clock we set out. There was very little moonlight and the march was extremely tiring. We left a lot of tracks as we crossed the canyon.... At two o'clock we decided to stop for a rest, but then decided it was pointless to continue.'

The period between these two dates was filled with dramatic events that are reflected in the notebook with its German calendar. Day after day the pages filled with Che's compact handwriting. The author is businesslike, brief and to the point. Sometimes the entry is simply 'no news'. Major Ramón is busy not with compiling a historical record but with his detachment wearied by unequal battles. Sometimes Che's entries reveal irony, but more often they reveal his mercilessness towards himself and his subordinates. Among those who followed him there were adventurers from the lumpenproletariat and undisguised cowards, faint-hearted deserters and outright traitors. All around he faced unfamiliar territory, a downtrodden and impassive peasantry and an enemy close on his heels.

The diary reflects Che's pain at the tragedy of the situation, yet its pages also communicate something more, perhaps the most important, namely the indomitable spirit of Ernesto Che Guevara, his revolutionary integrity and his heroism. He was one of that iron group of warriors without whom humanity would be spiritually and morally the poorer.

More than nine months had passed since the death of Che Guevara when a short, thick-set man of about 40, who identified himself as the Bolivian Minister of Internal Affairs, Antonio Arguedas, crossed the Bolivian border near the Chilean town of Iquique. He admitted that he was an agent of the CIA, and that it was he who, having decided to break once and for all with the 'evil band that

was plotting against humanity', had sent a copy of Che Guevara's diary to Havana. After a brief sojourn abroad (in Santiago, London, New York and Lima), Antonio Arguedas decided to return to Bolivia and face trial. As he was a former minister, only the National Congress had the authority to try him but, having returned to Bolivia, he appeared before the Supreme Military Tribunal. He considered, quite correctly, that the bloody vengeance of the CIA was less likely to reach him in the courtroom than in political emigration.

The whole trial centred on two vital questions: why and how had Arguedas made public Che Guevara's diary, thought to be safely under lock and key? However, the 'Arguedas affair' did not end with the answer to these questions; it went on to reveal the extent of CIA subversive activity in Bolivia and to provide the material proof that imperialism is the worst enemy of the peoples of Latin America.

The fury with which the CIA and the Bolivian authorities attacked Arguedas has its own logic and explanation. For one thing, the ex-Minister of Internal Affairs turned out to be the 'black sheep' of the high-ranking herd, had made its secrets public, disregarded the principle of herd loyalty and thereby set a precedent that threatened the CIA. Secondly, Antonio Arguedas had completely spoiled the game for those who were hoping not simply to hide the Guevara's diary but to distort it. The authors of the falsified version were pursuing a triple aim: to create a pretext for accusing socialist Cuba of 'subversive activity' and starting off a new wave of anti-Cuban hysteria; to justify the savage repression of the revolutionary movement and particularly the Communists in Bolivia; to distort the image of Ernesto Che Guevara in order to discredit communism. Wittingly or unwittingly Antonio Arguedas had foiled this malicious plan.

The sensational trial of the Bolivian ex-Minister of Internal Affairs and ex-CIA agent made news around the world. The trial was conducted behind closed doors, and the contradictory reports of the journalists were full of every kind of conjecture. The truth about the 'Arguedas affair' could only be discovered from the court records themselves.

Not long ago a photocopy of all the documents pertaining to the 'Arguedas affair' came into the possession of a Bolivian journalist. Comprising around two hundred and fifty pages in all, these photocopies contain four statements made by Arguedas himself, twenty statements made by witnesses and other material. There is absolutely no reason to doubt the authenticity of these documents.

Both the statements by the witnesses and the statements by Arguedas himself reveal that the CIA had penetrated into the political life, armed forces and repressive organs of the countries of Latin America. Fear that the extent of CIA activity would be dis-

covered and the desire to deny links with Washington on the eve of the inevitable collapse of the then Bolivian government determined the manner in which the military tribunal formulated its questions.

Let us now turn to the file of the 'Arguedas affair'.

The Republic of Bolivia Supreme Military Tribunal

Case: criminal proceedings against retired Captain Antonio Arguedas Mendieta.

Charge: various criminal activities.

From an order issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Bolivian Armed Forces, General Alfredo Ovando, on July 12, 1968.

'With the approval of the President of the Republic, I appoint an official investigator to determine and elucidate possible neglect of duty and criminal offences with respect to the seizure, use and safekeeping of documents relating to the anti-guerrilla actions taken in the south-east of the country in 1967.'

Next follows the swearing in of the members of the Military Tribunal.

From the testimony given by the commander of the 8th army division, Colonel Joaquín Zenteno.

Question. Where were you on the day that Che Guevara was captured, and what measures did you take?

Answer. On October 8, having been informed of a skirmish with the guerrillas, of losses, and of the fact that Che Guevara and others had been captured in the El Juro canyon, I sent a helicopter to the canyon at 15 hours. Lieutenant-Colonel Andrés Selich accompanied the pilot in order to clarify the situation. On October 9, at 6.30, I arrived at the airfield at Valle Grande in order to fly to the Igera region, and thence to El Juro to take part in the military operation. At that moment Captain Felix Ramos asked if he might accompany me as, so he informed me, he knew Che Guevara personally, which might help in his identification and any possible interrogation.

Author's comments. CIA agent Felix Ramos took part in the US intervention at Playa Girón and the Vietnam war. He had indeed met Che Guevara, and a clear picture of the revolutionary had imprinted itself of the retentive memory of this professional killer. According to the evidence given by Lieutenant Mario Huerta, head of the intelligence section of a ranger battalion, 'Captain Ramos and Colonel Zenteno interrogated Che Guevara. Later Captain Ramos was left alone with Che Guevara in order to force him to speak...' When the body of Che, transported by plane to Valle Grande, was shown to journalists, the explanation in English was

given by a balding young man. This escort accompanying the body of Che was Felix Ramos. He it was who first photographed Che's diary and sent it to the USA. According to Michèle Ray, a correspondent of the French magazine *Paris-Match*, CIA agent Ramos was last seen on October 12, 1967, in one of the hotels in La Paz, where he was registered as a businessman.

Felix Ramos is one of the many 'quiet Americans' who operated in Bolivia. In their famous book *The CIA and Cult of Intelligence*, former CIA agents Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks noted that the CIA was actually involved in suppressing the rebel movement in Bolivia and in the seizure of its leader, Ernesto Che Guevara.

Some agency special operations personnel were sent to the landlocked South American country to assist local forces in dealing with the rebel movement. They wrote: 'A team of experts from the Army's Special Forces was sent to La Paz from the Panama Canal Zone to train Bolivian "rangers"* in the art of counter-insurgency operations.'

The rear base for CIA activity in Bolivia was the Panama Canal Zone, where the Southcom or Southern group of the US Forces Command was stationed. Its commander-in-chief, General Robert Porter, met the top commanders of the Bolivian army in the presidential palace four months after Che Guevara first appeared in Bolivia, and informed them of US willingness to render every assistance in punitive action. Curiously, exactly two days later the first reports about the guerrilla detachment active in Bolivia appeared in the foreign press. A few days afterwards the headlines announced 'Che in Bolivia'.

Three weeks after the visit by General Porter, the first contingent of Vietnam-seasoned killers known as the Green Berets arrived in Bolivia from Panama. Weapons, ammunition and helicopters were also dispatched, and an 'air bridge' was created linking Panama with the Province of Santa Cruz, where Che was operating. The punitive action in Bolivia was code-named 'Operation Cynthia'.

The Green Berets undertook the crash training of two Bolivian ranger battalions. The head of this operation was the CIA chief in Bolivia, Major Ralph Shelton, known as 'Pappy'. He had fought as a sergeant in Korea, taken part in the US intervention in the Dominican Republic, and also in secret operations in Vietnam and Laos. 'Pappy' Shelton was the author of the following statistical aphorism: 'The murder of one Vietnamese cost 400,000 dollars. In Bolivia it is considerably cheaper.' He acquainted the Bolivian military with 'the effect of napalm', and shortly thereafter the Bolivian Air Force Commander publicly announced that napalm was

* Rangers—sabotage and anti-guerrilla units organised and trained in a number of Latin American countries by officers from the US Armed Forces.

being used 'with a view to achieving the same excellent results as were achieved by the US Air Force in Vietnam'. The Pentagon and the CIA attempted to cover up their presence in Bolivia. On the day after the murder of Che, General Robert Porter attempted to deny reports that 3,000 men of the US Special Forces had been sent to Bolivia. According to Porter, the total number of Americans sent to Bolivia was sixteen.

Question. Tell us what you know about the documents taken from those wounded or killed in the battle in El Juro canyon, and in particular about the diary of Guevara.

Answer. When I arrived in Higuera I learned from the reports of the officers of the 2nd ranger battalion that there were five wounded guerrillas and also confiscated kitbags, documents and other materials at the house of the local telegraph operator, Hidalgo. As the battle in El Juro canyon was still in progress, I decided to go there immediately without waiting to examine the confiscated material.... When I returned to Higuera, I saw Captain Felix Ramos in the yard in front of Hidalgo's house. He had been photographing a red notebook which later turned out to be Che Guevara's diary. Lieutenant-Colonel Selich was also present. Afterwards I went to the schoolhouse to look at the bodies of the dead guerrillas, among which was the body of Che Guevara.... I took Guevara's diary and carbine and returned by helicopter to Valle Grande. There I handed the diary over to the Commander-in-Chief of the Republic's Armed Forces.... Later I learned that representatives from the American embassy had sent photocopies of Che's diary to the President of the Republic, to the Commander-in-Chief and to myself. However, my copy was seized by the Armed Forces Command and therefore I did not receive a copy of Guevara's diary.

Question. On whose orders and for what purposes did Captain Ramos photograph the above-mentioned diary?

Answer. No such order was given, and Ramos photographed the diary of his own accord, as he had done before. Ramos and Captain Eduardo González had access to material related to our investigations.... On the basis of a high-level agreement reached through William Culeghan (head of CIA operations in Bolivia), Ramos and Eduardo González had already taken part in intelligence work. I was given personal instructions on this matter by the President of the Republic and the Deputy Minister of National Defence. Ramos and González were given the identity papers of captains in the Bolivian army.

Author's comment. Eduardo González, 'Captain in the Bolivian army' and, in reality, an agent of the CIA, is one of the most sinister figures in this drama, a pitiless executioner and an experienced agent provocateur. It was he who interrogated captured guerrillas from Che's detachment, sometimes trying to force them to confess

and at other times pretending to be on their side. During the interrogation, 'Doctor' González posed as a doctor from Panama with left-wing views, and showed the prisoners false documents testifying to his sympathy for the guerrillas. Among those who fought in Che's detachment was Jorge Vázquez, a Bolivian student and the son of the well-known historian Humberto Vázquez Machicado. When he was captured, the interrogators failed to get any information from him and he spat in the face of one of them. Then the radio broadcast a 'protest' by a 'progressive journalist' who had been refused permission to see the captured guerrilla. This 'progressive journalist' was González. He was allowed to speak to the young and trustful Jorge, presented himself as a 'contact from the guerrilla centre' and got all the necessary information. The victim of this provocation was killed 'while trying to escape'—a phrase used by executioners from time immemorial.

Eduardo González, special agent of the CIA, was the first to discover that Che was in Bolivia.

The court seemed to have specially selected Colonel Joaquín Zenteno as its first witness. He was the commander of a crack Bolivian division that formed the core of the forces sent to combat the guerrillas, and he was directly responsible for the murder of Che. As he had been wounded in the leg, Che could not legally be executed, such an exceptional measure not being provided for in the Bolivian constitution. On the other hand, imperialism feared to put Che on trial, as the defendant would then become the prosecutor. Imperialism was also afraid of the international campaign of solidarity with this outstanding revolutionary. The problem was solved by bullets fired from an American M-2 automatic rifle by Mario Terán, a non-commissioned officer, on the orders of Colonel Zenteno. Colonel Zenteno, who was the first to confirm that Che was dead, tried to remove any evidence of his bloody crime. At first he declared that Che had been killed during the battle, fatally wounded in the lung and the groin. A month later, in a conversation with a correspondent from the Argentinian newspaper *Clarín*, he declared that "Señor Guevara had no doubt died during transportation". He also mentioned en passant that he had been the first to examine Che's diary.

Colonel Zenteno continued to lie when he was rewarded by being promoted to the rank of general and appointed head of the military office of the then Bolivian President. However, in a moment of frankness he revealed that the government had close links with the CIA and, in particular, that two months before Che's death, William Culeghan, CIA 'coordinator', had put at his disposal as divisional commander the two CIA agents, Ramos and González. Moreover, their letters of recommendation were written by the Bolivian President himself. The talkative general was obviously reprimanded, and denied what he had said, calling a press conference at

which the embarrassment was put down to 'a phonetic error'; it seems he had been referring not to the CIA but to Bolivian military intelligence having a similar sounding acronym.

In 1971 General Joaquín Zenteno was one of the organisers of the right-wing putsch that overthrew the progressive government of Juan José Torres. On Zenteno's orders the university building was subjected to heavy fire. On becoming the Commander-in-Chief of the Bolivian Armed Forces, Zenteno was in charge of the savage reprisals meted out to all those who did not agree with the regime. His name became so discredited that it was decided to send him away, and he was appointed ambassador to France.

There is one more dark page in the biography of Joaquín Zenteno—his fervid defence of nazi war criminals and in particular of the former head of the Gestapo in Lyons, Klaus Barbier. The executioner of Lyons prospered in Bolivia for 25 years. Then France condemned him to death in absentia for mass murder, arson and theft and demanded his extradition. The judicial farce lasted for three years before finally, in 1974, the Supreme Court of Bolivia, whose decisions 'are not subject to appeal', legalised the carefree existence of the executioner. And the basis for such a decision? There was no agreement between Bolivia and France on the extradition of criminals, and the Bolivian criminal code had no clause dealing with 'crimes against humanity'. Barbier became a businessman, and also helped the local secret police. In a conversation with a French journalist whose father was killed on the orders of Barbier, the executioner of Lyons declared defiantly: 'We were the forerunners of the struggle against Bolshevism. Look at the situation now! If the Americans had not forced us to lose the war, this would never have happened.' The shameful role of defender of Klaus Barbier was assumed primarily by the Bolivian Ambassador to France, Joaquín Zenteno.*

From the testimony given by the commander of anti-guerrilla unit No. 3, Colonel Andrés Selich.

Question. On whose command were the diary of Che Guevara and other documents handed over to agents of the CIA?

Answer. This question is extremely important, and I would like to reply at length. As usual, all the documents first passed through the hands of CIA agent Gabriel García. For example, when papers (then follows a list of the names of guerrilla fighters killed in action —K.K.) came into our possession, they were handed over to Gabriel García and were photographed in full in Valle Grande by Captain Felix Ramos, who is also a CIA agent and a member of the intelligence section of the 8th division. As far as I am aware, all

* The military-and-police regime was overthrown in 1982, and the new government led by Presidente Suazo put the country onto the path of democratic rejuvenation, in which Communists have also been actively involved.

the negatives were developed in the United States.... As for the documents seized when Guevara was captured, I can say the following. On October 9, at 6.15 a helicopter carrying Colonel Zenteno and Captain Felix Ramos landed in Higuera....* Captain Ramos arrived fully equipped. He took out a powerful radio transmitter able to transmit over a large area, set it up and sent a coded message to an unspecified address. Then he set up his camera on a table and began work.

Question. Do you wish to add anything?

Answer. Yes. The CIA agents stationed in the battle zone carried out an important task. I wish in particular to mention that they supplied us with photographs of the guerrillas operating in the area and gave us their descriptions so that we knew everything about them before they were captured.

Author's comment. The subsequent fate of Colonel Andrés Selich, one of the murderers of Che Guevara, is very revealing. He was one of the main organisers of the reactionary putsch that overthrew the government of Juan José Torres, the 188th coup d'état in Bolivia since it became independent in 1825. The presidents of Bolivia passed as rapidly through the presidential palace as guests through the revolving doors of a hotel. *Le Nouvel Observateur* wrote that the signal had been given for insurrection and the hunting down of Communists. The rangers commanded by Colonel Selich, the crack units of the Bolivian army trained by the US Green Berets, served as the striking forces of the putsch. For his services Selich was made Minister of Internal Affairs, but he dreamed of occupying the presidential chair, and began to prepare the next coup d'état. Instead, having overestimated his own strength, he found himself behind bars. Shortly afterwards the authorities officially announced that he had 'died as the result of an accident when he fell down the stairs at police headquarters'. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, which apparently knew nothing of this farcial declaration, stated that the 'real cause of the death of Selich was a progressive disease of the liver'. Colonel Andrés Selich, head of the punitive forces, executioner, and henchman of the CIA, ended his shameful career thrown down a staircase like so much old rubbish, striking his head against the steps trodded by the lower ranks of the police. What else could such small fry as Colonel Selich expect from his patrons if the CIA had already overthrown several Bolivian presidents, including its own protégés.

At the time of the Arguedas trial, Bolivia was ruled by General René Barrientos, a graduate of a US air force academy. The previous civilian government headed by Victor Paz Estenssoro, which had been in power for twelve years, was removed by the CIA,

* According to the statement made by Zenteno, Selich himself was also on board this helicopter.

which then made René Barrientos, the former private pilot of Paz Estenssoro, President. After being brought to power by the CIA, Barrientos immediately declared that only the West suited modern Bolivia. However, the ex-pilot over-reached himself. Not content with backhanders from the powerful US Gulf Oil Corporation, he began to extort money from certain other American companies. This spelt the end for René Barrientos. According to the official version, Barrientos's plane, given to him by Gulf Oil, struck a high-voltage electric cable and burst into flames. This version was exploded when gunshot wounds were discovered on the body of the pilot—CIA agents had opened fire on the plane from a nearby hill.

Power was then seized by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Alfredo Ovando. The new government, to everybody's surprise, announced that it intended to carry through socio-economic and political reforms and to end imperialist interference in the internal affairs of the country, including the subversive activity of the CIA. Its most radical measure was the nationalisation of the Bolivian Gulf Oil Company, a subsidiary of Gulf Oil Corporation. The CIA overthrew yet another President, but failed to take note of the growing anti-imperialist mood of the Bolivian people, which found expression in the policy of the new head of state, Juan José Torres. His patriotic position and anti-imperialist, democratic programme did not suit the US, nor was the CIA satisfied with his mere overthrow. In 1976, five years after the coup, Torres was shot in Buenos Aires, and his widow accused the USA of responsibility for this crime.

Finally the choice of the CIA fell upon General Hugo Banzer, who ruled the country for a full seven years—a record by local standards. Like many other promising officers, he had received his military training in the United States and spoke English fluently. He established a ruthless military-political dictatorship; during his draconian rule around 15,000 people, including Catholic priests, were thrown into jail on political charges. Hugo Banzer denationalised the oil industry and handed over to US monopolies one-seventh of the entire territory of the country, for which he received regular bribes from Gulf Oil. The President encouraged extremely shady transactions; he sanctioned, for example, the transfer of considerable tracts of land to 150,000 racist emigrants from former Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. A joint-stock company was set up in La Paz to assist in creating this racist enclave in South America.

It was President Banzer who issued the blood-thirsty appeal to the peasants: 'I give you leave to kill the first Communist agitator who appears in the countryside. More, I will reward you for doing so.' It is worth recalling at this point that thirty pieces of silver were also offered for the head of Che Guevara.

From the testimony given by Moises Vásquez, a counter-intelli-

gence officer.

Question. What do you know about the documents confiscated from the bandits (the term that the military tribunal now begins to use to refer to the guerillas—K.K.), and in particular about the diary of Guevara, handed over to CIA agent Ramos?

Answer. I first made the acquaintance of Ramos during my trip to Santa Cruz with the technical consultant of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Gabriel García. García told me that Ramos was one of the leading experts of the US intelligence service.... I have information to the effect that Ramos photographed the diary of Che Guevara after he had been captured. There were very many photographs, and they were sent to the United States to be developed.

Q. What do you know about CIA agents Gonzáles, Ramos and García being given the army rank of captain?

A. I know absolutely nothing at all. García and González presented themselves as Ph.D's. García told me that Ramos was an army captain, but did not say in what army....

Q. When you visited the battle zone with one of the persons mentioned above, did his activity seem to you to be suspicious?

A. Naturally, once I knew that these people worked for the intelligence service of a foreign state, all their actions began to be suspicious. For example, when I was engaged in counter-intelligence work in our army, I discovered that all the information of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was passed on to the US embassy via CIA agent Hugo Murray before being sent to the intelligence section of the army. This information was supplied by CIA agents working in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.... At night all documents in the Ministry of Internal Affairs were locked away, and the key was in the possession of agent García.

Q. Were all the materials, ammunition, arms and documents seized from the bandits handed over to the intelligence section?

A. I will describe the battle at Higuera. Colonel Saucedo (head of the intelligence section of the 8th Army division—K.K.) informed me that, according to a soldier who had deserted from Captain Harry Prado's company, soldiers had seized several kit-bags during the battle in which Guevara was wounded. One of these packs contained a large amount of money. The soldier told Colonel Saucedo that he had been given around 2,000 Bolivian pesos and 100 dollars, and that the officers in Captain Prado's company had been given 2,000 dollars each. According to the deserter, the kit-bag had contained about 20,000 dollars in all. Captain Rico Torro, who also took part in the anti-guerrilla actions, demanded that the intelligence section return to him a confiscated radio receiver which, he said, he had seized and which should be given back to him as a battle trophy.

From July 19 to 25, 1968, the military tribunal subjected the

witnesses to gruelling interrogation. It was in a hurry: the political atmosphere in Bolivia was growing tense, the miners were stepping up their mass action to defend their rights. On June 24, a holiday in honour of the feast of St. John, the rangers launched a bloody attack on unarmed miners from the 'Siglo XX' tin mine, their wives and children. Sixteen were killed and seventy wounded. Two days later the miners were attacked yet again. On July 22, a state of emergency was declared, and three days later the government faced a crisis. It was two and a half months before the interrogation of the witnesses could be resumed. One may suppose that attempts were made to 'work over' Arguedas during this time, but, judging by his testimony, these efforts failed.

From the first testimony by Antonio Arguedas on July 20, 1968.

This would appear to be a copy of the record of an interrogation in Chile after Arguedas had fled there. The end is missing, and many words, particularly those relating to the links between Arguedas and the CIA, have been crossed out.

'In 1965 he was obliged by the US Central Intelligence Agency to resign from the post of Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. On being subjected (deleted)* that he was not a Communist, it was established (deleted), and he again took up the vacant post of Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs.... On July 18, at about 19.30, he received a telephone call from a CIA agent, which was unusual as he was visited at the Ministry whenever this was necessary. He was given an urgent appointment at a bridge, and he concluded that this was a trap set up to eliminate him, as the CIA had no other option.... After this phone call he decided to leave Bolivia.

'He added that he had no links either with the Cuban government or with the government of any other socialist country, nor with the Communist Party or any other political party. He also said that he had not received any payment for sending the diary to Cuba, and that he had done this in revenge for the humiliation to which his country was subjected by the United States, and also in revenge for the humiliation and insults he had suffered at the hands of CIA agents.... He had no dispute with the President of the Republic nor with the members of the government, and he had not informed them that he was leaving Bolivia because he feared he would be physically eliminated by the CIA.'

Author's comment. From this and the following evidence Antonio Arguedas emerges as a contradictory and somewhat tragic figure. He is at one and the same time both the head of the repressive apparatus of the military-police regime and its victim. The fate of Antonio Arguedas illustrates the truth that, if one wishes to become one of the 'powers that be' under a dictatorship, one must

* Probably this is a reference to the interrogation of Arguedas by CIA agents using the notorious 'lie detector'.

extinguish all traces of humanity, be prepared to wallow in dirt, become a turn-coat and even the blind instrument of the will of a foreign power.

As a young man, Arguedas was considered to be 'left-wing', and this became a trump card in the eyes of his future masters. Anyone who changes sides strives to 'expiate the sins of his youth', and to appear holier than the Pope. Arguedas graduated from an air force academy, became a captain in the Bolivian Air Force, and then a lawyer and an associate of René Barrientos, who had set his sights on the presidential office. Barrientos made Arguedas Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and introduced him to Colonel Edward Fox, US Air Force attaché in Bolivia and intermediary for the CIA. Fox was Barrientos's instructor when the latter was an air force trainee in the USA, and the head of state continued to stand to attention before his former mentor. It was not without reason that the US press spoke of the extraordinary influence that Colonel Fox exercised over the President of Bolivia.

Colonel Fox referred Arguedas to the CIA chief in Bolivia, Larry Sternfield, who put before him the rules of the game: if you serve the CIA, you will be made Minister of Internal Affairs. According to Victor Marchetti and John Marks, authors of *The CIA and Cult of Intelligence*, the CIA looked upon Arguedas as its agent from 1965 onwards. However, Arguedas's new masters needed proof of his loyalty, and he was subjected to a humiliating clearance procedure and dispatched to the neighbouring state of Peru, where the US embassy was equipped with a 'lie detector'. Here Arguedas made the acquaintance of Nicolás Leondiris, who worked for both the CIA and the FBI. He accompanied Arguedas to Lima and from then on kept a close watch on him.

In Lima Arguedas was questioned using the 'lie detector'. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, his mind dulled by narcotics, faced a torrent of provocative questions and assertions. 'Are you still a member of the Communist Party? Are you an agent of Moscow or Havana?' This punishing interrogation lasted for four days. Subsequently Arguedas will declare: 'Then all I wanted was to die: I was ready to throw myself from the fifth floor.' Those who conducted the interrogation overstepped the mark, unaware that Arguedas was nursing an insatiable thirst for revenge and was waiting for a suitable moment to repay the treatment meted out to him.

For the moment, however, Arguedas did not arouse suspicion. The CIA sanctioned his appointment as Minister of Internal Affairs invited him to visit the USA as a moral incentive, and as an incentive wrote him a cheque to the value of 6,500 dollars. Later Arguedas revealed that many Bolivian ministers received regular payments from the CIA. Even the most vigilant CIA spies did not doubt Arguedas's 'reliability', and the Ministry of Internal Affairs was packed with CIA agents. Arguedas was no exception in this re-

spect, and later he stated that in Latin America ministers of internal affairs are themselves unaware of what is going on in their own ministries. While Arguedas was in office, the mass repression of the workers, students and progressive organisations was intensified. The bewildered deputy head of the intelligence section of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Roberto Quintanilla (who later became the director of the Bolivian police force and himself tortured political prisoners) testified that Arguedas mounted an all-out campaign against all communist elements, searching their houses, confiscating forbidden literature, etc.

The CIA compelled Arguedas to blackmail trade-union leaders and the leaders of political, including Catholic, organisations, and to arrange the publication of provocative reports in the press, such as the report that Tamara Bunke,* Che's associate, was a 'Soviet agent'. This false rumour was also taken up by the main US news agencies.

Thus the behaviour of Antonio Arguedas did not arouse the least suspicion. Only a handful of people knew about the 'double life' led by the powerful Minister of Internal Affairs, a respectable señor and the father of four children. The news of his flight was like a bombshell for the CIA bosses. The well-known Argentinian journalist Gregorio Selser described Arguedas's action as the awakening of a benumbed conscience. What caused this awakening? There is no doubt that one of the causes was wounded self-esteem and the desire to pay back the CIA for daily humiliation. Another possible cause was the realisation that he was involved in criminal activity against his own country and the opportunity to regain his self-respect. The trigger was undoubtedly Che's diary, the diary of a selfless fighter for the happiness of another people. The destiny of two totally contrasting characters—Che and Arguedas—came together as if in a Shakespearian drama, illustrating the clash of light and dark, good and evil.

The contradictory personality and behaviour of Arguedas were revealed yet again during his wanderings around the world after his flight from Bolivia. He knew that the die was cast and that there was no further reason for silence, but he feared the long arm of the CIA and therefore alternated between saying nothing about US subversive activities, and, on the contrary, striving to avert revenge by frankness: to eliminate Arguedas would be to confirm before the entire world the truth of his disclosures. With this in mind he returned to Bolivia in the belief that, as the trial had started, the courtroom would provide a better guarantee of his safety than political emigration.

* Tamara Bunke was born (like Che) in Argentina, where her parents, German anti-fascists, had emigrated prior to the Second World War. She was involved in underground revolutionary activity in Bolivia and was killed by the rangers at almost the same time as Che. Her pseudonym was Tanya.

Arguedas was arrested in Chile, where he had gone on leaving Bolivia, and interrogated by Oscar Pizarro, a CIA agent. He was released only after he had promised to forget the word 'CIA'. It must be remembered that at this time, prior to the victory of the Popular Unity movement, Chile was inundated with CIA agents, and any new disclosures related to its subversive activities, particularly disclosures made by the Minister of Internal Affairs of a neighbouring state, would have seriously affected imperialist plans. While Arguedas was in prison, US Ambassador Edward Korry literally haunted the Chilean Ministry of Internal Affairs. The American Under Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Oliver T. Covey, who referred to himself as 'ambassador without protocol', was flown out post-haste to assist him. They both demanded that, contrary to the Chilean Constitution, Arguedas be refused political asylum. Although Arguedas said nothing about the activity of the CIA, he was expelled from Chile.

On his flight to London, Antonio Arguedas was accompanied by two men. The seat to his left was occupied by CIA agent Oscar Pizarro, and the seat to his right was occupied by CIA and FBI agent Nicolás Leondiris.

From the second testimony given by Antonio Arguedas on September 17, 1968.

Question. For what purpose and how did you obtain a copy of the diary of Ernesto Che Guevara and other documents whose contents were a military secret?

Answer. The only document of which I happened to obtain a photocopy was the diary of Major Ernesto Guevara. Approximately thirty or forty days after the death of the guerrilla leader, Hugo Murray from the US embassy, handed over to me a large yellow envelope saying that it contained a photocopy of the diary of Major Guevara and photocopies of other documents. Out of curiosity I took out of the envelope two packets of papers containing the field diary of Major Guevara and asked García to photograph them. On the following day, García handed me a small box and said that it contained the negatives of the diary. I put the two packets with the photoprints into an envelope and gave it to García, saying that these were guerrilla documents that the American embassy had sent for us to study. Later Lieutenant-Colonel Quintanilla from the Ministry of Internal Affairs informed me that Gabriel García had taken advantage of the negligence of one of the adjutants of General Ovando and had taken a photocopy of Che Guevara's diary.... On June 14, at about 17 hours, I sent to Major Fidel Castro the negatives of the field diary of Major Guevara which had been taken from the copy handed to me by Mr. Hugo Murray.

Q. Why did you leave the country?

A. I left the country because, in my capacity as Minister of In-

ternal Affairs, I became convinced that my country had lost a considerable degree of its national sovereignty, and that in Bolivia the North American agencies had become all powerful....

Q. Were you certain that the documents sent to one of the European addresses would be received in Havana?

A. No, I was not. However, allowing for my state of mind, I unhesitatingly made use of such a totally unreliable means of dispatch as the post in the hope that I could not only finally free myself from control and blackmail by the US government, but also once and for all expose the methods of neocolonialism used by the USA.

Q. What did you do while you were in Santiago, London, New York and Lima? Who paid for your journey?

A. After I had arrived at Iquique the deputy director of the criminal police and another man, to all appearances an American, put me in an isolated room. The deputy director told me that my request for political asylum would be refused as I was being sought not by the Bolivian government but by the government of another country. He also advised me to change the wording of my request for political asylum and to choose some other pretext. When I refused this suggestion he left, and two agents appeared who confiscated all my money and wanted to strip me.... Some time later the deputy director of the criminal police returned, and in a friendly voice informed me that he had taken a liking to me, and therefore had got in touch with people who would like to help me. However, I must not say a word against the Americans; I must say that the diary of Che Guevara was sold on the instructions of General Ovando in order to raise funds for a political campaign. He told me that, in return for doing this, I would be provided with money that would enable me to live in Europe for several years. The interrogation continued for another two days, and then Mr. Zúñiga (deputy director of the local criminal police—K.K.) told me that power in Bolivia had been seized by General Marcos Vásquez and that I would be shot. He also showed me a cutting from some newspaper with an announcement made by General Vásquez. An hour later Zúñiga returned and said that a North American friend of mine had arrived from Venezuela in order to discuss my future. Still not recovered from the news of the political changes that had taken place in Bolivia, I agreed to meet him and a few minutes later I was taken into a room where I saw Nicolás Leondiris. He greeted me in an affable manner and said that, as friends, we would be able to come to an agreement, that the story of a coup in Bolivia was a lie, and that I must understand my position and cooperate with him in order to keep my freedom and my life. We agreed that I would leave Chile on the first available plane, that I would say nothing anywhere about the activities of the CIA, and that the

Americans would then try to help me begin political activity in any left-wing political grouping....* In London I was under the control of the American secret service.... In both London and New York my interpreter was Mr. Leondiris.... At the airport in London and again at the airport in New York, agent Leondiris dealt with my documents and luggage while I left the airport through the emergency exit. On the two occasions that I went to the Foreign Office I was taken there secretly in order to prevent my having any contact with the London press.

Author's comment. After a long interval, the military tribunal resumed its interrogation of the witnesses on October 7, 1968. We will reproduce below a part of the evidence given by just one witness, who was the last to speak to Arguedas before he fled abroad.

From the evidence given by the head of the photo laboratory at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ricardo Aneiva.

Question. What was the purpose of your trip abroad?

Answer. On the orders of General Ovando I was sent to the USA to attend a course of training in intelligence work (earlier Aneiva had stated that he was invited to the USA on a 'grant' from the State Department in order to deliver the latest bugging devices to Bolivia—K.K.). I was in Washington for a month and ten days.

Q. Did Minister Arguedas give you an assignment on this trip?

A. He told me to get some noiseless pistols....

Q. As a member of the intelligence department were you given any instructions immediately after the publication of Che's diary to investigate how a copy of this document had arrived in Cuba, and who gave you such instructions?

A. I was given no instructions to investigate.... I decided to discover the source of this publication for myself.... I began to suspect that the Minister himself had sent the copy of Che's diary. I told the President of the Republic of my suspicions. The President not only did not believe me but, on the contrary, taking into account my trip to the USA, he gave me to understand that I might be the one responsible. He finished by saying that he wanted to see me and the Minister that evening. On leaving the presidential palace at around 19.45, I immediately informed Minister Arguedas that I had spoken with the President and that we were to call on him at 22.30. He arranged to meet me at the Ministry at 22.15. I came to the Ministry at 21.45 and saw Arguedas's chauffeur filling the jeep with petrol. The chauffeur told me that they were leaving on a business trip. Shortly thereafter the Minister arrived, and when he saw me he accused me furiously of spying on him. Then he said: 'I am leaving. The CIA will shoot me. Do your duty.' He left, and

* This act of provocation described by Antonio Arguedas is further evidence of the close links between the Chilean police and the CIA in the period immediately preceding the election of the Popular Unity government.

I tried to telephone the President.... I went to the President's home, but there I was told that I could not see him as he was at that moment addressing a meeting. In this situation I left the President the following note: 'Antonio fled at 10 o'clock.'

From the third testimony given by Antonio Arguedas on October 23, 1968.

Question. Who among the foreigners headed the CIA service in the country, and what did their activities include?

Answer. As Deputy Minister, and then as Minister, I maintained official relations with the North American representatives Larry Sternfield, Nicolás Leondiris, John S. Tilton, Hugo Murray, Gabriel García González, Hernández, and with two others whose surnames I no longer remember.... As is the case with the representatives of any intelligence service, their activities included spying, counter-intelligence and disinformation.

Q. Which American organisations—the Peace Corps, USIA* etc.—are working for the CIA?

A. In the course of investigations into the activity of guerrilla groups, some agents informed me that in rural areas members of the Peace Corps did not only give technical assistance to the population, but also tried to obtain information about those living in the area.... I am convinced that the North American intelligence service uses any and all methods to recruit agents.

Q. Why did you, as Minister of Internal Affairs, not take any measures to halt the activity of the CIA?

A. If the elucidation of this question constitutes part of the inquiry of the military tribunal, it could ask the President of the Republic and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces whether I had not, when I was Minister of Internal Affairs, repeatedly voiced my concern at the fact that our intelligence service operated in contact with the USA.... It is my opinion, Sir, that the problem of American interference in the internal affairs of Bolivia cannot be solved either by the government or any one individual. This problem concerns the sphere of national self-awareness and the support by the whole people for a government that is seriously resolved to oppose American interference.

Author's comment. After many months of wearisome procedure—summoning witnesses, recording testimonies, conducting a detailed correspondence with other military courts—the investigation seems to be drawing to a close. However, a curious 'detail' now emerges: it seems that, according to the conclusion of the mil-

* The Peace Corps—a US government-sponsored 'volunteer' organisation set up by President Kennedy to assist the population of the developing countries, primarily in the sphere of education, and vocational training. 'Corpsmen' were more than once discovered to be engaged in spying and subversion. The US Information Agency was the main weapon in the 'psychological war'.

itary tribunal itself, it is not competent to judge Antonio Arguedas. Although Arguedas appears simply as a 'retired captain', the military tribunal is empowered to judge only an officer who is still in active service. More importantly, according to the Constitution, a former minister may be tried only by Parliament. However, Parliament does not show the slightest desire to take part in an affair connected with the CIA and, displaying the wisdom of Solomon, the military tribunal decides to hand the 'Arguedas affair' over to the district court of the Bolivian capital, La Paz. A month later the criminal division of the civilian court accedes to the request of Arguedas's lawyer that he be granted bail at 800 dollars. In January 1969, Antonio Arguedas is once more summoned to appear in court. This time, facing judges wearing not military uniform but ordinary civilian clothes, he speaks with unprecedented frankness about the machinations of the CIA. This testimony constitutes the most interesting part of the 'Antonio Arguedas affair'.

From the testimony given by Antonio Arguedas to the criminal division of the district court of La Paz on January 14, 1969.

Question. In what circumstances were you appointed to the post of Deputy Minister, and then Minister of Internal Affairs?

Answer. Approximately 40 days after I was appointed (Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs—K.K.) I was obliged, under pressure from the US embassy, to resign. However, after I had been subjected to interrogation in Lima, the North American government put no further obstacles in the way of my promotion. On the contrary, members of US diplomatic, political and intelligence circles began to praise my work and value my activity.

Q. Did you have direct or indirect contacts with organisations or agents of foreign states?

A. I had direct contacts with agents of the North American intelligence service, which operated in our country in close contact with the state security services from roughly 1957 onwards.... I had no contacts whatsoever with agents of any other country.

Q. Did you know Ernesto Che Guevara?

A. I did not have the honour of knowing Major Guevara.

Q. What circumstances, motives and purposes caused you to hand over the diary of Ernesto Che Guevara?

A. As a member of the government, I clearly understood the fictitious nature of our state power. The colonising power is distorting the entire historical process of the development of nations, and subordinates all political, economic and administrative undertakings to the interests of the policy of world domination being pursued by the most aggressive circles of North American imperialism. Secondly, from conversations with North American officials I learned that the North American government wished to arouse widespread interest in the content of the field diary of Major Er-

nesto Guevara in order to subsequently produce its own version and introduce considerable changes into the original with a view to justifying a multilateral aggression against Cuba and mass repression in the country. In other words, an act of provocation was planned by means of the publication of a false or considerably altered text of the diary. Thirdly, because the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States began to suspect me after the exposure of its spy network in Bolivia, and had started to investigate all my activities. My situation was unique and, after I became Minister of Internal Affairs in 1964, my position became exceptionally difficult.... I knew about all the repressive actions taken inside the country, and I knew that they were closely linked to the wishes of the North American government. In these circumstances, the Americans had no alternative: either they must eliminate me, or strike a deal with me.

Q. After sending the diary, did you receive any remuneration?

A. No, Sir, I received no material remuneration whatsoever. My sole satisfaction was the recovery of my own dignity and the chance to show the people who is responsible for their poverty and backwardness, who is plundering our country....

Q. What, in your opinion, led to the defeat of the guerrillas?

A. I have reason to believe that the intelligence service of the United States knew about the preparation of a guerrilla base in Bolivia before our own authorities first received information about it. When CIA documents came into our possession I discovered one report that was dated 34 days before the first skirmish in Nancahuazú (Ernesto Guevara began his guerrilla activity after arriving in Nancahuazú on November 1966—K.K.). This report contained information on all the movements of Dagnino Pacheco, the guerrilla treasurer. The defeat of the guerrillas was also due to the lack of support from the peasants....

Author's comment. The Indians living in primitive rural communities did not know Spanish. For them, any white man, and in particular a foreigner, was an 'alien'. Not only did they not support the guerrillas, but even handed them over to the authorities.

The El Juro gorge, surrounded by cliffs and covered with scrub dotted by occasional trees, was the scene of Che's last battle. It had been completely surrounded by rangers. Interestingly, *The New York Times* published a report under the heading 'The Last Combat of Che' the day before the defeat of the guerrilla detachment. The CIA had planned its operations to the minute. However, let us return to the final interrogation of Antonio Arguedas.

Q. What caused you to hurriedly flee the country while you still occupied the important post of Minister of Internal Affairs?

A. Realising the fictitious nature of my power, I knew that the North Americans and their local henchmen could physically remove me without the slightest qualm of conscience, and—which

was very probable—later claim that I was the victim of some terrorist act.

Q. Could you describe the form of the interference of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States in Bolivia, and was this interference known to top government circles?

A. North American colonisation is a reality provoking grave concern among all Bolivian patriots. The Central Intelligence Agency, that repressive tool of the North American government, uses every available means to obtain information, disinform public opinion and discredit liberation movements. All this is done in order to facilitate the penetration of big capitalist monopolies and subordinate the government to the interests of the colonising powers and of the ruling circles of one or other Latin American country.

Q. Tell us about your activities in Chile, London, New York and Lima.

A. As soon as I arrived on Chilean territory I was isolated and found myself under the control of the Chilean political police and a North American agent. This agent had me watched from the moment I arrived in the town of Iquique. During the nine days that I was detained, he subjected me to constant interrogation and tried to compel me to produce in public a version that would not compromise the Central Intelligence Agency of the USA. Attempts to pressure me having failed, I was forced to conceal part of the truth, that is, not to reveal the activities of the CIA during my press conference.... I used the agreement I had reached with the North Americans to obtain permission to return to Bolivia via New York in order to tie the hands of the US government should anything happen to me, and in order to have the opportunity of revealing to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations the persecution to which citizens are subjected in their own country.... While in London I was followed by the North American agent Nicolás Leondiris.... I was registered under a false name first in the hotel Apollo and then in the hotel Richmond Hill. In London Leondiris interrogated me in the hotel.... In New York I was constantly followed by one, two and even three agents of the secret service. In hotels my residence cards were inevitably filled out by agents.

Q. At the press conference you mentioned that a certain Nicolás Leondiris, a CIA agent, played a vital role in your return to Bolivia. How did he succeed in obtaining your consent to return?

A. Nicolás Leondiris works as a consultant for the state security service in the Republic of Venezuela. Leondiris and the CIA agents allowed me to return because they were convinced that it was now impossible for me to take a revolutionary position. They constantly pointed out to me the futility of acting against their interests.... I was repeatedly told that my chances of waging an active struggle against them were nil. Moreover, I convinced them that I wanted only one thing—to live in peace, and that I

would not engage in disclosures....

Q. Did you work for the CIA? When did you break with this organisation, and for what reasons?

A. I referred to myself as an agent of the CIA.... My relations with the Central Intelligence Agency were of an official nature, and I am certain that, with rare exceptions, all ministers of internal affairs have always had such contacts, just as they have received payments offered for various purposes.... The government may change many times, but the apparatus of foreign domination and national oppression must remain inviolate. This is the unwritten law governing the policy of a colonial power.

Q. Do you wish to add anything to your testimony?

A. I have become the victim of the biggest propaganda machine in the world, and to defend my human dignity I will continue to expose North American colonising policy, which is inflicting such damage on my own country and on the whole of Latin America.

In Lieu of an Epilogue

Thus ends the last page of the 'Arguedas affair', which reveals with documentary accuracy the extent of CIA penetration into the life of one Latin American country.

What was the subsequent fate of Antonio Arguedas, who had found the courage to break with the CIA and disclose its shameful activity? The 'Arguedas affair' provoked such a public furor that the organisers of the trial decided to apply the brakes. However, the life of Arguedas, 'released on bail', continued to hang by a thread. Three attempts on his life followed in quick succession. Only a few steps away from the presidential palace in La Paz he was wounded by machine-gun fire from a passing car. A spokesman for the local criminal police stated briefly: 'It is quite possible that the attempt on the life of Arguedas was made by CIA agents.' On leaving the military hospital, Arguedas requested political asylum in the Mexican embassy, and shortly afterwards obtained permission to leave the country. At a press conference in the Mexican capital, Arguedas repeated his accusations against the CIA.

The 'Arguedas affair' influenced the development of the acute and chronic political crisis in Bolivia. Broad sections of the population demanded an end to CIA subversive activity. The new American Ambassador, Victor Ernest Siracusa, had scarcely arrived in La Paz when the trade unions and students accused him of being the head of the CIA in Latin America and demanded that he be expelled from the country. The then Minister of Internal Affairs publicly announced that the CIA espionage centre had been found in La Paz equipped with radio transmitters and telephone bugging

devices. The Minister also declared that the US espionage network was to be dismantled and that ministry officials discovered to have links with the CIA were to be brought to trial. The very next day after this warning, several US embassy employees very wisely left Bolivia. The government fired a group of officers in charge of the security and intelligence services.

More than ten years have passed since the events described above, and the Bolivian people, who have a proud tradition of liberation struggle against oppressors, have shown that they have not accepted the position of 'beggar on a golden throne'. In the middle of 1978 the military-police regime of General Hugo Banzer collapsed after many years in power. His protégé, Air Force General Juan Pereda Asbún, was his brief successor. The entire programme of this 'democrat at heart' boiled down to the declaration: 'I will not permit Communists to come to power.' The anti-communist credo of Asbún proved unpopular, and only a few months later his title had become that of ex-President. A group of patriotically-minded officers took over government, and in the summer of 1979 they voluntarily handed power over to a constitutional civilian government.

Bolivia launched into a programme of democratic reforms. A political amnesty was declared and the Communist Party was legalised after many years spent as an underground organisation. Together with other parties it was a member of the political bloc called the Front of Democratic and Popular Unity, which enjoyed a mass following. This bloc expressed the unity of the class and political forces of the country in the struggle against reaction and for democracy and social progress. In the elections held in June 1980 the bloc candidate won a convincing victory.

The bourgeois and land-owning oligarchy, the militarist clique and the CIA tried to avenge themselves for their defeat by organising yet another coup. In July 1980, the democratic movement was brutally suppressed, Parliament dissolved and political and trade-union activity forbidden. The Bolivian people found themselves once more in the iron grip of a police dictatorship. The head of this repressive regime, General Luis García Mesa, declared: 'I will remain in power until I have destroyed the cancerous growth of Marxism.' This protégé of imperialism and the CIA was the head of the cocaine Mafia, who sold their lethal wares in the USA. However, the rule of this 'warrior against Marxism' proved rather brief. In 1981 he was removed and his place taken by a less discredited general.*

As for the 'Arguedas affair', it serves as a vivid illustration of CIA subversion in Latin America. This story of almost unparalleled

* Early in 1983 Barbier was handed over to the French authorities by the present Bolivian government.

cynicism carries with it a moral lesson for millions of Latin Americans: how much confidence can the ordinary citizen, the 'man-in-the-street' have in today and tomorrow if even the head of a ministry that enjoys total power under a military dictatorship, the man who controls the repressive and punitive organs of the country and whose name is spoken only in a frightened whisper, becomes a helpless prey cornered by a pack of hounds?



Yevgeny Korshunov

YEVGENY KORSHUNOV—writer, author of the novellas *Operation Chameleon* and *The Rains Will Come*, and the novels *Storm over the Lagoon* and *The Crusaders*, all dealing with the struggle of the peoples of Africa for national independence and genuine political and economic liberation.

For many years Korshunov worked as Novosti Press Agency correspondent in Africa, and at present is the special Middle East correspondent of the newspaper *Izvestia*.

'THE DOGS OF WAR'

The Death Trade

'Wanted immediately!' read the advertisement published by several American newspapers in the winter of 1975. 'A Middle Eastern government is hiring mercenaries.... Captain's salary—1,000 dollars a month tax-free.... Air fare and travel expenses refunded on arrival.... Free accommodation and medical treatment. Sixty days' leave annually.... Life insured for twenty thousand dollars. Information on duties, area of service, contract, application form and medical certificate.... Phoenix Associates.' Then there followed an address.

One can only guess who had put this advertisement on behalf of Phoenix Associates: perhaps Sultan Qaboos bin Said, ruler of Oman, who had been fighting the Dhofar insurgents for many years with the help of mercenaries, perhaps the government of Saudi Arabia, which was sparing no expense to equip its army with the latest American military technology and foreign 'instructors'; perhaps someone in the Lebanon, where the situation was close to a civil war....

Correspondents from the US magazine *Newsweek*, who visited one of the recruitment centres in Los Angeles, provided a graphic description of the throng of people of all ages who besieged the small office on Westminister Avenue. The telephones never stopped ringing, and the secretary busily wrote down the names of 'captains' from Arizona, 'majors' from Georgia, and 'colonels' from Colorado offering their services in exchange for dollars. The telephone lines were also busy at Bell Helicopter International (Bedford, Texas) and at Bird Air (Oakland, California).

Bird Air was offering pilots a monthly salary of 2,225 dollars.

Other recruitment centres were interested in experienced infantrymen, who were offered from 1,400 to 1,800 dollars a month to train Saudi Arabian soldiers in modern fighting methods. According to Robert Brown, a former lieutenant-colonel in the US Air Force and now the successful publisher of the magazine *Soldier of Fortune*, a qualified American mercenary costs 2,000 dollars a month. The Italian magazine *L'Espresso* noted that the material published by Brown would cause even Hitler to blush.

The magazine *Soldier of Fortune* was set up by mercenaries who found themselves out of work after they had been thrown out of Angola. In an attempt to retain their 'fighting spirit', these adventurers founded Phoenix & Omega Ltd., an organisation that regularly holds meetings and conducts training and manoeuvres. It possesses a training camp in Arizona and an arsenal well stocked with a wide variety of weapons. Under Brown's supervision they also 'analyse' the international situation so as to know in advance when, where and by whom their services might be required.

Soldier of Fortune could be described as a professional advertising publication. Its first edition of only 4,000 copies was an immediate success in a country where violence has long since become an integral part of life. Respectable American publications eagerly reprinted its photographs of beheaded Rhodesian patriots. Its pages also contain memoirs, 'theoretical' discussions, declarations such as 'In war there are no good and bad, just and unjust—there are only heroes and cowards, those who have guts and those who haven't' or even 'Mercenaries of the world, unite!'

War veterans boast unashamedly of their sadistic refinement. Readers of the magazine learned that the Americans tossed out over Southeast Asian villages hundreds of bats with tiny incendiary bombs tied to their feet. When the bats flew into a peasant hut, the bomb exploded.... The Vietnamese, like the Japanese, believe that the fox brings bad luck. Thousands of dummy foxes breathing fire were set up in the forests of Vietnam. However, the Vietnamese were not so easily frightened, and the *Soldier of Fortune* had to admit that this was one of the few mistakes made in Saigon. Moreover, certain 'Vietnam veterans' self-confidently asserted in their magazine that if the defence of Saigon had been entrusted to a battalion of handpicked mercenaries, the USA would not have lost the war.

The recruitment of mercenaries is contrary to US law, which views it as a criminal offence punishable by a prison sentence of up to three years and a fine of up to one thousand dollars. Nonetheless, mercenaries hired in the USA operated in Angola, Oman and in the Seychelles. Mercenaries hired in the USA and some Latin American countries were sent into Nicaragua to help the dictator Somoza, whose regime was disintegrating under the blows being delivered by patriotic forces. As usual, the mercenaries

readily posed for photographers and boasted of their exploits. The CIA, worried about the fate of the Nicaraguan dictator, was ready to meet the cost of saving him out of its secret funds.

The American Themis modestly averts her eyes away from the business of Phoenix & Omega Ltd., and other similar 'companies'. They are, after all, private firms offering their wares. And as for their other interests...

He Who Pays the Piper...

Moreover, it has long been common knowledge that the secret services of the imperialist states are behind the 'soldiers of fortune' and those who recruit them. This was convincingly demonstrated in June 1976, in Luanda, the capital of the People's Republic of Angola, when 13 foreign mercenaries captured by patriotic forces appeared in court. Six months previously, the imperialist states had attempted to prevent the establishment of popular power in the newly independent Angola. The open military intervention involved South African troops who fought alongside local factional bands and foreign mercenaries, including about 300 Americans. Gustavo Marcelo Grillo, a twenty-seven year old former US marine, told the court that it was very easy to become a mercenary in the USA. It was sufficient to watch a television film showing the exploits performed by the mercenaries and then ring the number that followed. All the formalities would be taken care of. This was how Grillo became a mercenary and ended up in Angola.

In January 1976, at the height of imperialist intervention in Angola, the US newspaper *Christian Science Monitor* wrote: '... According to these sources, who are close to the US Central Intelligence Agency, the CIA is indirectly recruiting American ex-servicemen, training them, dispatching them to southern Africa, contributing towards their pay (via funds for Zaire and Angola's two pro-West factions), and providing them and the indigenous forces with light and heavy weaponry....' It also became known that the butchers hired by the CIA were being trained at Fort Benning, Georgia, where they also studied 'interrogation techniques and the Portuguese language'. In Angola, wrote the *Christian Science Monitor*, the mercenaries were formed into 'special forces "B-team" under the command of a Belgian-born American with combat experience both in Indo-China and the Belgian Congo (now Zaire)'. The B-team also included six 'A-teams' of 14 men each and a headquarters staff of ten. Another B-team of 94 mercenaries, also trained in the USA, was led by a French-born American who was also a veteran of Vietnam and the Congo. In addition, 150 helicopter pilots and mechanics for a special helicopter team were also being recruited in the USA. Each B-team cost about one million

dollars for the first six months, not including the cost of heavy weapons and helicopters. The recruitment and training of mercenaries proceeded apace. The American press wrote that these mercenaries were united by a common hatred of communism, a love of money and adventure, and the opportunity of selling their combat experience on the market. Together they composed the 'secret army' of the CIA.

During the impartial judicial investigation in Luanda, the mercenaries were defended by their compatriots. Robert Cesner, a lawyer who had flown in from the USA, laid the blame not on the defendants, but upon those individuals and organisations who had created this situation. None of the defendants, he argued, could have come to Angola by himself, and he accused the US government of having permitted the recruitment of mercenaries in its own country. A similar opinion was expressed by the British lawyers Peter Warburton-Jones and Stanbrooke. The defendants themselves were well aware who had 'paid the piper'. One of the mercenaries, John Derek Barker, told the court that the organisation which had recruited them was a branch of the American CIA.

The statements made by the defendants and their lawyers contained nothing that was not already known to the public. Even before the trial began, John Banks had been given press coverage that a film star might envy.

In January, 1976, Norman Hall, a close friend of Holden Roberto, arrived in England with an attaché case full of banknotes supplied by the CIA. Once in London, Hall immediately got in touch with the SAS (Security Advisory Services) set up by Les Aspin, an arms dealer, Frank Perren, an ex-soldier from the British Marines, and John Banks, an ex-paratrooper. Having checked Hall's financial position (it was later revealed that he had been given \$60,000 dollars by the CIA for recruitment purposes), this trio set about filling his order. For each recruited mercenary the SAS received 300 pounds commission. Soon British newspapers started carrying advertisements for ex-servicemen aged 24-45 years willing to work abroad as military instructors for good pay. One was advised to telephone 705423 and 605541 from 10 to 19 hours.

As, according to official statistics, there were almost one and a half million unemployed in the country at the time, the response to these advertisements was more than sufficient. However, not only unemployment lay behind this response. It was an illustration of the collapse of the human personality in capitalist society. The man driven to desperation by unemployment, and the adventure-seeker, the professional bandit and the shopkeeper wanting to make a name for himself even as a criminal, the drug addict and the dyed-in-the-wool conservative, the psychopath and the racist—all of those who offered their services were the product of the capitalist world and its spiritual crisis.

The recruiters, acting in accord with the hypocritical morality of the society in which they had been brought up, strove to conceal the criminal nature of their undertaking behind a veil of decency. Those who rang up the numbers given in the advertisements found themselves connected with 'service bureau' which expressed polite surprise at their call. The 'bureau' had never heard of any work abroad. However, the caller was asked to give his name and the reason for his call. If the answers satisfied the invisible employee of the 'service bureau', he asked for the address and telephone number of the caller, and the next day a meeting was arranged by telephone at the Tower Hotel or the Piccadilly Hotel. In the Tower Hotel those wishing to become mercenaries were interviewed by 'Major' Banks in room 615; at the Piccadilly Hotel they were interviewed by Les Aspin, Terence Haigh or Norman Hall himself.

To whom had the CIA entrusted this delicate mission which, moreover, was liable to prosecution under British law, which considers the recruitment of British citizens to serve in a foreign army as a criminal offence?

Norman Hall, then aged 38, had been dishonourably discharged from the British army for trading in stolen weapons. In Angola his 'exploits' included acting as the personal chauffeur of Holden Roberto. As proof of the reliability of the firm running the operation, Hall showed the new recruits who came to the Piccadilly Hotel his attaché case full of banknotes.

Terence Haigh, who dispatched 96 mercenaries to Angola, assured them that the organisation was financially sound, and let slip the information that the dollars were coming from the United States.

John Banks was 33 years old and, like Norman Hall, had served for eight years as a paratrooper in the British army, from which he too had been dishonourably discharged. He then set up a transport company, signed a contract with a Middle Eastern country to the value of 200,000 pounds and then, as was to be expected, failed to deliver the goods. The rank of 'major' was given him by Holden Roberto whom he went to see himself, not trusting the CIA link through Norman Hall.

Les Aspin, the same age as John Banks, and a former junior officer in the British Air Force, was a long-established dealer in contraband and had several times been arrested for rape while serving in Malta.

For the CIA, and not only for the CIA, as will be shown below—these individuals served as a kind of standard: without conscience, without any moral principles, greedy for profit. Moreover, those who took the bait offered by the Security Advisory Services were no different. Costas Georgiou, a former British paratrooper with a criminal record, became 'Colonel' Callan in Angola, and would set

off grenades pushed into the mouths of prisoners of war simply for amusement. Georgiou shot 14 of his British 'colleagues' for insubordination.

Another of the same stamp was Raymond Copeland (Sammy) a sadist and alcoholic who loved to repeat: 'I'm ready to kill anyone if I'm paid well for it!' This same 'Sammy' machine-gunned mercenaries condemned by Costas Georgiou, and was himself shot on the order of another mercenary, former corporal Peter McAleese, who had become Holden Roberto's right-hand man and appointed 'colonel' in his band. Georgiou was also killed in Angola: he was shot on the order of the court in Luanda, and when his body, together with the bodies of three other mercenaries executed with him, were sent back to Britain, the loaders at Heathrow airport spat on the coffins. 'The Dogs of War' was the name given to the mercenaries by the reactionary British writer Frederick Forsyth in his novel justifying their activities.

However, all this was to happen later. At the beginning of 1976, the Security Advisory Services were still busy recruiting. The new recruits were paid 150 pounds of travelling expenses, were promised a weekly pay of the same amount, and guaranteed work for six months, after which they would receive a month's paid leave and a plane ticket to anywhere in the world. The money could be transferred to relatives or to a bank account in London. There was also what one might call a system of bonus payments—750 pounds for each tank destroyed, 250 pounds for each enemy soldier killed, 1,200 pounds for each captured enemy officer.

While 96 recruits were waiting for their documents to be processed, the Security Advisory Services put them up in a hotel close to the airport. A delay of even a few days nearly proved fatal to the whole operation. The drunken orgies indulged in by these 'fighters against world communism' (for this was their 'ideological base') were such that the police were obliged to lock them up. However, a 'miracle' then occurred. After intervention by some 'unseen power', the brawlers were escorted to the airport and placed in the VIP lounge, from which, one cold January morning in 1976, they left for the warmer climes of Africa.

It soon became clear that the recruiters had sold the CIA unsuitable wares. The mercenaries revealed almost no combat ability and took to their heels during the first skirmishes with units of the Angolan People's Army. Thirty-six out of the ninety-six were killed, five were reported missing, and thirteen were wounded. Those who survived and returned were arrested by the British police, some for previous crimes, others for desertion from the army. Nor could the authorities do otherwise, for the scandal had already broken out. Banks, not happy with his share of the 'commission' had begun to reveal publicly what he knew, while the trial of the mercenaries in Luanda had led to debates in Parliament, put-

ting the British government in an embarrassing situation.

To begun with, something had to be done with regard to the indignation being expressed abroad, particularly in the countries of Africa and Asia whose relations with the former metropolitan country already left a lot to be desired. Moreover, bourgeois morality had been manifestly flouted—not because British citizens had gone out to Africa to hunt people, for this had never been considered shameful in Britain—but because there was a scandal and the veil of decency had been torn aside. As was to be expected, hypocritical bourgeois society adopted a hypocritical attitude to those who had scandalised it. British law did not find them guilty of any serious crime and no one received the merited punishment. However, there was much talk of 'British democracy'.

Scandal Follows Scandal

When news began to filter in from Angola that 'Colonel' Callan had shot fourteen British mercenaries, the bourgeois press, which had shown no emotion when these British mercenaries were killing Angolans with impunity, was loud in its protests. Harold Wilson, then Prime Minister, was obliged to give an explanation to the House of Commons. The Conservative opposition was not attempting to discover the extent of CIA activity on British soil, but seeking a pretext to attack the labour government. The government was also not seeking to expose the CIA. Its aim was to save face both in Parliament and before prospective voters. Discussion on the subject of British mercenaries and those who recruited them became a condemnation of 'small-time crooks'.

Answering a question put by the leader of the opposition, Mrs. Thatcher (the present Prime Minister), Harold Wilson declared: '... small-time crooks with records have become possessed of vast sums of money, sums far greater than they could ever earn in other ways honestly or dishonestly, and have obtained access to lists of names of former soldiers, SAS [Special Air Service—Y.K.] and the rest, and signed them up as mercenaries in conditions which I hope the whole House would regard as utterly abhorrent.... We must face the fact that within a few days a small group of people—whatever their background—have been able to raise a vast private army.' At this point Wilson was interrupted by cries of 'CIA!' The members of the House of Commons already knew what to shout. John Banks had called a press conference in London and had informed reporters that Aspin was a CIA agent and that his link with the CIA was through Larry Katz, a Federal Narcotics Bureau officer at the US embassy in London. Banks also stated that Aspin received his money from Don Belfort, who lived in Leeds, and that Colin Taylor, Holden Roberto's representative in

Britain, was in charge of the recruitment organisation's security arrangements. Banks also claimed that Taylor had threatened, 'You blow it and we'll blow you open.' Losing his temper, Banks called Taylor 'the Gestapo'. He admitted to receiving 75,000 pounds in US dollars, but alleged that even larger sums had gone astray.

This press conference took place on February 9, 1976, and Harold Wilson had to give the House of Commons an explanation the following day. It is interesting to note that, in expressing their indignation at CIA involvement in the recruitment of mercenaries in Britain, the members of Parliament failed to notice Wilson's reference to the fact that the recruiters had had access to lists of ex-servicemen. At the time no one thought to enquire further, but four months later, at the end of June, reports appeared in the press that implied that among the mercenaries who left for Angola to fight under the command of the notorious Colonel Callan there were also two British secret agents. Banks revealed this just at the moment when ten British and three other mercenaries on trial in Angola were awaiting their sentence, explaining his decision by saying that he was sick of lies and hypocrisy.

According to Banks, he had included the two agents in his force on the request of the Special Branch of British Intelligence. 'Before my main force men left for Angola I was approached by the Special Branch in a pub in Camberly, Surrey. Ever since I'd started operations I'd been under their surveillance.... Once they were sure I wasn't raising some ridiculous domestic revolutionary force—and that it was going where I said it was, and to do what I said it was going to do—we got along fine. I think they were personally interested and sympathetic..., the Special Branch asked me if I could include two of their agents in my force.... I was duly introduced to these characters—one Smith and one Brown..., their documents were in order and out they went with us from London airport. Naturally we had a Special Branch send-off.'

The politicians gave the appearance of knowing nothing about it. However, the government must surely have been aware of what was happening—provided, of course, the intelligence service trusted it.

One of the two agents was killed and the other wounded when his jeep was blown up. The Special Branch asked Banks to keep quiet though neither agent had made any secret of why they were in Angola.

One of the surviving mercenaries, Keith Henderson, who was made sergeant-major while in Angola, also stated that there were two British secret agents in their detachment. One of these was John Lockyer, who told Henderson that he had been sent out by MI 6. The other, according to Henderson, was middle-aged and overweight, and died of a heart attack during his first patrol. The

truth will always out.

The debates in Parliament ended with the creation of the Diplock Committee which was given the task of studying old English laws forbidding recruitment into foreign armies and, where necessary, bringing those laws up to date and strengthening them. However, this enterprise led nowhere, as, according to British legal experts, the prohibition of the recruitment of mercenaries would be an infringement of British civil liberties.

The British authorities remained impassive when the former mercenaries were exposed. Not so the CIA when its agent, David Bufkin, an ex-paratrooper, began to boast openly that he had succeeded in recruiting several dozen of his fellow Americans to work in Angola, Rhodesia and South Africa. The Central Intelligence Agency hastily denied any connection with him and had articles published in the press referring to him as a 'tall story-teller', a 'swindler' and even a 'double agent'. However, although the CIA hotly denied the accusations directed against it, it was later revealed that among the mercenaries sent to Angola by David Bufkin, the owner of the 'mercenary fighting group' office, was one George Bacon, a CIA agent who had received numerous awards for his work in Laos. Fearing further disclosures, the CIA refused to help the American authorities in their investigations into Bufkin's scandalous activities.



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A 'BLACK FLY' FOR GADDAFI

The Conference at Langley

A sunny May morning in 1981. Gleaming black limousines raced through the Washington suburb of Langley and drew up in front of the main building of the US Central Intelligence Agency. The rear doors opened and out stepped men in civilian clothes—some young, some already greying, others middle-aged, but all of athletic bearing. That day an important conference was being held, attended by almost all the branches of the CIA. On the agenda was just one topic—Muammar Gaddafi....

The political course being followed by Libya had long been a thorn in the American side, and the White House had instructed both the CIA and the State Department to influence the behaviour of the Libyan leader, Gaddafi. Both had tried, but without success.

What is it about Libyan policies and the behaviour of Gaddafi that does not suit the USA?

Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan leader, was born in 1942. He studied history at the University of Libya in Benghazi, and in 1965 he graduated from a military academy. While studying at the military academy he had become active in politics, and in 1964 he became the founder and leader of the underground Organisation of Free Officers Unionists, whose aim was to liberate the country from imperialist rule.

Gaddafi took an active part in the revolution of September 1, 1969, which overthrew the monarchy and established a Libyan republic. Following the overthrow of the monarchy, Gaddafi was appointed commander of the Libyan Armed Forces and chairman of the highest organ of power—the Revolutionary Command Council. When this was abolished in March 1977, Gaddafi was

elected General Secretary of the highest legislative organ—the General People's Congress of Libya and Libya itself officially became the Popular Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Since March 1979, though not occupying any official post, Gaddafi is the de facto head of the Popular Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; he is also Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Armed Forces.

In the years following the revolution, the Libyan government, headed by Gaddafi, carried through a number of socio-economic measures designed to meet the interests of the popular masses. In its foreign policy Libya adheres to the principles of positive neutrality and non-alignment, and is pursuing an anti-American policy.

Gaddafi's foreign policy does not suit America. Shortly after the 1969 revolution the Pentagon had to close down its largest air force base in the East Mediterranean—the Willusfield base in Libya. The Libyans assumed control of their oil, and resisted pressure on the question of trade concessions and oil prices to suit Washington. The Libyan leadership strongly condemns those governments that have agreed to provide the United States with bases, opposes the Camp David agreement between the USA, Egypt and Israel, and gives moral and material support to the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

The American leadership was particularly displeased by one of Gaddafi's recent speeches delivered at a mass meeting in Tripoli, in which he said: 'American imperialism has started a crusade against the countries of the Middle East and Africa who are fighting for a bright future and national independence. In so doing, the United States is posing as a defender of Islam, but in fact is merely defending the interests of its henchmen in the region.'

The Reagan Administration has, in effect, declared a cold war against Libya. It was decided to isolate Libya diplomatically: the Libyan embassy in Washington was closed down and all Libyan diplomats expelled; the US diplomatic mission was recalled from the Libyan capital. Economic sanctions have also been declared in the form of an embargo on imports of Libyan oil. All the mass media have been instructed to discredit the Libyan leadership and its policies.

As all the legal channels of influence on Libya have been blocked off, the CIA bosses were meeting on that May morning to discuss the question of what could be done next to finally get rid of Gaddafi. Nor were they meeting empty-handed. The CIA had already engaged in operations against the present Libyan regime both inside Libya itself and at the international level. The practical result of this invisible activity was an intensive campaign of slander against the Libyan leader. For example, the CIA spread rumours to the effect that Gaddafi was involved in the slave-trade with the Sahara, and that he speculated with Libyan deposits in international banks and squandered the national wealth earned by oil. The

CIA also arranged the disappearance of a moderate Muslim leader following a visit to Libya with a view to arousing suspicion and hatred towards Gaddafi throughout the Muslim world. The former Libyan Ambassador in India, Mohammed Yusuf Almagriaf, who is now in London, has been bought by the CIA and has set up, with American funds, an 'Afro-Asian International Committee' to fight Gaddafi. Almagriaf is also the leader of the 'National Front for the Salvation of Libya', whose aim is to create disorder inside Libya by sabotage, provocation, etc. In other words, the CIA is conducting a classic destabilisation campaign against the Libyan regime. This campaign has three main points. The first is disinformation via the press and radio and by means of rumours designed to 'hurt' Gaddafi and his government. The second is the creation of a 'counter-government' which would dispute the Colonel's right to run the country. The third is support for those in Libya who are discontent with the regime and encouragement for various acts of sabotage, including bomb explosions, intended to show the existence of an opposition to Gaddafi among local political forces.

Information leaked to the press about the decision adopted at the Langley conference. Given that the USA has no diplomatic relations with Libya, a new, more decisive line would have to be pursued. About 2,500 Americans, mainly oil experts working on contract, were in Libya at the time of the conference, and it was decided to make use of this in organising an attack on Gaddafi. But how?

Operation 'Black Fly'

How many plots have been devised against the life of the leader of the Libyan revolution? Perhaps dozens, we do not know. However, some information has found its way into the press. Here is what one well-informed US journalist told me in a private conversation.

'...You remember the plot to poison the Cuban Prime Minister, Fidel Castro? The contract to kill him arranged with gangsters from the Mafia? The CIA agent who plugged in the 'lie detector' and switched off all the electricity in a second-rate Singapore hotel? The failed underground military operations in Cuba, Laos and Iraq?

'The James Bond types who carry the responsibility for these unsuccessful ventures are in business again. The CIA department where these "wizards" have taken up residence is now proposing new, ridiculous projects similar to those that ended in such noisy fiascos in the sixties and seventies.

'Anyone who has seen that gleam in the eyes of CIA strategists which arouses concern in the beholder, or attended a planning

session held by a bunch of people addicted to secret operations, cannot help but ask himself what new secret action the CIA is about to launch. Some time ago, for example, reports appeared in the press to the effect that this organisation is working on a multistage operation supposedly directed at freeing the world from the radical Libyan ruler Muammar Gaddafi. The White House denied these reports. Other reports that leaked to the press revealed that in fact this operation was directed against Mauritania, and not against Libya. This naturally provoked the displeasure of Mauritania, but yet another 'information leak' provided further elucidation: the place in question is not Mauritania but Mauritius. Mauritius is an island in the Indian Ocean with a relatively small population and with which a dispute is of no particular importance.

Meanwhile, in the corridors of the CIA, securely protected from the outside world, they whisper amongst themselves about dispatching a killer to Libya and eliminating Gaddafi. Judging by one of the plans, they intend to avail themselves of the services of a gangster disguised as a mercenary, who will then infiltrate into the crowd of experts in Gaddafi's service.

'According to one of the variants proposed by the CIA, the secret assassin will be carrying a lethal, slow-acting poison. During the first 48 hours there are absolutely no signs of poisoning whatsoever. Then Gaddafi will go down with an illness that cannot be distinguished from a number of sicknesses caused by viruses. This is followed by partial paralysis, coma, and finally death. No trace of poison will remain in his body.

'In CIA circles my friend Ronny M. was given a complete description of this unpleasant potion, a fairly common substance that can be produced in almost any laboratory. My sense of responsibility as a journalist therefore does not permit me to give any further details.

'In order to poison Gaddafi with this potion, the CIA conspirators thought of using a tiny "dart" made to look like one of those black flies that can be found everywhere in the Libyan desert.'

Thus the Central Intelligence Agency is quietly returning to its old methods of carrying out secret subversive operations abroad. Naturally, the CIA does not announce its plans openly, but it is clear from the intelligence reports that the first to know about the subversive actions directed against them are the intended victims themselves.

The CIA has apparently admitted the real reason why it must hide its change in tactics from the American people. In one top-secret plan there is a warning that publicity might cause panic among the American public, which has still not recovered from the shock of the Vietnam war.

CIA strategists have planned their secret operations together

with such countries as Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Guatemala, South Africa and South Korea. Some of these plans are already being put into operation. For example, Sadat's Egypt helped the CIA to give secret support to the insurgents in Afghanistan and prepare its secret operations against Libya. Egypt and Turkey were involved in operations against Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. In Guatemala the CIA has arranged for secret training in sophisticated murder techniques. The training itself is conducted by Cuban emigrants, and the CIA stays in the background. The Guatemalan killers intend to use the knowledge they have acquired in their struggle against 'revolutionary agents' from Cuba—or at least this is the theory. The Guatemalans interpret the term 'revolutionary agent' very broadly indeed. Almost any opponent of the present regime may be thus described. According to those working in the intelligence service, the programme of physical elimination is coordinated from one of the offices in the presidential palace. Among the victims were health-service employees who were calling for a boycott of baby foods which, in some regions of the country, were prepared with infected water.

The CIA is also training detachments of commandos from among Cuban emigrants, having apparently forgotten the lesson of the Bay of Pigs. Discussions were held on plans to parachute the commandos into Cuba and also to use them for subversive activity against Cuban economic missions and other organisations in Latin America. The emigrants are also to start a radio station 'Free Cuba' with US technical and financial aid.

In the Middle East, the CIA is working together with Israel in an attempt to destroy radical elements in the Palestine Liberation Organisation. However, the Israelis are using the very same destabilisation operations against Saudi Arabia, which is a firm supporter of the USA and one of its oil suppliers.

The Division of Special Operations

Within the US Central Intelligence Agency there is a section known as the Division of Special Operations or, more familiarly, the department of 'dirty tricks', which is entrusted with the management of 'sensitive' intelligence operations. Special bases and camps have been set up both in and outside the USA which train terrorists, saboteurs and murderers to carry out the tasks set by this department. Within the CIA structure a special place is occupied by 'The Technical Support Division', which prepares equipment and 'devices', i.e. the means of individual or mass murder. Numerous research institutes and firms employing highly qualified experts are involved in the development of sophisticated methods of eliminating undesirables. Representatives of the US press mana-

ged to talk with one such expert, who did not wish to give his real name, and he gave a detailed account of the 'services' he provided for the CIA. This expert was directly involved in preparing the insidious weapon that was to be used to kill Gaddafi. Here is an extract from his interview published in the *Playboy* magazine, which comes out in Chicago.

Question. But you did say you worked with poison. What type of work was that?

Answer. Basically, I was asked by the CIA to devise methods and devices for assassination. Almost everything I worked with was designed to kill people. The three major assassination techniques I dealt with were shooting, poisoning and explosive devices.

Q. Can you give us an example of a weapon that used poison?

A. Yes. In the mid-fifties, my CIA contact came to me with a problem he wanted solved. These things were always put hypothetically. For example, suppose you wanted to kill someone on an airplane without attracting a lot of attention. Well, the simplest answer is a contact poison. I was given a substance called [deleted], a liquid that penetrates the skin and carries with it anything you mix in. Put a drop on someone's clothes, in his shoe. That would be the most basic tool for this type of thing.

Q. Did you deliver that to your CIA contact?

A. I used lyophilized [freeze-dried] tiger-snake venom at first. There's another snake called the boomslang that was finally settled on, because the symptoms are very subtle. It causes internal bleeding and can take days to finally kill you. It would be hard to tell what had happened to you.

Q. You say those jobs were given to you hypothetically. Did your contact ever get specific?

A. One of the only times he had to get specific rather than just give me a 'What if' was when he wanted to extract a black guy who drove a Jaguar.... this black man had to die at a certain point in the ride he was to take, say eight minutes after he started—for what reason I don't know.... I had to know a lot—body weight, was he right-handed, that sort of thing. They eventually brought me the steering wheel from a Jaguar and a photograph of the man driving, which was just his hands on the wheel. That's how I knew he was black.... I mixed up a batch of [deleted]..., which I told them to point onto his steering wheel where he'd normally put his hands, I adjusted the dosage so that knockdown time would be the eight minutes or whatever the figure was. Apparently, they were pleased with that.

Q. So far, we're talking about chemical systems. Did you also design gadgets like that dart gun?

A. Not quite like that, but quite a number of other things. After the automobile episode, my contact came to me with another

hypothetical problem: Suppose you're in a situation in which it is impossible to bring into a room any firearms, or unconventional things that would be suspect. How would you take care of a roomful of guys? Well, next question is: How taken care of? I mean, do you want them extracted, do you want them blinded temporarily? Biological assault?—always loved that term.... Well, in this particular instance, my contact said, 'We want them extracted for sure. A fair number of them, in a moderate-sized room.' And I wound up with one of the nastiest nasties that I came up with. That incidentally, was the jargon for those gadgets: Assorted Nasties. This one was a subminiature bomb, roughly the size of a 45-caliber cartridge. You threw it and it exploded. It was loaded with hardened steel shot, like bird shot, which was coated with poison....

Wilson's Clockwork Pencils

On June 8, 1981, in a small, quiet restaurant in the suburbs of Rome, two Americans met for lunch: one was the chief of the CIA in Italy, and the other a CIA agent by the name of Edwin Wilson. Having ordered a bottle of red Chianti, the two men held a serious, businesslike discussion on how to eliminate Gaddafi.

Edwin Wilson, the agent selected to carry out the 'fly plot', is a veteran of American intelligence, and a refined and inventive expert in 'elimination'. A reporter for *The Washington Post* managed to establish that the Chilean patriot Orlando Letelier was killed by a mine that had been fitted with 'clockwork pencils' by this same Edwin Wilson. 'Clockwork pencil' is CIA jargon for electronic, remote-control detonators which resemble ordinary pencils.

While the two CIA agents are discussing their plans over lunch, let us look at some of the biographical information on Wilson that we have taken from the American and West European press. In our opinion it is fairly typical for a man working in such an organisation.

Edwin Wilson has worked for the CIA since 1951 and is considered a leading expert on explosives. In 1971 Wilson suddenly left the CIA and opened a private office in Washington. However, he continued to obtain from the CIA arsenal explosives, detonators and electronic equipment used in sabotage operations. Now, operating as a private trader and exporter and thus protecting the CIA from public exposure, Wilson supplies the punitive organs of pro-US dictatorships with various devices used in police surveillance, and with such apparently innocent items as telephones, electric lamps, televisions, vases and briefcases that can be exploded by

remote control.

However, it was later discovered that Wilson was shortly thereafter given a long-term assignment in the Middle East. First he visited Iran on the eve of the collapse of the Shah's regime, and supplied the Iranian secret police with one of the items produced for export by 'International Consultants'—iron rings for torture. He then moved on to Cairo, where he supplied Sadat's palace guard with telephone-tapping equipment and electronic-optical devices for night-time surveillance. Finally Wilson ended up in an Italian trattoria, sitting opposite one of his bosses and listening to his plan for the elimination of Gaddafi. It is difficult to say what agreement was reached on that day. This article is not dealing in idle guesses but in facts and actual events. However, when, about two months after the meeting, the Western press told the world about it, Wilson was quick to react. He declared that the meeting in Rome had been arranged to discuss his proposal to assist in tracking down two fugitives from justice who were being sought in connection with the murder of Orlando Letelier in 1976. It would seem that Wilson himself was not involved in the murder, though he knows who was responsible.

We can also give a brief portrait of Wilson 'just in case': aged 53, over 6 ft. tall, brown hair, balding, with dark eagle eyes and heavy brows, a square, thick-set chin and a short, thin nose. Likes to wear brightly-coloured ties. Always travels with a dozen false passports issued under fictitious names. Has a lethal hobby: sometimes he shakes from his sleeve, as if by accident, something resembling a black African fly....

Desperate Action

The slander campaign against Libya, the destabilisation programme and sophisticated plans to remove Gaddafi by means of powerful poison—all came to nothing. The US leaders resorted to open military provocation. On August 19, 1981, at about 7 o'clock in the morning, an incident took place over the Gulf of Sirte on the Libyan coast which caused concern throughout the world. Eight American F-14 fighter planes taking part in manoeuvres by the Sixth Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean attacked two Libyan fighter planes on their regular patrol flight along the Libyan coast. Tripoli qualified this incident as an act of aggression.

Immediately after this incident the White House and the Pentagon, and all the US mass media began a 'psychological' attack on Libya. They accused Libya of aggression against the USA! Although anyone who is even slightly acquainted with geography and politics can only consider such an accusation as frankly ridiculous. President Reagan and Defence Secretary Weinberger stated

that the United States would continue to respond with force to any act similar to that allegedly committed by Libya.

During the US military venture in Vietnam, Fulbright, then a Democrat Senator, described the foreign policy of the USA as a display of the 'arrogance of power'. This was also the title he gave to his book. This expression inevitably comes to mind today, for it is precisely such a provocative and arrogant display of power, the desire to win by sheer muscle power and frighten a smaller country that underlies the provocative actions taken by US ruling circles against Libya, off whose shores Washington deliberately organised the manoeuvres of the US Sixth Fleet.

The deliberately provocative nature of the manoeuvres was obvious even before they began, as was revealed by *Newsweek*, which commented that the Reagan Administration intended the manoeuvres to be a direct challenge to the Libyan leader in order to test his reaction. In view of such undisguised threats and pressure, it is not surprising that many US commentators expressed serious doubts about the version hastily put out by the Pentagon and the State Department, in which it was alleged that two Libyan spy planes had launched an 'unprovoked attack' on a group of US jet fighters which then opened fire in self-defence.

From the moment it came to power, the Reagan Administration has pursued a policy of confrontation with Libya, and a group set up to study the 'Libyan problem' was instructed to formulate ways of intimidating Libya. The first tactic adopted was that of accusing Libya of 'international terrorism and subversive activity'. Subsequently it was announced that the ultimate aim of the United States was to bring about a change in Libyan policy so that it would be more 'acceptable' to Washington. Those in power in Washington make no attempt to conceal their hostility towards Libya and their desire to settle accounts with its leader. Here is an extract from an interview given by US Presidential Advisor Edwin Meese to an ABC reporter on 11 October 1981.

Q. Since the death of Sadat, there has been an unprecedented escalation of the rhetoric by officials of this government against Muammar Gaddafi, the strongman of Libya. The Vice-President, the other day, called him an egomaniac.... My question to you is, is this all talk, or are we going to do something about Gaddafi?

A. There is no question that Gaddafi and Libya have been a problem.... There is a threat to the peace and stability of the Middle East because of this country and its leader.

Now, as to what this nation is doing, we are, of course, seeking to build up relationships with the other countries in the Mideast.... We are willing to entertain joint military planning, military contingency plans, and other things....

Q. But all that is very general.... Our denunciations of Mr. Gaddafi are really and truly at an unprecedented pitch.... The

question is, what can we do besides continuing to denounce this man?...

The Presidential Advisor again limited himself to a general answer to this question, and the ABC reporter was unable to elicit a clear and precise response. The reporter was correct in assuming that the government of the USA and the omnipresent CIA would not stop at words only. The CIA will not stop even after its 'black fly' plot against Gaddafi has been exposed in the press.

The answer which the Presidential Advisor could not, or, more accurately, would not give to the ABC broadcaster was provided by the Libyan JANA agency. Here is the statement issued by this agency on 5 November 1981:

'Tripoli. Libyan public opinion is seriously concerned by reports in the Western press over the last few days that the CIA is preparing another assassination attempt on the Libyan revolutionary leader, Gaddafi.

'The JANA agency points out that information leaked to the press indicates that the CIA is actively continuing its assassination preparations in connection with the forthcoming military manoeuvres to be held by the Pentagon and its allies close to the Libyan border.

'According to information from diplomatic circles in Washington, the USA is planning to use its B-52 strategic bombers in a massive attack against Libyan territory, and in particular those places where Libyan revolutionary leader Gaddafi might be supposed to be. With this in view, the CIA has of late been carefully following Gaddafi's movements inside the country, noting the places that he visits frequently and those at which he stops.'

It would seem that a new assassination attempt against the Libyan leader has been elaborated behind the closed doors of Langley and is now being put into operation.

The anti-Libyan campaign started after the failure of American attempts to pressurise Libya into changing the consistent and principled political course it adopted following the 1969 Revolution, and which constitutes the basis of its positive position as regards national and international problems. This position is not to the taste of the US government, which sees the defence of lawful rights as aggression and qualifies the national liberation movements or support for them as terrorism.

That a great power such as the USA should accuse, and moreover without foundation, a developing country of engaging in terrorism is all the more ridiculous when one remembers that this same great power itself perpetrates numerous acts of terrorism, supplies weapons of murder and destruction to Israeli Zionists to attack the Palestinian Arab people, and offers full protection to the Zionist racist regime in occupied Palestinian territory. It is the USA that scares peoples of the world by its military bases and na-

val fleets in the East and West. It is the USA that provides aid and support to the racist minority regime in South Africa and to fascist regimes rejected by the people.

Revolutionary Libya can rely on its friends, the socialist countries, in its struggle against the intrigues of American imperialism. Any new CIA plot against the Libyan revolution will be repulsed by the Libyan people and all those who support them.



TIMUR GAIDAR

TIMUR GAIDAR—writer and journalist, he worked for many years as a correspondent for the newspaper *Pravda* in Yugoslavia and Latin America. His books include *Forward the Neva*, *On the Telephone from Havana* and *Under the Afghan Skies*.

HIDDEN FACES

It was early on an April morning at a southern military aerodrome, and the day promised to be very hot. Amongst the interceptor planes wrapped up in covers as if in field shirts, the blue-and-silver Ilyushin-18 standing next to the runway had the appearance of a well-dressed city man who had wandered into an army barracks. However, once inside the plane, this impression is dispelled: no padded seats, no carpeted gangway. Each morning this plane transports people, mail and urgent freight to the Soviet military units stationed in Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan government.

The engines whirled into life, the green shoulder straps swayed back and forth, and the kit-bags slithered around under our feet.

The tall, shimmering mountain peaks passed below us, stretching endlessly in all directions and blurring only at the horizon. White and black, glaciers and ravines stood out in sharp and unrelieved contrast.

'What a magnificent sight!'

My exclamation was spontaneous, not addressed to anyone in particular. My neighbour, an officer in the engineer corps, immediately responded.

'Do you think so? That depends who you are. We sappers don't think so.'

We talked about the mountains till we arrived in Kabul.

Although he had spent his long military service battling against the mountains, military engineer Sergeyev had come to love them. Perhaps he was simply endowed with a rich imagination. As he spoke, the mountains 'moved', 'tied themselves into knots', and even 'curled upwards'—his description of the Hazarajat plateau in

the middle of Afghanistan.

I will relate in brief and more prosaic terms what Sergeyev told me.

Mountains and plateaux form four-fifths of the territory of Afghanistan. One half of the country is more than 1,800 metres above sea level. As a result, the road system is poorly developed, particularly between South and North. The total length of roadway in Afghanistan is around 20,000 kilometres. Of these less than 3,000 have a hard surface, and around 7,000 are covered with crushed stone.

The eastern border of Afghanistan, which begins in the Pamir, is shielded by mountains whose peaks reach a height of 7,000 metres. Towards the south they are lower. The British who invaded Afghanistan several times from this direction, came in across the passes—the Khyber, the Bolan, the Kurram. However, it is not difficult to block these passes. More dangerous for Afghanistan today are the caravan routes, of which there are a large number. They run along ledges in the cliffs and the bottom of ravines, and they are used by the bands organised by the CIA, who come across from Pakistan.

My companion took from his map case a sheet of paper covered in small, neat handwriting.

'Take a look at this. I managed to find an old book about the civil war in Afghanistan in 1928-29, and took some notes. Here they are.'

I began to read:

'The general conditions in this part of Afghanistan are as follows:

'1. Extremely rugged terrain. The numerous mountains are usually separated by deep, narrow gorges with little-known footpaths running upwards.

'2. The inhabitants are scattered in the deep valleys, often cut off from one another by mountain ridges and spurs, which form natural barriers dividing the area into isolated parts.

'3. Insufficient water supply.

'4. Difficult weather conditions. Here heat and cold play an incomparably more important role than in open territory.'

'In the west of the country the Afghan army can deal with the bands more easily,' said Sergeyev, taking the sheet of paper back from me. 'Plateau and desert. Far from ideal, but the land is open for observation....'

With its right wing tipped towards the mountains, our Il-18 was beginning its corkscrew descent into the narrow valley of Kabul.

II

No one met me at the airport, and I was glad when Sergeyev invited me to get into the car that had been sent to fetch him.

We drove along a broad highway lined with plane trees and, as is always the case on a first visit, my eyes took in every detail.

There were few cars in this part of town, and the air smelt of dust and oranges. We passed the American embassy—a two-storeyed white building set on a green lawn and surrounded by cars. The gates in the iron railing fence opened and a long black car with a diplomatic number plate drove out and sped towards the centre of town, overtaking us.

Robert P. Lessard, an executive officer in the CIA whose name occasionally appeared in the Western press, once worked in this building. In 1974 he was expelled from Kabul for 'activity incompatible with his diplomatic status'. Shortly before the April revolution of 1978 he turned up again, not in Kabul but in Islamabad, this time as an expert on the 'Afghan question'...

We have arrived in the centre. Beyond the square one can see tightly-packed six- and seven-storey buildings, stalls, shops. To tell the truth, Kabul is not at all as I imagined it. It is both richer and poorer, more severe and more festive than it appears on photographs. It has more broad modern roads, buildings and parks than one might expect and, unusually, the mosques do not dominate the city; their minarets cannot serve, as they do in other eastern cities, to point the way in the tangle of streets. However, nowhere can one hide from these baked clay buildings. The dark, square windows of old Kabul gaze down from the hillside onto the centre with its cinemas, its televisions, its demonstrations, flags, and schools.

III

I arrived in my hotel, the Kabul, towards evening. The hotel itself was old and had known better days. It has three floors and no lift. From the foyer, with its few low tables and armchairs and the posters on the oak panelling advertising the Afghan tourist company, doors lead into the restaurant, the lounge where breakfast is served, and the garden.

I was already familiar with the situation and I knew the itinerary of my first few trips.

A couple of days before my arrival a bus was travelling along the road that cuts across the mountainous plateau in the west of Afghanistan. The Afghan patrol under the command of Senior Lieutenant Said Yusuf, which was secretly keeping watch over the road 75 kilometres to the west of the city of Herat, did not pay it any particular attention. It was daytime, and the bus was travelling openly. However, when the patrol stopped the bus for the usual check, armed men jumped out from the front and rear doors and started firing machine-guns. In the skirmish that followed the

bandits were routed and two taken prisoner. They told Said Yusuf that the detachment had been formed in Iran, in Kum, and had been assigned the task of reaching Herat, contacting the counter-revolutionary underground movement there and starting sabotage operations. They had brought their own ammunition, including grenades.

None of this would have aroused special interest were it not for the fact that Said Yusuf, on inspecting the weapons found in the bus, discovered strange-looking grenades packed in cases. They were immediately dispatched to Kabul, where it was discovered that they were chemical grenades.

...A press conference for Afghan and foreign correspondents was being held at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. When I arrived I found myself in a long, narrow room whose doors opened directly onto the park. It was packed with journalists and brightly lit—three television cameras were operating. The conference was chaired by a man of average height with greying hair and a refined but somewhat tired-looking face. I was told that this was Sarboland, the Minister of Culture and Information. He chaired the conference with calmness and restraint. To be frank, I had expected more emotion.

Ghulam Djelani, a chemist, was the next to speak.

'The poisonous substance inside the grenades is known as 517 C-S. It has a wide range of effects. First the eyes start to burn, followed by vomiting and pain in the spine. The victim becomes helpless...'

The light was switched off and a documentary film was projected onto the screen above the platform: a country road wound its way among the bare hills; a bus, its doors hanging open, stood tilting to one side on the edge of the road; the bus driver, an elderly and obviously frightened Afghan, lifted up his shirt to reveal the traces of a beating. 'They broke into my house, beat me up and forced me to take them to Herat...'

The light went on again. Senior Lieutenant Said Yusuf was standing on the platform. He was about twenty-five years old, with a pleasant, open face. He answered the questions clearly, though he was evidently nervous before the television cameras and such a large audience.

'You found these grenades in the bus?'

'Yes, these very grenades. They were packed in cases.'

The grenades were lying on the platform table, brightly coloured like cans of beer.

The last to speak was the head of the Main Political Department of the People's Armed Forces Lieutenant Colonel Gol Aka, who read a statement by the Government of the DRA:

'The government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan vigorously protests against international imperialism and reaction

in the area arming hired bandits who are sent into Afghanistan with chemical weapons, the use of which is an act of vandalism....'

No audience leaves a room as quickly as journalists if there is something important to pass on to their newspapers. The hall emptied. The television operators switched off their equipment, and an Afghan officer cleared away the grenades from the table covered with a red tablecloth. I asked if I could hold one of them. It was light, and on the pale-coloured metal I could clearly read the words 'Federal Laboratories Inc. Salisbury, Pennsylvania USA, 1978'. This was all the more noteworthy in view of American propaganda to the effect that 'the Russians are using chemical agents' in Afghanistan. This piece of 'news' was first reported—strange as it may seem—in Hongkong. William Miller, a UPI correspondent, reported an account given by an 'eyewitness' whose house had purportedly been filled with gas. Preserving the appearance of objectivity, Miller added that no confirmation of this raid, supposed to have taken place on February 22, 1980, had been obtained from any other independent sources.

However, no such 'confirmation' was necessary. From then on everything proceeded according to the prepared script. *The New York Times* reported this 'information', referring to a source that preferred to remain anonymous. *The New York Daily News*, basing itself on 'intelligence data', described 'hideous pictures of poisoning'. The US Secretary of State, speaking 'on the basis of information received', expressed concern at the growing, if not definitive, evidence that chemical agents were being used in Afghanistan.

Now, after all this fuss and bother, we could see with our own eyes the reality of the situation: chemical grenades made in the USA supplied to one of the bands by the CIA.

Immediately after the April revolution, Lee Robenson, Rogers Brock and Van David, CIA agents, arrived in Pakistan to assist Robert Lessard. They formed a 'task force' whose aim was the organisation of armed struggle against Afghanistan. This task force is led by the CIA chief in Pakistan, John Reagan. This group liaises with the Pakistan government through Agha Shahi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs advisor, and Nawaz Shah, a secretary at the same Ministry. The cover for this operation is provided by organisations such as the US Drug Enforcement Administration and the Asian fund.

IV

While still in Moscow I was told: 'If you are offered tea, then you must drink not less than three cups. That is the Afghan custom. The first is to quench your thirst, the second is for the general

health and well-being of all present, and the third is a mark of respect towards the host.' I cannot remember how many times our cups were filled as we sat at the low table in the office of the Head of the Main Political Department of the Afghan Army. The conversation continued for some time.

Gol Aka was born in 1939 in a village 12 kilometres from Kabul. His father was a peasant—not one of the wealthy, but also not the poorest man in the village. In 1959 he entered a military engineering academy, as did many of the sons of peasants and craftsmen. For the most part they came from military boarding schools where they had had board and keep from the age of ten. The cadets at the military academy read Marxist literature published by the Iranian Tudeh Party. In the evenings the cadets would gather to discuss ways of ending the backwardness of the country, the reforms of Ammanullah Khan, Islam and revolution. Stories of life in the Soviet Union were passed amongst them. Here Gol Aka started reading Lenin, and he joined the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan six weeks after it had been founded in January 1965 by its first constituent congress.

In 1967 the party split into two groups. However, despite the split, both groups continued their political and social struggle for reform. In 1977 the party reunited as a result of the growing revolutionary situation in the country, and the PDPA leadership decided to enquire into the activities of Hafizullah Amin, who had originally provoked the split in the party and then done all he could to prevent its reunification.

Gol Aka was still reserved, speaking unhurriedly and pouring tea, but his pale face, on which the traces of smallpox stood out more clearly, betrayed tension. He spoke of arrests and the murder of party cadres, of Amin's army purges—seven altogether. Six prominent party leaders, including Babrak Karmal, Nur Mohammed Taraki and Anahita Ratebzad, had been removed from power, sent abroad, and then declared 'enemies of the people'....

'The consequences of Amin's criminal activity can still be felt even today,' continued Gol Aka.

'We now have considerable evidence that Hafizullah Amin had become a paid agent of the CIA during his stay in the USA, and that he was assigned the task of spying on Afghan students in America. Fear of exposure haunted him and led to further criminal activity. You remember the tragic incident with Dubbs?'

How could one forget? It was reported in newspapers around the world.

On the morning of February 19, 1979, Adolph Dubbs, the US chargé d'affaires in Afghanistan, was going to the embassy in his car. The car slowed down at the traffic lights at a crossroad, and a policeman stepped out in front of it. The driver opened the car door, and saw a pistol aimed at his head. Three armed men got

in the back of the car and ordered him to drive to the hotel Kabul. There, having dismissed the driver, they took Adolph Dubbs to Room 117.

Four hours later Hafizullah Amin ordered the police to break into the room. The *chagré d'affaires* and one of the terrorists were killed, and the others wounded.

'Why was this order given? Why was there no attempt at negotiation in order to rescue Dubbs? Why were the surviving terrorists shot almost immediately on the order of Amin? Now,' said Gol Aka, 'we think we know the answer. The terrorists belonged to one of the religious groups, and wanted to force Amin to stop his repression of religious leaders. They decided to get proof of Amin's links with the CIA from Dubbs, and Amin ordered their elimination.'

'On December 27, 1979, the healthy forces within the party put an end to Amin's arbitrary rule. The second stage of the revolution had begun. However, it is by no means easy to overcome the damage done to the country and the revolution by Amin.'

V

After the hollow of Kabul, with its cracked brown soil, and the bare, rugged mountains of the Jalalabad valley, lush greenery was a joy to behold. It seemed as if we were flying over polished malachite glistening in the sun, with the river, a gleaming thread of silver.

The aerodrome is situated just a little to the east of Kabul, alongside the road that runs from the capital via Jalalabad to the Khyber pass.

I was introduced to Afghan comrades. Governor Nasser Shanladar was a young man, tall and well-built, wearing a green jacket made of rough army broadcloth. A machine-gun hung from his shoulder. Hazrat Rasul, head of the political section of an Afghan division, spoke Russian fairly well.

'Welcome. We were expecting you.' Both had only just returned from military operations against bandits in the province of Laghman and the district of Khugiani. Now the troops were on their way back to their barracks.

Rasul explained the situation to me. Up to February 27 all was relatively calm. Then the Adam-Khan band, about 750-800 strong, appeared in the province. This band was a military unit belonging to the Hezbe Islami Party, one of the main counter-revolutionary organisations vying with each other for ascendancy. Organised and armed by the CIA, this band arrived from Pakistan and here it was joined by many small bands 3-to-15-strong. Adam-Khan had virtually laid siege to Jalalabad, cutting off the highway

west of Kabul and east of the border with Pakistan. The bandits blew up a high-voltage electricity cable, leaving the city without electricity for some time. Several attempts were made to blow up the water tower. In the surrounding villages, they set fire to schools and the houses of officers and soldiers in the Afghan army, killed party activists and teachers.

'We found this among the things belonging to one of the defeated bands....'

Rasul picked up from the table a small book in a green cover and began to read the headings: 'Road Mining.... Road Destruction.... Sabotage of Transport.... Organisation of Ambushes and the Seizure of Transport.... Lightning Attacks.... Attacks on Guard-posts.... Destruction of Fuel Dumps....' I asked him to translate a few paragraphs for me.

'As the vehicle approaches the ambush point, the driver and his assistant are fired on, preferably from air guns or rifles fitted with silencers, so that the shots are not heard. The passengers are then eliminated using cold steel. The less noise, the greater the success. The operation is completed by the removal of the freight. The ambush is set up at a place where the driver has to reduce speed.... Those taking part in the ambush are positioned as follows: concealed look-outs on either side of the ambush, snipers with air guns, the main group....'

I asked about the tactics used by the bands coming from Pakistan, and was told that they have no set tactic. Sometimes the band is composed of as many as 500-600 men, and sometimes as few as 30-40 men. They carry out raids and establish fortified basis. Their favourite method is ambush at bridges and narrow passes. The bridge is destroyed or the pass blocked, and then they open fire from above. If a well-armed army unit is to be attacked while on the move, the reconnaissance and combat patrol groups are allowed through unharmed—and then a sudden burst of well-aimed gunfire and a rapid retreat. Recently they have taken to mining the roads, covering the mined section with rifle and machine-gun fire. The mines are US-made, have no outer shell and are difficult to detect. Although these bands appear to be uncoordinated, in fact they are well-organised troops acting according to plan. One can feel the hand of CIA instructors controlling the bands' headquarters in Pakistan.

During the day the insurgents rest up in the numerous mountain caves hereabouts. These caves also serve as munition dumps and storehouses for weapons coming in via Pakistan from the USA, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The bands always select a cave with two or three exits, each of which is defended by a machine-gun post. These are so well camouflaged that they cannot be seen even from a helicopter hovering directly over the entrance.

Food is obtained from Pakistan, and sometimes includes US

army rations and canned food. Some of the provisions are taken from the Afghan peasants and this requisitioning assumes a regular form, rather like a tax. Savage reprisals are meted out to any who refuse to give bread and meat. The family is killed and the house burned down.

The operations mounted against the Adam-Khan band were carried out by Afghan troops in the river Laghman gorge (Laghman Province) and the districts of Khama, Surkhrud and Khugiani. The method was as follows: the area was blocked off, combed and the bandits wiped out. Adam-Khan was killed, his band destroyed, and the survivors fled to Pakistan.

VI

Mastan Shah, a major in the Afghan army, thick-set, stern, with a gruff voice and a moustache—in short, all those bellicose attributes which good-hearted and cheerful people assume in the army. Moreover today he is wearing his dress uniform: crossed sabres glitter on his scarlet stripes, gold buttons gleam on his jacket, and a snow-white shirt sets off his suntanned face. He is wearing the dress uniform because of our trip to the Khyber pass on the border at Tor Khama, where he may meet Pakistan border officials.

We set off in a Toyota car. To the left, behind the trees and the silver-green band of the river Kabul, we could see the brown houses of the villages in the Kama district, and straight ahead rose the misty Sulaiman mountains.

An armoured carrier, which is a must here, hurried along behind us. We crossed a bridge over the canal. It was securely guarded by machine-guns concealed behind blocks of stone and a tank on the side of the road.

We passed a settlement that housed Soviet specialists helping to bring water to the Jalalabad valley. Large-scale irrigation work has been under way for five years and has involved the construction of a water reservoir in the mountains, a tunnel system—the longest tunnel is 7.5 kilometres long—and 70 kilometres of canal. As a result, 30,000 hectares of land are now irrigated.

As we were about to drive into Ghaziabad, one of the largest farms on the newly irrigated land, we came to a military guard in a concrete sentry box. We stopped and the major telephoned.

We sat in the shade drinking cool milk out of aluminium mugs—a quiet, friendly lorry driver from Ghaziabad had stopped to give us some milk straight out of his milk churn. The water in the canal murmured as it flowed under the willow-trees, and an orange orchard spread out, peaceful and inviting, behind the poplars. It seemed our weapons were an unnecessary precaution.

Mastan was obviously worried when he returned. A band had been spotted the previous night near the village of Mamandra, about twenty kilometres further on towards the border.

'They'll be in Pakistan by now,' said Sarwar. Very probably. Nonetheless, when, after about another 15 kilometres, the radiator started to boil and we discovered that the ventilator had broken, our former peace of mind had disappeared. However, the fan belt was soon repaired, the radiator topped up, and we were on our way.

We saw nomads for the first time as we approached the Small Khyber. Here the valley narrowed and ancient forts stood black against the cliff tops. A cloud of dust was rising between the cliffs.

'The tribes are on the move,' said Mastan Shah. 'This year they're earlier than usual. That means this summer will be a hot one.'

There are an estimated two or three million nomadic tribesmen in Afghanistan, but the exact figure is unknown. They are always on the move. Each tribe has its own route, its own passes, foot-paths, pastureland and water sources, its own friends and enemies among the other travelling tribes. They pass the winter in the valleys where it is warmer, and in spring they move to the plateau of central Afghanistan and even to the north of the country.

Whose side are they on now? Are they for the revolution? Or against it?

Judging by what I was told in Kabul, they are neither for nor against. They live their own life and pursue their own road, accompanied by the sound of sheep bells, pitching their tents under the open sky and following their 'Pukhtunwali'—the unwritten code of honour of these warrior tribes.

One of the leaders of the Pushtu tribes, Abdul Gafar Khan, had addressed a meeting in Kabul shortly before my arrival, and had called for support for the revolution in defending Afghan independence against Western imperialism. Faiz Mohammed, Minister for Border and Tribal Affairs, held successful talks with representatives of the Momandi, Shinvari and Tani tribes, and they promised to provide 7,000 soldiers to help in border defence. However, the CIA agents based in Pakistan are also not sitting idle. By bribing the leaders, by deceit, by threats and promises, they are attempting to attract at least some of the tribes, individual clans, and particularly those that travel between Afghanistan and Pakistan, onto the side of counter-revolution. Reports have recently appeared in the Western press to the effect that the CIA has devised a special set of recommendations for using religious movements and inter-tribal strife to stimulate the counter-revolutionary struggle.

During the afternoon a dry, even heat filled the boulder village of Torkham. Everything is bathed in an amber light, like liquid gold, and nothing stirs.

There was still some movement when we arrived. The border guard had lowered the iron chain across the road, and buses and lorries had driven in from Pakistan. We had caught a glimpse of gold- and silver-embroidered skull caps, dark beards and grey beards, grey and black turbans. We went up to the chain dividing the two countries. Two policemen wearing grey uniforms with red neckties were talking on the small square that marks the beginning of Pakistani territory. Above them, painted on the wall of a two-storey house, was a large sign: 'Attention! Visitors are requested not to spend the night in remote and deserted places, but to attempt to reach Peshawar before nightfall'.

'Bands,' explained Sarwar. 'The same bands that they send across to us. Their bases are nearby. According to our information, there are about 80 such bases in Pakistan.'

In the hut at the Afghan border crossing point sat Lieutenant Mi Golam Khan and Doctor Abdul Karim. Sergeant Khar Mohammed was standing by the door. The customs check is thorough—parcels are inspected, bags are sometimes opened, and spot checks are conducted on cases.

We got into our car again and set off from Torkham, hemmed in on all sides by cliffs and forts, up the steep, almost vertical road. The gloomy, harsh, woodless mountains stretched away to north and south and east, while straight ahead between the rows of mountains, lay the narrow gorge of the Khyber pass.

The security organs of Afghanistan have a list of the camps, centres and bases—more than 80 in Pakistan—where the CIA recruits, trains and arms hired bands. Faqirabad, Gulbakhor, Miram Shah, Bachu... Some are sited right next to the Afghan border, others are further away. Each camp has its assignment, and each has its own secret routes.

'There it is, the border,' said Mastan Shah. 'Three hundred passes. As for the footpaths, only Allah, the All-Powerful and All-Merciful, knows how many footpaths there are.'

VII

The house we drew up at late in the evening had no guard, or at least no guard was visible. The gates were opened by a small boy wearing a turban and a robe. People wearing civilian clothes were also standing inside the gates, though it must be noted that the term 'civilian' is not altogether appropriate when used to describe an Afghan wearing national costume—if he is armed. A flowing shirt, a sleeveless jacket, wide, shapeless trousers and footwear resembling sandals. It is hard to imagine less military attire. But if a bandolier is added, he is instantly transformed into a soldier—from another age, perhaps, and not the kind we are used

to, but nonetheless, a warrior.

'I hope the journey did not tire you. Did you have a pleasant trip?' Said rose from a table on which there stood a typewriter. He was a man of medium height and did indeed appear to be a civilian in his jacket and tie. He was about forty years of age, and his black hair was turning grey. When he removed his spectacles I could see that his eyes were red from lack of sleep.

'Please sit down and rest. Tea will be served in a minute.'

This branch of HAD—Afghan State Security—had its office in the former house of one of the counter-revolutionary leaders. Such are the ironies of life!

'Perhaps he has paid you a visit?' I joked.

'Not yet. He is biding his time in Pakistan,' Said answered seriously. 'However, he sends his greetings.'

He pointed to the wall. Near the ceiling the damask wallpaper was pockmarked with bullet holes. Then he went on to explain:

'Most of the present leaders of the counterrevolution fled abroad immediately following the April Revolution of 1978. They include big landowners, khans and the more fanatical of the religious leaders. Some were already living abroad when the revolution took place, for even the Daoud regime, even King Mohammed Zahir Shah were too far 'left' for their taste.

'Take, for example, mullah Subghatullah Mojadidi, a cousin of Hosrat Shorabazar. In 1929 this family was involved in the overthrow of Ammanullah Khan, and thereafter for many years Subghatullah Mojadidi took part in the organisation of all reactionary activities. Towards the end of the fifties he incited the mullahs and the most backward section of the population of Kandahar to oppose a government decision to expand secular education. In October 1966, he organised the beating up of members of parliament who represented the views of the democratic section of the population. In the summer of 1970, here in Jalalabad a crowd led by mullahs and shouting 'The King is an infidel' attacked a cinema, a girls' school and the Spinzar hotel and tore down portraits of Mohammed Zahir Shah. This was in reaction to the King's announcement that his government would 'consider agrarian reform'. Once again, Mojadidi was one of the organisers of the demonstration.

Mojadidi is not only opposed to social reform. For many years now he has been waging a bitter battle against modern medicine, women's education and secular education in general, against new agricultural technology, industrial development, the cinema, television. He has become one of the leaders of the reactionary National Front for the Liberation of Afghanistan, which includes the Islamic Party, the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, the Islamic Revolutionary Movement, the Islamic Nationalist-Revolutionary Party and several other smaller organisations. The Front was set up in

January 1980, in Pakistan in order to 'co-ordinate activity' and put an end to the squabbling among the various organisations over American financial aid. The Front's military organisation is led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of the founders and leaders of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan.

The Adam-Khan band recently destroyed in the province of Nangankhar was an armed unit belonging to another leader of the Islamic Party Yunus Hali Nabikheil, who has broken away from Hekmatyar. The strife among the various counter-revolutionary organisations continues.

'Here, look at this,' said Said, showing me a document, which read.

'Greetings, courageous fighting brothers, engineer Mohammed Nabi Khan and engineer Bashir Khan. May the great Allah be merciful to you!

'Firstly, I pray to Allah that he give you good health. Secondly, I wish to emphasise that it is imperative that Mohammed Nabi Khan and also engineer Bashir Khan and his detachment come immediately, as a certain section of the "societies" and "movements" have started a struggle against us and our comrades-in-arms. If this section of the "movement" continues in its opposition to the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, all our efforts may come to nought.

'It is essential that engineer Mohammed Khan smooth over this confrontation. Only then will we be able to leave this area and return to Pakistan.

*Abdul Sabur Sarbirair,
Commander of the Central Front of the Islamic Party
and the Province of Tahir. 18 March 1980.'*

... Despite the efforts of the CIA to preserve secrecy, reports of deliveries of arms by the United States for use by counter-revolutionary bands in Afghanistan regularly appear in the Western press. According to these reports, the CIA is putting into operation a secret programme of arms delivery to Afghan bands, for which purpose CIA agents are buying on the international market arms made outside the USA. The city of Durah, 40 kilometres south of Peshawar, is the assembly centre for arms delivered by the USA. At present the USA is supplying arms through various channels to terrorist bands in 80 camps on Pakistani territory near the border with Afghanistan.

The American magazine *New Republic* gave a detailed account of CIA activity in the area. According to this magazine, shortly after December 1980, reports appeared in the press to the effect that the USA intended to supply arms. However, since then there

has been no more information on the subject. In fact the role being played by the Americans in Afghanistan is, according to high-ranking officials of the Carter and Reagan administrations, far greater than is indicated by press reports. President Carter told his assistants that the delivery of arms should not destroy the impression that the struggle being waged in Afghanistan is a Muslim struggle. On January 9, 1980, the CIA put before a special Senate commission a plan for the delivery of arms to Pakistan to be used by bands operating on Afghan territory. The USA was to finance and coordinate this operation.

According to *New Republic*, Saudi Arabia is also giving considerable financial aid to Pakistan. It has Pakistan firmly under its own control and is demanding—on the insistence of the USA—that the border be kept open for the shipment of arms into Afghanistan. Pakistan itself, the country most important to the success of the operation, allows arms to be shipped into Afghanistan across the whole 1,400 miles of its border with that country.

The arms arrive by plane in Pakistan disguised as ordinary freight. The markings on the planes are constantly changed. Here, watched by representatives of the Pakistan Intelligence Bureau, the arms are shipped across the border and from there to the mountain passes, where they are distributed among the different groups.

* * *

Photo. The banks of a stream. Three peasants are squatting on their heels. They are blindfolded. They are about to be shot.

Photo: A man, his hands tied behind his back, is lying near a wall with his head on a piece of wood. Next to him, a machine-gun over his shoulder, stands one of the bandits, his legs set apart, holding an axe aloft in both hands. He is looking not at the victim but into the lense of the camera. The moment of execution.

Photo: A peasant, his body pierced by the teeth of a harrow. Around him stand bandits with machine-guns and rifles.

I had seen enough. I pushed the photographs to one side and picked up some crumpled leaflets. I found myself looking at grey-bearded old men in turbans—the leaders of the counter-revolutionary organisations. However, I could see other faces gazing at me from these creased pieces of paper, the faces of John Raynan, Robert Lessard, Lee Robenson and Rogers Brock, the CIA agents in Pakistan, and behind them I could clearly make out the faces of their masters in Washington.



LOLLI ZAMOISKY

LOLLI ZAMOISKY—journalist and specialist in foreign affairs. Zamoisky has worked as a radio commentator and as Soviet correspondent in Italy and France. He is the author of the book *Italian Frescoes* and numerous articles on international issues.

Zamoisky holds the Popov Journalists' Award.

WAR AGAINST ... ALLIES

The Handbag of Senora Donnini

On the afternoon of July 3, 1981, a plane on a flight from Nice landed at Fiumicino airport. There were only a few passengers on board, and the customs officials, weary from the heat, were happy to keep the customs inspection down to the minimum. Suddenly, however, their manner changed. In front of them was an attractive blonde whose passport bore the name 'Maria Grazia Donnini'. They took her handbag from her, searched it, and found small packets sown into the lining. They had obviously known where to look. Maria Grazia was accused of spying and of being involved in a criminal organisation, and was taken to prison. Meanwhile investigations were conducted into the contents of her concealed luggage.

These investigations revealed surprising information. Among the confiscated papers the investigators discovered secret documents from La Guardia di finanza which contained the names of prominent Italian politicians involved in shady transactions. There were also letters addressed to members of the P 2 masonic lodge and a photocopy of a secret American document. The Italian police had caught the daughter of Licio Gelli, 'honorary grand master' of the masonic lodge Propaganda 2, who had fled to Latin America to escape legal prosecution, and who was using Maria Grazia as a 'courier' to deliver to his friends and associates documents that could be used to blackmail both the Italian authorities and his patrons in Washington and NATO headquarters.

Gelli had worked for many years for both the CIA and NATO and had built up a secret network of his lodge whose aim was, in effect, to seize power in Italy. Of all the conspiracies that shook

the Republic of Italy following the war, this was the one that came the closest to success. And there were many such conspiracies, as was revealed by General Gian Adelio Maletti, for many years the head of Italian counter-intelligence, in an interview given to a correspondent from the magazine *L'Espresso* published on March 15, 1981.

Question. How many coups d'état were attempted during your years of service in SID?*

Answer. Five, more or less. I say 'more or less' because not all were equally dangerous.

Q. The first, in December 1970, was planned by Duke Borghese. Could you tell us, sincerely: was democracy in Italy then in serious danger?

A. No. In all probability Borghese and his 'forestali' would have been unable to take even Rome. However, there might have been bloodshed.

Q. And the 'Rosa dei venti' plot? Was this more dangerous?

A. This putsch never moved into the operative stage. However, the conspirators could have created serious problems.

Q. And the third attempt: the one prepared by Edgardo Sogno. What is your view of that?

A. This was also referred to as the 'white coup' because it was not to be a genuine coup d'état. Sogno had established contacts with a view to gaining support for his proposed changes to the institutions. He did not plan to use force.

Q. And the other two?

A. They were probably the most dangerous. The first was timed for August of 1974. A group of junior officers had established contact with senior officers and was preparing to seize power in Rome. The plan involved the capture of President Leone, who was to speak over the radio in favour of the coup. This conspiracy was foiled at the last moment... The second was to be carried through in September 1974 by the associates of Borghese. This coup was also averted.

Five conspiracies in five years... And more can be added. During the sixties General De Lorenzo, then head of carabinieri and SIFAR, attempted to seize power. This was the so-called Solo Plan. It was after the discovery of this plot that SIFAR was reorganised into SID. The name changed, but the nature of the organisation remained the same, and it was involved in the Antarctica Plan, drawn up on the basis of a NATO draft similar to the famous Prometheus Plan which brought the 'black colonels' to power in Greece. Almost the whole of Italian postwar history is overshadowed by plots to overthrow the government. The originators and

* SID was initially SIFAR—the title of Italian secret service. It has since been split into a number of separate services.

participants change, but the aim remains the same—to deal a blow to democracy, to suppress the working-class movement and to establish a reactionary dictatorship. The forces upon which the conspiracies draw also remain unaltered—fascists, reactionary groups within the armed forces, the secret services, political parties, and also masonry and the mafia. The chief methods are terrorism and violence.

In fact, General Maletti understated the danger presented by these conspiracies. The fascist duke Valerio Borghese armed his bands with weapons from the arsenal of the Ministry of the Interior and was ready to take over public buildings and television. Coordination and distribution of arms was in the hands of a police colonel. Only confusion over the march on Rome by the paramilitary 'forestali' made up of pro-fascist elements frightened off the fascist thugs at the last moment.

It was planned to declare Borghese a 'second Mussolini'. Army units in sympathy with the coup—the tank corps commanded by General Hugo Ricci and the 3rd army corps stationed near American bases—were to move into action when the signal was given. Under the command of Amos Spiazzi, a colonel in the secret service working as liaison officer with the Americans in Verona, they were to cut off Rome from the industrial north.

Contrary to what Maletti said in his interview, the 'white coup' (*golpe bianco*) planned by Sogno was to be, according to Sogno himself, 'savage, quick and merciless' and was intended to install a dictatorship headed by the ex-minister of defence, Randolpho Pacciardi. The 'Rosa dei venti' coup was planned by the same Spiazzi who had been involved in the Borghese plot. Maletti's silence on many things is very eloquent. In all these conspiracies the leading role was played by the Italian secret services. Maletti and General Miceli, head of SID, were themselves active members of the masonic lodge P 2, which rescued the conspirators when their plans failed and replaced them with others. This was revealed a few days after the publication of the interview, and Maletti fled to South Africa to avoid prosecution.

It is also understandable why the General's 'confessions' included no reference to the main organiser of the conspiracies—US intelligence, for it was the CIA and NATO agencies which were at the source of this subversive activity, this secret war being conducted by the USA against its own allies. It was US intelligence, working together with reactionaries in West European countries, that formulated the strategy of this undeclared war. The 'honorary grand master' of lodge P 2, offended by the fact that the Americans whom he served had not done all they might to defend him, sent to Italy extracts from the 'bible' containing the basic rules of the US war against its 'friends'. Who better than Gelli knew the details of an operation in which he himself had been directly involved?

General Westmoreland's Manual

The secret American document discovered among the papers taken from Maria Grazia Donnini (Gelli) is entitled 'Stability Operations Intelligence—Special Fields'. It was compiled under the supervision of General Westmoreland, former commander of American troops in Vietnam and United States Army Chief of Staff. Extracts from this document had been published several times in the American, French, Italian and Spanish press, but each time Washington had denied the authenticity of the document. Gelli of course knew this, and when he sent the document to be published in the fascist weekly *Borghese* run by his friend Mario Tedeschi, also a member of lodge P 2 (card No 2127), his purpose was clear: CIA accomplice Gelli was confirming the validity of the provisions in it and that they were in harmony with the policy being pursued by lodge P 2.

According to the provisions formulated by Westmoreland in his instructions, the USA 'allows itself a wide range of flexibility in determining the nature of a regime deserving its full support'. This support ceases (and is replaced by the 'stability' programme carried through by American intelligence and its associates) for the following reasons:

'a. A government enjoying US support may weaken in the war against Communist or Communist-inspired insurgency through lack of will or lack of power.

'b. It may compromise itself by failing to reflect the interests of important sections of the nation.

'c. It may drift into extreme nationalistic attitudes which are incompatible with or hostile to US interests.'

The casuistic language of some of the recommendations serves to conceal their real meaning. 'Communist or Communist-inspired insurgency' in fact refers to a situation in which left forces come to power, or even simply increase their influence. 'Important sections of the nation' refers primarily to pro-Atlantic forces. 'Extreme nationalistic attitudes' includes those important bourgeois forces and groups which are guided by national interest and refuse to be turned into the puppets of American monopolies.

What happens when the USA, in 'determining the nature of a regime deserving its full support', discovers that its allies do not satisfy requirements needed? In such a case, the USA asserts its right to gain 'modifications of the structure' of allied countries, i.e. change the state structure and bring to power groups obedient to the USA. How is this to be achieved? The authors of the manual are aware of the unpopularity of direct intervention by US armed forces, although such a possibility is by no means ruled out. According to the manual, to ensure 'stability', 'US Army intelligence must have the means of launching special operations which will

convince the HC [host country] governments and public opinion of the reality of the insurgent danger and of the necessity of counteraction.

'To this end, US Army intelligence should seek to penetrate the insurgency by means of agents on special assignment, with the task of forming special action groups among the more radical elements of the insurgency. When the kind of situation envisaged above arises, these groups, acting under US Army intelligence control, should be used to launch violent or nonviolent actions.... it may help towards the achievement of the above ends to utilize ultra-leftist organisations.'

The businesslike style of this horrifying set of instructions on provoking disorders mirrors the so-called 'strategy of tension' by means of which Italian public opinion and political circles have for many years now been prepared for the institution of an authoritative regime.... Neither is this strategy original. One might recall the burning of the Reichstag, a provocative act organised by the nazis in order to lay the blame on the 'reds' and eliminate opposition.

The CIA has assisted in the burning of many such 'Reichstags' all over Europe, relying on that malevolent force which soaked Europe in blood and everywhere left behind the ashes of conflagration—fascism. In the opinion of the 'strategists of tension', traditional bourgeois parties sometimes display 'lack of will or lack of power' in the face of the growing democratic working-class movement. Fascism, with its experience in the use of violence, terrorism and murder, was taken as a model in the struggle against left forces.

In April 1967, the NATO Prometheus Plan was put into operation; Greece was taken over by fascist colonels and subjected to the terror unleashed by Pattakos-Papadopoulos-Ladas, long-time CIA protégés. Since then, US Army intelligence has directed its attention mainly to Italy, where the technique of provocation and the alternation of 'black' and pseudo-red terrorism will reach their apogee, while the government apparatus and democratic institutions will prove to be seriously weakened by the joint efforts of internal reaction and US 'stabilisers'.

Why Italy? First, the collapse of the Mussolini regime was followed by a steady increase in the influence of Communists, Socialists and the working-class movement. However, the fascists still retained considerable forces, and it was decided to make use of them. Secondly, Italy is of strategic importance for US militarist designs in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Finally, if a fascist regime had been restored across the Alps, a community of reactionary regimes would have spread across Southern Europe from the Portugal of Salazar and the Spain of Franco through Rome and on to Athens and even Ankara, where everything was ready for a take-over by the extreme right. Next in turn would have been France, another West European country with strong

potential left forces.

Recently in the USA the report of the National Security Council dated February 10 and March 8, 1948, was taken off the secret list. It proved to be an outline of the programme that served as the basis of the bloody 'strategy of tension'. Here is an extract from that frank document:

'The basic objective of the United States in Italy is to establish and maintain in that key country conditions favourable to our national security.... The security of the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East would be jeopardised if the Soviet Union should succeed in its efforts to obtain control of any of the following countries: Italy, Greece, Turkey or Iran.' In imperialist jargon, the expression 'obtain control' refers to a left parliamentary election victory and the formation of a legal left government. Just prior to this, the USA had managed to get Communist ministers withdrawn from the French and Italian governments. However, Italy was preparing for its first postwar elections, and Washington was panic-stricken that the outcome might prove to be unfavourable for reaction. Millions of dollars were spent on buying electors and political leaders. The Italian Communist leader, Palmiro Togliatti, was attacked and seriously wounded by the fascist thug Pallante. However, let us return to the document of the US National Security Council.

'Italy's position in the Mediterranean,' the report continues, 'dominates the lines of communication to the East and flanks the Balkan countries. From bases located in Italy it is possible for the power holding them [and everyone knows which country is meant— L.Z.] to control Mediterranean traffic between Gibraltar and Suez, and to apply substantial air force against any point in the Balkans or surrounding area.'

In order to achieve its aims, the text reads, the USA must be prepared to 'make full use of its political, economic and, if necessary, military power.' Moreover, the promise of effective American aid 'might encourage non-communist elements in Italy to make a last, vigorous effort, even at the risk of civil war, to prevent the consolidation of communist control....' In such a situation provision was made for 'a limited mobilisation including any necessary measure and announce this action as a clear indication of the United States determination to oppose communist aggression and to protect our national security'. The USA also promises to 'provide the anti-communist Italian underground with financial and military assistance'. If it proved impossible to overthrow the legally elected government in this way, the USA planned direct seizure of Sicily and Sardinia. A group of quislings was cobbled together on each of the islands ready to proclaim secession from Italy and an alliance with the USA. In Sicily the leading role in these separatist plans was played by the mafia, hoping to use this 'alliance' to

profit from the drugs trade and other illegal operations. Speaking of the document, the magazine *L'Espresso* concluded that the USA was ready 'to risk civil war and a dictatorship of the right' to prevent the consolidation of communist control.

Triple 'M'

'Perhaps one had to jam the wig of Thomas Jefferson on the head of Mussolini?', Mrs. Clare Booth Luce, wife of the proprietor of the magazine *Time* and also (in the 1950s) US Ambassador to Italy, once asked the American journalist Cyrus L. Sulzberger. 'Mrs. Luce,' noted Sulzberger, 'has the most extraordinary contempt, which she does not bother to conceal, for the intellectual acuteness of apparently everybody. She says the Italians are corrupt cowards who are unable to govern themselves by democratic means. She says there is no chance of a third-force government such as the present one continuing for any long period, as has been the case in France, and anybody who thinks so simply does not understand Italy. The only thing is for the right to come in.'

Mussolini, or more accurately his successors, the 'Missini' (from MSI Movimento Sociale Italiano—Italian Social Movement) is one of the three 'M's' underlying the policy of 'stability'—more accurately destabilisation of Italy being pursued by the USA. The other two 'M's' are the mafia and masonry. How did it come about that these two organisations became, together with fascist elements, the chief CIA support in Italy? The extreme secrecy and brutality of the first, combined with the ramified and flexible structure of the second and its rabid anti-communism characteristic of secret sects provided the Americans with the unique opportunities of achieving their objectives outside official channels and via third parties, that is, with the minimum of risk and the maximum of effect. The efficiency of the mafia had been proved in the USA itself, where it had created a virtually invulnerable syndicate of a gangster business. When, during the Second World War, US Army intelligence needed the support of people of Italian extraction, its choice fell upon Cosa nostra. Salvatore Lucania, better known as 'Lucky Luciano', was transferred from jail to an expensive hotel. The contacts of Luciano and his clan were supposed to facilitate the establishment of relations with the Sicilian mafiosi. Before landing on this island, US troops were to make contact with the leaders of secret radical groups, for example, the mafia, and give them every possible assistance. This assistance was given, and the mafiosi, with the help of Allied troops, often came straight from jail to become the mayors of liberated towns. Such was the case with 'Don' Calò Vizzini, the 'dean' of the Sicilian mafia.

Thus the foundations were laid for cooperation between the

mafia and US intelligence, which were destined to strengthen and which proved indispensable in carrying through the more dangerous operations—political murders and provocation. This same co-operation can be traced in the USA itself from the assassination of John F. Kennedy to 'Watergate'. In Italy several hundred people—politicians, statesmen, lawyers and state prosecutors, policemen and journalists—will die at the hands of the mafia, carefully nurtured by the Americans.

Masonry suited the CIA because, while a secret organisation like the mafia, it was less reprehensible. It could once boast of the names of Enlighteners from the period of the French revolution, and fighters against papal power in Italy. However, the days of Mazzini and Garibaldi, Goethe and Voltaire were too remote, while the interests of American big capital were very close indeed.

Masons traditionally occupy key positions in the American oligarchy. Secret clubs and 'lodges' enable them to meet together and decide on delicate matters in private. Practically from the days of George Washington, all US presidents have been members of these lodges. Harry Truman, who gave the order for atomic bombs to be dropped on Japan, Herter and Marshall, both Secretaries of State, were all high-ranking masons. Thus the CIA, and also its predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), contained a large number of masons who saw in these organisations vast opportunities to extend their invisible power in newly liberated Europe.

The OSS gave the task of drawing up the 'Italian Plan' to Max Corvo, an American of Italian extraction. Born in Melilli, Sicily, he lived before the war in Middletown, which had a large Sicilian emigrant population. With the help of Cosa nostra, the US mafia headquarters that controlled the US trade unions and seaports and also his own contacts, Corvo managed to persuade many Italo-Americans, including lawyers, judges and journalists, to act as informants. He also turned his attention to the emigrants. In his own home town he employed the services of 'Joe', Giuseppe Lupis, who was later to become a Social-Democrat minister in Italy. He likewise attracted to his cause the mason Randolfo Pacciardi, a member of the New York Giuseppe Garibaldi lodge. Pacciardi's past was a little disquieting—he had been on the Republican side in the Civil War in Spain. 'What a mistake!' exclaimed Corvo. 'Just remember how he reorganised the Italian Armed Forces during the cold war!'. This American agent, a dedicated 'supporter of atlantic orientation', was indeed a suitable candidate for the post of Italian minister of defence. Hemingway speaks of him with scorn in his book *Across the River and Into the Trees*. Later Pacciardi became the head of the profascist forces that attempted to establish their dictatorship in Italy.

Even then the Americans knew well enough what they were doing. Corvo described his plan as follows: 'It was not just an

espionage plan, but also a plan of psychological warfare.' War against whom? Against workers' parties and organisations, against the forces of democracy and peace. The job he had started would be continued by others. The fanatic James Angleton, the 'poet of counter-intelligence', would fill the spy network with officers he had saved from the anti-fascist purges and who had remained loyal to Mussolini even after Skorzeny had succeeded in abducting the arrested 'Duce' and flying him to the 'Salo Republic' in the north of Italy, set up and controlled by the Gestapo. According to Corvo, Angleton sent those who could not yet be enlisted into the Italian police and secret services to Spain, where they were sheltered by Franco. General Walters, Colby, later the Vietnam executioner, and Harvey, the creator of 'death capacity', the special CIA department dealing with political assassinations throughout the world—in short the 'cream' of the CIA—received their initial training in Italy or in neighbouring France, working together with the three 'M's' to explode the democratic institutions and republican system of Italy. They worked in close liaison with the United States embassy. Colby, for example, was full of admiration for Clare Booth Luce: 'Clare Booth Luce took an intimate interest—and hand—in the CIA operations run out of her embassy.... Extremely attractive, intelligent and knowledgeable, full of confidence and poise, quick and decisive, leaving no one in doubt who was in charge, Mrs. Luce stands high on my list of strong and effective ambassadors.' No doubt! Mrs. Luce wanted to jam an American wig onto the head of Mussolini.... She off-handedly dictated who should and who should not be included in the Italian government, and was furiously opposed to the election of Giovanni Gronchi, a left-wing Christian Democrat, President of Italy.

The Removal of Enrico Mattei

Hostility towards Gronchi was so great that the USA threatened serious economic sanctions against Italy should he be elected president. When he was nonetheless elected to this post, Mrs. Luce was obliged to leave this disobedient country in a fury. However, the campaign against Italy did not end there. In the eyes of American reactionaries, Gronchi was doubly guilty—not only was he left-wing, but he also defended Italian economic interests.

As President of Italy, Gronchi supported the normalisation of political and economic relations with the Soviet Union. He was the first Italian President to visit the USSR. Trade between the two countries finally got under way, greatly assisted by Enrico Mattei. A friend of Gronchi and a former guerrilla, Mattei had become head of the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi. In fact, Mattei had been given the job of burying this state company founded under Musso-

lini, but, an intelligent man with a talent for business, he saw that, reorganised, this society could play an important role in overcoming the chronic energy crisis hindering the economic development of the country. In the north of Italy he explored for methane, and in Sicily he looked for oil, and the success of these ventures served to swell the national reserves. Next he established contacts with the Arab countries, where a struggle was being waged against the domination of the seven major oil monopolies. Mattei was the first to offer the Arabs more profitable and more equitable terms of cooperation in drilling for and processing oil, and he was also the first to propose the purchase of Soviet oil and the placing of Soviet orders among a number of branches of Italian industry.

As far as the CIA was concerned, Mattei was becoming an increasingly dangerous person. He was the symbol of the 'extreme nationalism' which will later be described in Westmoreland's 'textbook' as affecting American interests. Moreover, as the whole of postwar history shows, striking at the economic interests of their allies by forcing them to buy oil at monopoly prices is as important to the upper echelons of the American bourgeoisie as the escalation of international tension and the arms race. The oil trusts invest huge sums of money in the war industry, including missiles and electronics. That is why the recent US economic sanctions against the USSR, both under Carter and under Reagan, inevitably include an embargo on oil-drilling equipment and electronics. Super profit from the sale of oil—practically at black market prices—is as important for them as super profit from military contracts. Anti-Sovietism allows them to play on the anti-communist reflexes of the West European bourgeoisie, and charge an exorbitant price for fuel and military supplies. The US oligarchy has never separated political demands from profit. In undermining detente it is seeking to kill two birds with one stone—to damage its ideological opponents, and also to damage its 'friends', for these 'friends' are also competitors, and when billions of dollars are involved, any crime is permissible. This is the logic faithfully pursued by the CIA. It also conducts its own trade, in arms, drugs and other merchandise, exploiting the secrecy afforded to it by 'special operations'. Thus the CIA was the perfect choice for the murder of Mattei.

The operation which led to the death of Enrico Mattei when his private aeroplane crashed on October 27, 1962, was planned in Washington under the direction of William Harvey, whose name has already been mentioned above. Harvey then involved Rosselli, the head of the American mafia. Rosselli, who had made a fortune out of cinemas and casinos, had already attempted to assist the CIA in the planned assassination of Fidel Castro, and later he would be involved in the assassination of John Kennedy (in which oil interests played an important role). He was finally eliminated, the fate of

many undesirable witnesses. Following the Kennedy assassination in Dallas, he was strangled and thrown into the sea. His involvement in the Mattei assassination would thus be a kind of prelude to his involvement in the Kennedy assassination. Rosselli assigned the organisation of the catastrophe to his assistant, Carlos Marcello, underworld boss in the State of Louisiana. Meanwhile, the head of the CIA in Rome, Thomas Karamessines, was agreeing on the details with General De Lorenzo, head of SIFAR. Immediately after the death of Mattei, Karamessines hastily left Italy, just as CIA resident agents left Uganda after the murder of Patrice Lumumba, and the Dominican Republic after the removal of Trujillo, a dictator who for a number of reasons had ceased to suit his American masters.

The assassination of Mattei was to have far-reaching consequences. The CIA and its people did all it could to compel the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi to make concessions in favour of its seven sisters. Many of those who attempted to provide Italy with an independent energy supply became the victims of slander and libel, and the development of atomic power engineering in Italy would be held back for several decades. Many years later, those who attempted to unravel the mystery of Mattei's death would do so at the cost of their lives. 'He who touches the wire dies,' Italians often say. This was the fate of the Sicilian journalist Mauro de Mauro, who gathered information on the last days of Mattei's life for a film about Mattei to be directed by Rosi. It will be the fate of Scaglione, the Sicilian state prosecutor, who evidently knew too much about the murder of Mattei and the disappearance of Mauro. Another victim will be judge Francesco Coco, who went to Sicily from Genoa in order to investigate the death of Scaglione. All these murders were made easier by cooperation between the CIA and the triple 'M', and also the Italian secret services.

The Machinery of Provocation

A special department was set up within the Italian secret services. Even those who worked there were given only the minimum of information. When the De Lorenzo plot came into the open, it was announced that SIFAR was to be reorganised and renamed SID. However, the nature of this state within a state remained unaltered. Ten years later a court in Catanzaro will investigate the provocations organised with the help of the SID, and in particular a series of explosions arranged by SID in Rome and Milan on December 12, 1969. On being cross-examined, General Miceli, former chief of SID, admitted that this organisation had a top-secret department known as Super-SID. The Italian magazine *Panorama*

commented that Super-SID was the department linking the Italian secret services with the secret services of other NATO countries and that it came into being in 1949, when Italy entered NATO.

Through this department, and its other contacts in France, the CIA began to put its Demagnetize Plan into operation. This prototype of a whole series of plans with picturesque codenames empowered Super-SID to carry through 'political operations aimed at reducing the presence of the Communist Party in Italy'. Super-SID was financed mainly by American money, and, according to *Panorama*, it was suspected of being involved in all the political tragedies that struck Italy—bombs, explosions and subversive activity. It was a known fact that Super-SID or Super-SIFAR spying activity spread to the very highest echelons of power. Colby demanded that microphones be installed in the Vatican, the Quirinal, the residence of the President, in order to record the private conversations between the Italian President and the Pope. Their content was then reported to Washington. Colby is not ashamed to boast of his bribery of political figures in various Italian parties. 'Where there was a communist organisation, we financed or created an anti-communist organisation,' he wrote. *Panorama* goes on to state that it is still not known whether CIA money allocated to Super-SID was used exclusively to finance right-wing organisations, or whether some of it also went into the pockets of those who were carrying through the strategy of tension. The answer is contained in the question itself. One has only to examine the key moments in the events that ensued to realise that CIA agents were involved in almost every scandal or crime that shook Italy.

Since 1963, pro-fascist elements within the Italian army began to prepare for the struggle against 'the subversive communist threat'. They were led by General Aloja, Chief of the General Staff of the Italian Armed Forces. His closest associate in the elaboration of new methods of 'psychological warfare' (one remembers Corvo!) was the fascist journalist Giannettini, who suggested that they 'infiltrate the hostile political forces'. Aloja recommended that Giannettini join the secret service, and the latter became one of the organisers of the fascist 'red masquerade'. The leader of the neo-fascist organisation Ordine Nuovo, Giuseppe Pino Rauti, adopted this method and he sent a number of persons to Greece to study the provocation 'experience' acquired by the Greek fascists. The fascists then infiltrated left-wing groups as leftists and anarchists with the aim of pushing these groups into excesses for which the 'reds' could be blamed. Rauti himself went to Greece, where he established contact with Plevris, a fascist emissary and the leader of the August 4 movement (a 'movement' inspired by the ideas of the dictator Metaxas, who, on August 4, 1936, had dissolved the Greek parliament and outlawed political parties.) In April 1969, Rauti took part in a secret meeting in Padua at which it was decided to

make use of Greek experience and organise provocation throughout Northern and Central Italy. The Paduan group headed by Freda and Ventura, two fascist fanatics, was given the task of putting this plan into operation.

However, the upsurge in the student movement in Italy, France and the FRG in the spring of 1968 had led to a considerable shift to the left among young people, and it was difficult to appeal to them using purely fascist slogans. The student movement itself was diverse and contradictory. Its leaders were constantly changing, competing in their vociferous condemnation of 'the system', and marked by 'leftist' attitudes and hostility towards the Communist Party. The movement included within its ranks the children of prosperous families playing at 'revolution', and the embittered and declassed. This is potentially the ideal combustibles for provocation. Those who sought to overthrow 'the system' also, for the most part, were foes of the organised working-class movement. NATO, the CIA, the Greek, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese fascists, the secret services, the police and the masons—all worked together to 'tame' the leftists and channel their activities in the proper direction (following the recommendations in the manual to make use of 'ultra-leftist organisations').

Following the meeting in Padua, the group led by Freda moved into action, organising 22 fires and assassination attempts in the space of nine months. They blew up the office of the rector of the University of Padua and the Fiat stand at the Milan Fair, and also caused explosions at the Milan railway station and on board trains. Finally they organised the huge explosion that occurred in the Agricultural Bank in Milan on December 12, 1969, in which 16 people died and 80 more were wounded. Simultaneously, bombs were exploding in Rome itself.

SID (and, of course, Super-SID) had been informed of these planned acts of terrorism through their agent Giannettini, but had done nothing to prevent them, and even helped many of the fascist organisers of these bloody acts to escape across the border. Anarchists will be accused in their place. One of them, Valpreda, a former dancer, will be found guilty, another, Pinelli, will die during interrogation by the Milan police. Calabresi, the commissar of police who interrogated Pinelli, will be shot down by terrorists.

The main clues would seem to have been destroyed. However, when the original version of events fails to withstand investigation, the secret services will fabricate other equally false ones. It was not until many years later that Freda and Ventura at last appeared before court, but even then, after much delay, they were acquitted.

Thus, if we trace the sources of terrorism in Italy over recent years we come back to 'all the king's men'—internal and inter-

national reaction—headed by the 'psychological warfare' service of NATO. They ensured the immunity of the subversive forces and will later continue to plan, working together with the same triple 'M', a series of plots and terrorist acts.

'Rosa dei venti'

Among the continuous chain of coups d'état planned according to the recipe—fascist trigger, left-wing cover, right-wing coup, the 'Rosa dei venti' conspiracy is of particular interest. In the spring of 1973 the Italian Prime Minister Mariano Rumor arrived in Milan for the solemn unveiling of a memorial statue to Calabresi, the commissar of police. During the ceremony a bearded man in the crowd suddenly cried 'Long live Pinelli' and threw a grenade. Four people were killed, dozens wounded, and the public was panic-stricken. However, Rumor was unharmed and the terrorist, quite unexpectedly, was arrested. Under interrogation he repeated again and again that he wanted to avenge the death of Pinelli. In fact, however, the murder of Rumor was to be the signal for a coup d'état planned by a group calling itself 'Rosa dei venti'.

Bertoli, the terrorist who had thrown the grenade, was a front man, a criminal uninterested in politics. In order to make his motive appear more credible, Bertoli had been introduced into an anarchist group, and then sent to Israel, where he spent more than a year living in a kibbutz and removed from inquisitive eyes. The participation of the Israeli intelligence in this affair was supposed to ensure its secrecy. When the time was ripe, Bertoli was returned to Italy and dispatched to Milan, where he was given a grenade. The provocation is complete. The right-wing press thunders against the 'reds'—though the failure of the assassination attempt somewhat weakened its effect.

The documents prepared by the conspirators declared that the death of Rumor was to be the detonator 'obliging the armed forces to intervene directly in defence of the institutions'. Judge Tamburino was of the opinion that the 'Rosa' coup would have resulted in the 'physical elimination of two thousand political and military personalities'.

The list of conspirators included the names of a large number of top army officers. According to the Italian press, General Johnson, head of NATO security, was directly involved in the plot. The details of the conspiracy were agreed upon at the house of the banker Sindona, who was a member of the masonic lodge P 2. He had friends among American bankers, and was also a CIA agent, as he himself admitted later.

CIA involvement in conspiracy increased. Edgardo Sogno, a long-time agent of the CIA who had been sent to join the Italian

guerrilla movement during the war, was thereafter assigned by Dulles the task of setting up the 'yellow' unions, a service for which he was handsomely rewarded by Italian monopolies fighting the democratic trade unions. His previous guerrilla activities provided him with cover. He founded the anti-communist organisations Peace and Liberty and the Committee to Resist Democracy. When he said that the 'white plot' had gone no further than feeble efforts to 'modify' the constitution, General Maletti was lying to protect Sogno. Sogno's plan was quite specific: kidnap the President, and compel him to set up a government headed by Randalfo Pacciardi, who by then had founded the fascist movement known as the New Republic. Sogno was put on trial, but was acquitted. There is nothing surprising in this, for in Italy judges and criminals often meet together as members of the same lodge. Both Maletti and Sogno were members of the subversive lodge P 2. After all, the most reliable lodge may become subversive once it falls into the hands of masons from the CIA, assisted by masons such as Gelli or Pacciardi.

The Target—de Gaulle

If the documents relating to the secret policy of the USA and NATO towards France are ever published, it will then be possible to form a complete picture of the concentrated attack launched against the policies of Charles de Gaulle. There can be no doubt that the concept of the 'greatness of France', the refusal on the part of the French President to follow American instructions and, more particularly, France's withdrawal from the NATO military organisation provoked a sharp reaction in Washington. De Gaulle fully realised that Dulles's policy of 'rolling back' the Soviet Union and ignoring the results of the Second World War could well lead to another conflict. He also realised that the cold war policy worked exclusively to the benefit of the USA, destroying the independence of its allies, subordinating West European economies and finance bringing it enormous profits. In his policy of political, economic and cultural links with the USSR and his concept of all-European cooperation formulated as 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals', de Gaulle saw an alternative to American policy and a counterbalance to the United States domination.

De Gaulle's efforts to settle relations with Algeria and his condemnation of US reckless involvement in Vietnam brought him enemies among the extreme right in his own country. One day light may be shed on the link between the CIA and the Secret Army Organisation (OAS), the revanchist organisation which lay behind all the plots against de Gaulle. There were around thirty

such planned assassinations, which de Gaulle survived in part thanks to his reorganisation of the security service, and in part by sheer chance. However, if the assassination attempts were to meet with failure, CIA-assisted efforts in other directions were not without results. These efforts were directed mainly at compromising the General by accusations of pandering to the left, in particular by pointing to France's expressions of sympathy for the national liberation movement in Latin America. When, for example, de Gaulle condemned American intervention in the Dominican Republic (1965), this was used to compel the General to 'lose face'.

The CIA agent liaising with the Dominican Republic was called to Madrid to meet with General Walters, the head of the CIA, who would later (1967-72) be in charge of all actions directed against de Gaulle. This agent was given the task of presenting himself as a supporter of Dominican independence and the Dominican colony in France and French politicians, obliging them to 'adopt a position that was increasingly radical (thus provoking discord among the Gaullists) and increasingly ridiculous'.

Once in France, this agent collected medicine and food for the Dominicans fighting the invading forces. The goods were, of course, seized by the Americans, who had been warned in advance. De Gaulle, indignant, was then persuaded to consider sending a French warship to break through the American naval blockade. This move caused dissention among the ruling circles too, and was ridiculed in the American press.

All this information is provided by Luis M. Gonzalez-Mata, the author of a book entitled *Les vrais maitres du monde*. The agent involved was the author himself!

Of particular interest is Gonzalez-Mata's evidence about how the CIA used the student unrest of May 1968 against de Gaulle. 'Their strategists,' writes the author, 'saw in this "revolution" not only a possible danger, but also, and in our opinion, above all, the chance to deliver the coup de grâce to one whose nationalism had proved over the years to be increasingly negative: President Charles de Gaulle.'

The agent, whose alias was 'Swan', was instructed to infiltrate into the student movement. Once in Paris, he was given further instructions. General Walters himself was present at the meeting, as was also Molisani, the representative of the AFL-CIO trade union. The extent to which American trade-union bosses are involved in subversive activity in Europe is nothing short of amazing. Their representative, Irving Brown, was accredited in Paris specifically for the purpose of splitting the European trade unions and helping subversive groups in the socialist countries. One has only to remember the role played by the AFL-CIO in recent events in Poland, described in the Polish newspaper *Trybuna Ludu*. Among the de-

legation from the Italian Union of Labour (UIL) attending the Solidarity congress in Poland were a certain Luigi and Paulo Scricciolo. As representatives of the international section of UIL, they met the leaders of extremist counter-revolutionary groups operating in Poland. They also organised numerous demonstrations in Italy under the slogans of 'Solidarity with "Solidarity"'. In February 1982, Luigi and Paola Scricciolo were both arrested by the Italian police and accused of being members of ... the 'Brigate rosse' (red brigade)! Thus these two CIA agents were simultaneously members of the most reactionary trade union in Italy, financed by American money, and of the ultra-leftist 'red' terrorists. The activities of the 'Swan' in Paris serve to illustrate CIA tactics among 'left' extremists.

Graham, who coordinated the activities of the CIA and military intelligence in Paris, explained 'Swan's' assignment to him: 'It is not a question of easing the seizure of power by the left, but, by encouraging disorders, by creating incidents between demonstrators and the forces of order, of provoking a reaction in the "silent majority" of France who, faced with this danger, will oblige de Gaulle to change his policy, move away from the Eastern countries and rejoin a Europe that is the ally of the United States.... Pressure from the right will perhaps force de Gaulle to resign and make way for a government with which it would be easier to reach agreement.... What we have to do ... is to infiltrate into the organs directing subversion in such a way as to reconnoitre their plans and their possibilities and be able to influence them, in our interests.'

'To start with it is important that our friends who have already infiltrated into these activist groups are inciting the demonstrators to create the largest possible number of incidents with the forces of order. *The destruction caused and the wounded are, for the moment, our best allies.*'

'Swan' was cast into the Sorbonne and settled into the heart of the rebel *gauchistes*—in the Odéon Theatre. In the midst of the most provocative militant leaders of the May demonstrations he counted another three or four CIA agents.

The situation grew tense. The bourgeoisie was indeed concerned, and some even fled to Switzerland, where things were quieter. At the end of May the President left the Elysée Palace, and the army, on the advice of 'friends from the CIA', brought in reinforcements. Everyone knows what happened next. De Gaulle dissolved the National Assembly, and onto the streets of Paris poured that very 'silent majority' that the CIA had wanted to rouse into action with its ebullient actions organised by its agents in the leftist movement.

The students abandoned their position. According to the memoirs of Maurice Grimaud, Prefect of Paris, the last to leave the

Odéon Theatre was a 'young man, polite and distinguished-looking, who presented himself as the one "responsible for the Odéon".... Later he wrote a book about these events in which he declared that he had been working for the CIA'. Grimaud was not surprised at this, realising to whose benefit it was to destabilise France. 'And why not?' exclaims the Paris police chief ironically. The 'Swan' was Gonzales-Mata.

And the results? The regime underwent a marked swing to the right and the influence of de Gaulle diminished. He lost the next referendum and retired.

The Basques, or the 'Quiet Americans'?

Despite the efforts made by Washington, fascist regimes were proving less and less successful. The 'black colonels' of Greece, in whom so much money and hope had been invested, were in danger. Next it was the turn of the countries across the Pyrenees, where Francoism was preceding Franco to the grave, and the Salazar regime was on its death-bed.

It is not difficult to imagine the concern of Washington at the downfall of regimes that had been considered a reliable barrier in the way of left, democratic forces. The Spanish bourgeoisie was still uneasy, the military still occupied strong positions, and the left parties, who had only just been legalised, had been infiltrated by CIA agents and phalangists who were seeking to destroy them. Thus the same 'strategy of tension' was implemented in order to galvanise the phalangist movement into action, preserve the authoritarian regime and make use of a still powerful military. As in Italy, so in Spain it was essential to create a 'red' bogey, a terrorist problem, and this was done by exploiting separatist tendencies.

In a number of European countries, ethnic minorities have preserved many of their distinctive characteristics, and the exploitation of separatism is another common tactic, alongside that of creating 'red-black' terror, used by the CIA to achieve destabilisation, or 'stabilisation à la Westmoreland'.

For many years the CIA encouraged the separatist movement among the Italian German minority. The same tactic was tried in Sicily and Sardinia. On the eve of the 1978 parliamentary elections in France, Michel Rocard, the leader of the French Socialist Party, remarked that the CIA had prepared a plan to destabilise the country should the left win the election. This remark aroused considerable interest. When asked to be more precise, Rocard first replied that 'everyone knows'. However, he was obviously one of only a few who in fact knew about these plans. Then Rocard explained that he was referring to the fact that terrorists from various ethnic

groups—Corsicans, Bretons and Alsations were to be used to combat the left. Indeed, the activity of these groups increased as the elections approached. However, in 1978 the elections were won by the conservative parties. In 1981, when France elected a socialist president and the early parliamentary elections brought left parties to power, there was another series of explosions in Corsica and elsewhere in France, including Paris itself. This synchronism is very revealing.

Let us return to Spain. Here several terrorist groups were formed whose activity was reminiscent of the 'strategy of tension'. The 'Basque card' was given a prominent place. In December 1972, a suspicious gathering of young people was noticed in one of the districts of Madrid, by a church that stood opposite an influential diplomatic mission. This church was regularly attended by the Spanish Prime Minister, Carrero Blanco. The youths moved into a house not far from the church. This house could be seen from the mission, and the 'diplomats' secretly photographed its occupants and handed over the photographs to the Spanish secret service. The latter identified the youths as members of ETA, the Basque terrorist organisation, and indicated that the Spanish police knew of their plans. Fearing that the terrorists might shift their target to the diplomatic mission, the 'diplomats' installed microphones in the house and listened in to the terrorists' discussions. It now became clear that the terrorists were planning to assassinate the Prime Minister. The mission's chief of the Security passed on this information to his superiors and received an unambiguous order: His superiors, 'considering that the disappearance of Carrero Blanco would ease the implementation of their strategy in Spain and in Portugal', writes Gonzales-Mata, 'ordered him "to take all necessary measures to ensure that the assassination attempt succeed"'. But the assassination must appear to "be the work of terrorist separatists"'. The terrorists dug a tunnel under the road along which Carrero Blanco usually drove on his way to the church. On December 19, 1973, they filled the tunnel with explosive. The agents working for the 'diplomat' added (to ensure success) two anti-tank mines with electronic detonators. The next day the 'Basque terrorists' and the 'diplomats' of a 'friendly' country acted in concert, dispatching the Prime Minister and two policemen to the next world. Such is the detailed picture provided by former CIA agent Gonzales-Mata.

This assassination will be followed by the murder of various high-ranking military judges and lawyers and the kidnapping of representatives of the ruling parties—tactics similar to those used in Italy. In 1981 the local Borghese, Tejero Molina, pointing to the instability in the country and the 'impotence' of the government in the face of terrorism, will take over the building that houses the Spanish parliament with the agreement of General del Bosch. The

putsch was suppressed, but the USA curiously enough forgot to congratulate the Spanish government of the successful elimination of this danger. No doubt this is a sign of that shyness characteristic of 'quiet Americans'.

The Anomaly of the 'Brigate Rosse'

As the above-mentioned events were taking place in Spain, the 'Brigate rosse' were emerging in Italy. Their 'hit-and-run' tactic becomes the theory of chaotic terrorism, with increasing emphasis on 'military actions in urban conditions'. The robbery of small arms shops gives way to the kidnapping of wealthy people for ransom. This money is then used to buy weapons again, and 'columns' are formed in Rome, Turin, Venice and Naples. The 'Brigate rosse' become more daring. While serving their sentences in prison, they try to 'politicise' criminal elements among the prisoners, and the Calabrian mafia, who specialise in kidnap for ransom, join them. The criminals and the ultra-left revolutionaries share common interests.

Professor Antonio Negri, the ideologist of the 'Brigate rosse', wrote in his articles: 'Insurrectionist activity against the state is designed to lead to the destruction of the state. Insurrection cannot be separated from the aim of eliminating the state. Destabilisation and destructure represent the main interest in general.' Negri, like Freda, was born in Padua and is at home among French intellectuals, the 'new philosophers'. When he is sent to prison, they will rise to his defence, accusing the Italians of violating 'the freedom of ideas'. As for Negri's ideas, these are peppered with anti-Sovietism. It is therefore no wonder that he impresses 'left' anti-communists in his own country and in France.

It is not surprising that Negri is accepted in America too. The reputation of the defender of 'urban terrorism' does not appear to worry the American authorities, who all but automatically refuse visas to representatives of communist parties, whom they consider to be subversive elements threatening the state structure of the USA. It is even said that Negri managed to organise in New York a meeting of activists from the leftist movement 'Autonomy', from which the 'Brigate rosse' draw their members. This tolerance on the part of the Americans towards the ideologist of the extreme 'left' is not without its reasons. General William Yarboro, head of CIA special operation, declared that so-called 'chaotic' (blind) terrorism is a tactic elaborated by the CIA together with various Atlantic organisations. This tactic, he explained, is used mainly as the cardinal element in various programmes designed to destabilise government and persuade the population to accept the formation of a strong police state.

Such contacts between the leaders of leftist organisations and Americans and the right are not unusual. Renato Curcio, a former fascist who became a 'Brigate rosse' leader, spent a long time in Paris with Negri. He was arrested several times, but escaped from prison with suspicious ease, as, indeed, did many of his friends. Once, while in prison in Turin, he found himself sharing a prison cell with Ronald Stark, an American citizen. Stark provided Curcio with the addresses of his friends in the Middle East who could help to get arms and provide shelter in case of need, and drew diagrams to show Curcio the best way to use explosives.

Stark was very soon released from prison, although he was wanted on a long list of charges that for anyone else would have brought severe penalties. He is known to have been involved in the manufacture of powerful drugs both in the USA and, later, Belgium. In the Middle East he had links with the main heroine smugglers. The 'drug poet' Timothy Leary, who promoted LSD across America, often stayed at Stark's ranch in California. Leary, it seems, preferred to try out the effects of this hallucinant on his hippy retinue rather than on himself. These experiments were, as it turned out, part of the work being conducted by the CIA on the development of drugs capable of 'changing behaviour', clouding the mind and turning the individual into an obedient tool. When Stark was released from jail in Bologna on April 11, 1979 (after the assassination of Moro at the hands of Stark's near and dear 'Brigate rosse'), the judge declared that Stark could not be put on trial because 'he is an agent of the CIA and was operating in that capacity'.

In this episode we have an illustration of Westmoreland's manual recommendations concerning the use of 'extreme leftists' by American intelligence. It is therefore not surprising that those who seek to overthrow the capitalist system and come out as 'Brigate rosse' conducting a 'proletarian war' are welcomed by the most dedicated opponents of progress—fascists. The right is quite happy to mimic the left. The 'brains' at Langley have also long since understood this technique. For them, the most important aspect of this relationship is that it provides the opportunity to use leftist attitudes of terrorists against left parties and the trade-union movement. Leftist terrorists are the ideal cover for provocation, no matter whether the terrorists are acting out of conviction or are simply professional agents provocateurs. They can be used to cover any political crime—as was shown by the murder of Aldo Moro.

'I Am not Understood in the United States'

Together with the assassination of the two Kennedy brothers, the murder of Aldo Moro, President of the Italian Christian Democratic Party, is one of the major political crimes of the second

half of the 20th century. The general course of events is known to everyone. In the middle of March 1978, the 'Brigate rosse' were waiting for Moro and his escort on via Fani in Rome, just ten minutes' drive from the headquarters of the Italian secret service. They quickly dealt with his guard and locked up Moro himself in a so-called 'people's prison'. From here Moro wrote despairing letters to party colleagues, the Vatican and his family suggesting negotiation with the terrorists. His party colleagues, however, preferred to show 'determination'. On May 9, following a phone call from the 'Brigate rosse', Moro's body was found in the centre of the capital, half way between the headquarters of the Christian Democratic Party and those of the Italian Communist Party. This last fact was symbolic, for Moro had been 'punished' for attempting over the previous months towards a rapprochement of the two parties. He had been kidnapped on the very day on which he was going to put before the Italian parliament the list of the proposed members of the government that the Communists had agreed to support 'from the outside'. This was the equivalent of including the Italian Communist Party in the government majority.

Many of those involved in the kidnapping were arrested, and in February 1982, the Italian Minister of Internal Affairs announced that the 'people's prison' had been discovered under the city of Rome. However, one question still remains unanswered: who wanted to remove from the political scene this far-sighted and skilful politician? The 'Brigate rosse'? The murder of Moro caused dissension in their ranks. The information obtained during 'interrogation' in the 'people's prison' proved so meagre that the terrorists did not carry through their threat of publishing material they had initially described as a sensational exposure.

Where did the idea of kidnapping Moro originate? Who suggested it? Who insisted on the murder of an unarmed captive when it was clear that this action would cause the 'Brigate rosse' themselves more harm than good.

At the height of the tension, when it was still hoped that Moro would be saved, one of Rome's press agencies published a report declaring that the brains behind the kidnapping of Moro had nothing in common with the 'Brigate rosse'. It added that the kidnapping of Moro would only become significant if it helped to reverse the trend towards rapprochement between the Christian Democratic and the Communist parties.

This press agency belonged to Pecorelli, the former friend of Gelli and a member of lodge P 2, who had begun to blackmail his associates and the secret services after receiving from Gelli top-secret documents, including dossiers on Italian politicians. A few months later Pecorelli was killed by a gunshot through the mouth. This is how the mafia disposes of those who are unable to keep

a secret.

One thing is certain. Pecorelli knew that the kidnapping of Moro had not been organised by the 'Brigate rosse' and that the 'brains' that had organised this crime must be sought elsewhere. But where?

Let us turn to the letters that Moro wrote while captive. Having discovered that the higher echelons of the CDP are unwilling to rescue him he writes: 'Perhaps this tough position towards me is the indication of American or West German influence'. In his position, Moro could not afford to be more precise. Now the letters he wrote immediately prior to his death are being analysed in detail, as is the evidence of his closest friends, in the search for a clue that will help solve the mystery. It has become clear that Moro feared that an attempt would be made on his life. The USA's hostility to his policy of national agreement aroused the alarm of this experienced leader. Towards the end of December 1977, Moro learned that Gardner, the US Ambassador to Italy, was sending extremely negative reports on him back to Washington. Gardner was a man who enjoyed considerable influence, and was one of the leaders of the powerful Trilateral Commission. He had close links with the CIA and with American and Italian masons. Moro sent his representative, Pisanu, to the USA in order to sound out the possibility of Moro himself visiting the United States to smooth over the tension that had arisen between the two countries. Pisanu was given an icy reception, and Brzezinski's assistant declared that in Washington 'no one wished to meet the leader of the Christian Democrats'.

The USA was concerned that Moro's policy might influence the entire European situation: France was to hold its general election that spring, and it seemed highly likely that it would result in a left government. On January 12, the State Department published a sharply worded statement advising the Italians and the French not to admit Communists into the government in any form, and the US Congress prepared a programme of political and economic 'quarantine' against these two countries should this happen.

More understood the nature of this warning. 'These people,' he said, 'will do anything to ensure the sale of the last Californian orange.' The word 'orange' is, of course, metaphorical. California is the centre of the US military-industrial complex, and it is from California that the new president will come. The attacks on Moro become increasingly savage and base. Rumours are spread abroad accusing him of accepting bribes from the Lockheed company. Obviously the source of these rumours is the CIA. On March 3, the US Ambassador to Italy, Gardner, spoke at the University of Colombia, where he said: 'Aldo Moro is the most dangerous and ambiguous personality on the Italian political scene.' On March 16, the sound of machine-guns could be heard on the via Fani...

The circumstances surrounding the murder of Moro were similar to those surrounding the assassination of Kennedy in Dallas: threats from the military-industrial complex, indications of mafia and CIA involvement, misinformation, and then an attempt to lay the blame on 'left' elements in order to confuse the issue. In an article entitled 'Moro a Repeat of Kennedy?', the Italian magazine *Panorama* commented that the leadership of the Christian Democratic Party was convinced that its leader had 'fallen into the ruthless net of a genuine conspiracy ... organised with the intervention of influential economic and military circles in a country that until then had been considered a natural ally—the United States'. According to the magazine, the political secretary of the CDP, Piccoli, and the former deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Zamberletti, had come to the conclusion that Moro had paid with his life for attempting to free Italy from the 'supervised liberty' in the US orbit, and for refusing to block communist participation in government despite pressure from the Pentagon and the State Department.

There is much evidence to support such a conclusion. First there is the incoherent behaviour of the Italian police during the Moro kidnapping. Having received information that the terrorists were hiding out on via Gradoli, they went to a small town of the same name in the province of Viterbo. When they finally headed for the address they had been given, they arrived so noisily that they frightened away the criminals. However, they did discover a stock of weapons, including those that had been used during the kidnapping, and also a typewriter on which the terrorists had typed their proclamations. The documents seized by the police contained clues which might have helped to save Moro, but they were not followed up in time.

Renzo Rossellini, one of the extreme 'left', had predicted the kidnapping of Moro on the Citta Futura Radio Station 45 minutes before it happened. Later Rossellini talked with leaders of the Socialist Party, including the party secretary, Craxi, and gave misleading descriptions of the criminals. It was obvious that he had known about the preparations to kidnap Moro, but no one bothered to seriously investigate the source of his odd information.

A few years later Rossellini will reappear ... in Afghanistan, having arrived illegally from Pakistan in order to set up radio transmitters broadcasting anti-Soviet appeals in Russian. It is not difficult to guess with whose approval and assistance he engages in such activity. Only one common denominator can unite Rossellini's inside information on the planned attack on Moro and his involvement in subversive activity in Afghanistan—the CIA. One further point. When it was still possible to save Moro's life, the CIA refused to put its dossiers at the disposal of the Italian police, although they could have shed light on the circumstances of the kidnapping.

All of the evidence related above leads to the conclusion that US subversive centres were involved in the assassination of Moro. The 'Brigate rosse' were merely the tools. The Italian secret services and certain military circles connected with NATO also come under suspicion.

Is it true that the members of the 'Brigate rosse' used military codes known only to secret service agents?—the question put by Senator Cervone. The Christian Democrat Fracanzani asked: 'Is it true that prior to his abduction Moro was advised to abandon his political activity? Who gave him this advice? How was it possible to kidnap Moro on the via Fani? ... Had not his guard been issued with bullet-proof vests? Why?' Pecorelli could no doubt have given the answers, but he was removed. Licio Gelli could also have answered them. He it was who had sent to Italy the 'textbook' compiled by Westmoreland, the general who had once issued the order to use chemical weapons in Vietnam. The answers could have been supplied by their high-ranking American 'friends' who raise such a storm about alleged Soviet involvement in international terrorism and their determination to put an end to the 'brain trusts' of terrorism.

The clues, however, are many, and they all point in one direction.

The String-Pullers from NATO

In an interview, Licio Gelli once said that it was his childhood dream to become a puppeteer, a 'burattinaio'. He would like all the public figures of Italy to be members of his lodge, so that he could pull the strings as he desired. Such a statement could only be made by a megalomaniac. On the night on March 18, 1981, Milan police were instructed to leave the city immediately and move south. Only when they were 100 kilometres from Milan were they to open the secret packet handed to them before their departure. Acting on the instructions they found in the packet, they seized the personal archive of the 'grand master' in the town of Arezzo. Then it was discovered that the head of lodge P 2 had not been idly boasting. The lodge lists contained the names of all branches of the Italian armed forces, the leaders of all the intelligence services—Generals Grassini and Santovito, Giannini and Pelosi, and Admiral Torrisi, who was also a commanding officer in NATO. Also on the list were the names of influential bankers and industrialists, newspaper chiefs and the directors of Italian television, ministers—both Christian Democrat and Socialist—and parliamentary leaders. The connection spread out to Africa and Latin America, but the most important and the closest links were with the USA. More than this, through lodge P 2 the Italian masonry, with a mem-

bership of around 20 thousand, had become virtually a branch of the CIA. Why? Because the postwar reorganisation of masonic lodges in Italy (and in Greece and other West European countries) had been carried out under the supervision of US intelligence. According to Max Corvo, the father of the 'Italian project', the American masons among the leadership of the CIA had rushed to Italy even before it had been completely liberated in order to establish their network there. Frank Gigliotti, one of the CIA chiefs, was in charge of the operation which purged almost 500 Italian lodges of anti-fascist, left elements. Leadership of the Italian masonry was handed over to overt fascists. Gelli, for example, fought on the side of the fascists in Spain as a volunteer. On becoming an officer in Mussolini's army he meted out savage reprisals against the Italian guerrillas. In one instance an Italian youth hanged himself in his cell rather than be subjected to torture at the hands of Gelli.

Nearly all the NATO commanders were masons, and special lodges for American officers were set up for their convenience at NATO headquarters and bases in Italy. The lodge in Verona was called the 'Verona American Lodge'; in Vicenza it was the 'George Washington', in Livorno the 'Benjamin Franklin', and in Naples the 'Harry S. Truman'. There is also a lodge at the Aviano base. The 'Colosseum' lodge is for US diplomats in Rome. Nearly all the US ambassadors in Rome were high-ranking masons, and the masonic lodges provide a convenient meeting place to discuss and direct the activities of their Italian subordinates.

What would have become of Gelli, the once unknown businessman from Arezzo who began by giving away his firm's mattresses to deputies and ministers, without American support? This fascist 'string-puller' was himself a puppet in the hands of far more sophisticated and experienced puppeteers. The US military-industrial complex, the White House, the CIA, the Bilderberg Club and the Trilateral Commission all brought Italy under their control via Gelli and his ubiquitous subordinates. There can be no doubt that lodge P 2 had a hand in the decision to permit the deployment of American missiles on Italian territory, for its membership included, apart from three ministers and seven high-ranking officials from the Italian Ministry of Defence, 42 generals, 51 colonels and 8 admirals, of which one is Admiral Torrisi, the Italian Chief of the General Staff.

The industrialists and financiers, politicians, generals and lawyers who took the oath of loyalty to masonry thereby entered the service of the CIA with the aim of blocking by any means available the advent to power of Communists. The press has more than once listed the crimes in which masons, along with the secret services, have been involved: the explosions in Milan and the murder of judge Occorsio, who suspected masonic-fascist roots of the crimes,

the attack on the 'Italicus' train in which 12 died and the explosion at the Bologna railway station in August 1980, which killed or wounded over 200 people. There are also direct links between Gelli lodges and the 'Brigate rosse'. Suffice it to say that with the help of the Franch masonic order 'The Knights of the Jerusalem Temple' Italy was supplied via Marseilles with arms which Gelli then transferred to the 'Brigate rosse'. Revised with the support of the CIA and American masonry, the Italian subversive 'lodges' organised the succession of 'black' and 'red' terror throughout Italy, which is paying a heavy price for the 'strategy of tension' imposed upon it by Washington.

What, then, can be said about those highly-placed public figures who launched in the USA the noisy campaign about Soviet involvement with terrorists? This campaign was led by Reagan and his then Secretary of State Haig. The CIA was, as everyone knows, unable to provide any evidence of 'the hand of Moscow' in the terrorism that has struck the allies of the USA. This is not surprising. In its investigations into terrorism, the CIA invariably discovered the 'hand of Washington'. The authors of the campaign also turned out to be far from spotless. Alexander Haig, former NATO Commander-in-Chief, had close links with lodge P 2, which was behind terrorism in Italy. Gelli's own people were certain that Haig would become US Secretary of State nine months (!) before he was actually appointed, and immediately upon his appointment they sent Santovito, a general in the secret services and a member of the P 2, to Washington to convey their congratulations.

The attitude of President Reagan and his entourage to the super-conspirator Gelli is truly amazing. Even after his name was inextricably linked with vicious crimes and major scandals, the presidential team continued to hold him in the highest regard. The Italian-extracted Philip Guarino, one of Reagan's election campaign assistants, considered it his duty to keep Licio Gelli regularly informed on the course of the campaign. He wrote that the Republican Party's affairs were doing fine and was convinced that Reagan and Bush would turn up trumps. Gelli briskly replied that if he wanted Italy to gain a good impression of the presidential candidate, he would have to send the material he deemed necessary. And Gelli would see that they were printed.

For his services to the CIA and Washington, Gelli was invited to attend the inauguration of 'his old friend' Reagan and congratulate him on behalf of 'all the king's men' working in Italy on the usurpation of power and terrorism strictly in accord with American instructions.



Eduard KOVALEV

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'CLOAK-AND-DAGGER KNIGHTS' VS THE REVOLUTION OF THE 'RED CARNATIONS'

A little About the Past in Order To Better Understand the Present

Lisbon, April 25, 1974, in the early morning haze the courageous captains of the Armed Forces Movement led their soldiers from the barracks to the fight against fascism, which had been oppressing Portugal for almost half a century. This was not just a military coup, as the West would have one believe. The fascist dictatorship was overthrown by the armed revolt of the young officers from the 'Captains Movement' and was immediately and strongly supported by the masses. Both these forces of the anti-fascist national democratic revolution in Portugal united to strike a blow for their country's freedom, independence and social progress. Thus began the April 25 Revolution.

The events in Portugal affirmed once again that a revolution is a powerful means of social renewal. It frees the enormous hidden strength of the people. But it also affirmed something else: the overthrown social classes do not easily give up; they try to counterattack, to obstruct the development of democracy, destroy freedoms won and restore their power and authority. International imperialism and reactionary forces, especially from the US, are active in helping these counterrevolutionaries achieve their goals. The CIA played an important part in the intrigues engineered against the Portuguese Revolution.

The following observations deal with the behind-the-scene and underground forces, carrying out subversive activities, rather than the major events of the Revolution in Portugal. But in order to understand the present (and perhaps future) course of events, it is necessary to thoroughly examine the past.

On May 23, 1974, the Lisbon newspapers splashed a sensational

story: the day before, while searching for PIDE* agents in hiding, a detachment of Marines under the command of Lieutenant Matos Moniz conducted a search on the premises of the little known, privately owned press agency, Aginter Press (the full name given by its French owner was: l'Agence Aginter-Presse). To everyone's surprise, a real intelligence centre, which had worked for PIDE, and more importantly, for international neofascist organisations, and some secret services in the West, including the CIA, was ensconced behind the doors of this modest establishment. It turned out that the 'cloak-and-dagger knights' from Langley controlled the activities of Aginter Press and used that agency's personnel to carry out their assignments.

It seems that the Marines had uncovered one of the underground cells of a real neofascist International, which was headed by former officers from the Secret Army Organisation (l'Organisation armée secrète—OAS). This organisation which united French reactionaries and colonialists, had fought against Algeria's liberation forces seeking to free their country from French colonial dependency, and afterwards against democratic forces in France itself. The head of this center was Ralf Guérin-Sérac, a man well known in extreme right circles in Western Europe. Incidentally, one of the reports of the Italian SID noted that this man had masterminded the large-scale terrorist operation in Italy on December 12, 1969. Documents from the Service for the Coordination and the Processing of Information of the Portuguese General Staff which were published by the press and also investigative material gathered by the Italian police disclosed that Guérin-Sérac appeared in Lisbon at the end of 1962. He had a different name then, Yves Guillou, and was a captain in the French army. For his 'feats' in the war of aggression against the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, he received the American Bronze Star. He apparently established contact with the CIA while he was in Korea. Guillou then served in Indochina where he received the Legion of Honour for his 'deeds' in the colonial war. A real soldier of fortune, Guillou moved next to Algeria to fight with the local guerrillas. When the French government began to negotiate with the Algerian National Liberation Front, he deserted the army and joined the OAS. He was soon forced to flee to Spain and there he and Colonel Chateau-Jobert formed the so-called Revolutionary Struggle Movement. He next became a member of the Georges Bidault Directory. Finally Captain Guillou offered his services as a specialist on national liberation movements and 'psychological operations' to the rulers of the world's last colonial empire—Portugal.

Captain Guillou, with the aid of CIA men, formed an interna-

* PIDE (Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado)—Portuguese fascist police.

tional anti-communist organisation. The members were to be like him, specialists in 'subversive activities'. In Lisbon he established contact with a small circle of OAS fascists and French immigrants who had collaborated with Hitler during World War II. One of them, Jacques Ploncard d'Assac, a 'theoretician' of the extreme right of French nationalism and fascism, had access to Portuguese dictator Salazar's ruling circle. He introduced the 'OAS activist' to the chiefs of the secret police PIDE. This opened up for Guérin-Sérac (as he now called himself) new and greater opportunities. Under his 'contract' with PIDE he set up a spy and subversive centre using the cover of a press agency. Along with the bogus agency, Guérin-Sérac established an underground political organisation to which he gave the pretentious name, Order and Tradition. This organisation was to become a 'dynamic means of counterattack against the pressure of materialism, especially communism'. To put into practice their neofascist 'theories', Guérin-Sérac and his accomplices formed their own military organisation—the Organisation of Action Against International Communism (Organisation d'action contre le communisme international—OACI).

Judging from confiscated documents found in the Aginter Press archives, the organisation's task was to 'be always prepared to intervene anywhere in the world against the serious threat of international communism'.

OACI was surrounded with the utmost secrecy: members swore blind allegiance and vowed to obey their leaders unquestioningly, to keep secret everything they knew about their organisation's activities.

Order and Tradition, OACI and its subsidiary, Aginter Press, got down to work and created an information network in many West European countries and Latin America. Especially close ties were established with the Italian neofascists. Journalism, of course, was not the topic of discussion, although officially Aginter Press established contacts with similar 'press agencies' in Italy. One such agency, Oltremare, was headed by Giorgio Torchia, a man well known for his contacts with SID and the CIA. The paths of Guérin-Sérac and his CIA 'friends' cross yet again!

Aginter office in the US maintained contacts with *National Review* magazine and its editor, William P. Buckley, who is brother of New York Senator James L. Buckley and one of the leaders of the extreme right forces in the US. Howard Hunt, who masterminded the Watergate break-in, writes in his book of memoirs *Undercover* that Buckley was an old CIA man. According to Hunt, Bill Buckley worked under him (Hunt) when he was the CIA resident in Mexico at the beginning of the sixties. As the progressive Portuguese press observed, the Buckley family in general had a 'weakness' for the CIA. Bill's sister Priscilla Langford Buckley worked in the CIA network in Paris at the end of the fifties, as

did his sister-in-law, the wife of Senator Buckley, Ann Frances Cooley. The same Aginter archives contained documents—an exchange of correspondence—concerning ties between Bill Buckley and an Aginter agent, a friend of Guérin-Sérac, Jay Salby (alias, Jay Sablosky; alias, Hugh Franklin). We will have reason to mention Salby again when we discuss the subversive, counter-revolutionary activities of the Portuguese extreme rightists in 1975-76. Under CIA instructions, Sablosky and Guérin-Sérac formed the infamous Portuguese Liberation Army (Exército de Libertação Portugues—ELP), which organised terrorist acts in Portugal in the summer of 1975.

The CIA Analyses the Situation and Draws Its Own Conclusions

The downfall of the fascist regime in Portugal at first caused no great concern in Washington: the people who took control of the government after Caetano's regime crumbled were well known to American representatives in Lisbon. General Spínola, who became president, was also known to members of the Bilderberg Club (an organisation of financial and political big shots) and to members of the newly formed Trilateral Commission. So the imperialist West was unperturbed. Gradually, however, the American administration began to grow uneasy at the turn of events in Portugal. Spínola's position weakened with each passing day and the real 'danger' of a progressive revolution in Portugal became a possibility. The Secretary of State at the time, Henry Kissinger, was becoming skeptical of the 'excessively optimistic' reports he was receiving from Ambassador Nash Scott. In the summer of 1974 Washington decided to send to Lisbon a 'qualified observer' who could study the situation first-hand. This observer turned out to be none other than the Deputy Director of the CIA, General Vernon Walters. There was no doubt as to his 'qualifications' as a master of subversive activities: in the spring of 1964, as a colonel and US military attaché in Brazil, he played a decisive role in the conspiracy of Brazilian generals who overthrew the left nationalist government of President Goulart. In May-June 1974 he turned up incognito in Lisbon. At the end of August and beginning of September, Walters again returned to the Portuguese capital, and this time there was no keeping it a secret.

As future events revealed, Walters' reports were in complete disagreement with those of Ambassador Scott. The CIA's Deputy Director considered Portugal to be on the brink of falling into the 'clutches of communism' and that the situation called for 'taking drastic measures'. The failure of the September 28, 1974 conspiracy made Walters' recommendations even more categorical. The

CIA drew its own conclusions from the unfolding events in Portugal.

The Boston newspaper, *The Christian Science Monitor*, which can hardly be called leftist, wrote, concerning this issue, that the CIA was amplifying its activities abroad, especially on the Pyrenean Peninsula; that the CIA was exerting pressure on the State Department in order to obtain a larger number of diplomatic posts to be used as a cover for its agents, particularly in such politically unstable countries as Portugal and Spain.

In the autumn of 1974, the well-known Australian journalist, Wilfred Burchett, told me: 'Since the middle of August it has become clear that the local monopolies and multinational companies have begun an orchestrated campaign to provoke economic chaos in Portugal.' And he added: 'In Portugal today [i.e., by autumn 1974—E.K.] there are more than 200 CIA agents. Many of them are 'veterans' having gone through Chile and Vietnam.' At that time the French weekly, *Nouvel Observateur*, had reason to report that the situation in Portugal was beginning to resemble that of Chile. It is true that during the first stage of the revolution, Portugal did not have such a violently reactionary newspaper as Santiago's *El Mercurio*. But afterwards similar publications did spring up like poisonous mushrooms. The CIA found appropriate candidates, paid them well, and a 'free press' began to flourish; for example: the weekly *Tempo*, with reactionary Nuno Rocha as editor.'

Contradictory evaluations about the situation in Portugal led to the dismissal of Ambassador Scott. On November 16, 1974, Frank Charles Carlucci was appointed US Ambassador to Portugal. Two years following the stormy events of 1975's 'hot summer' (in which Carlucci actively participated), American journalist T.D. Allman of *Harper's Magazine* wrote: 'Carlucci's instructions were unambiguous: to accomplish in Portugal what had been achieved in Cambodia and Greece by Kissinger's two favorite ambassadors—John Dean and Henry Tasca. Let them forget about "carrot", and use only the "stick". Get the ridiculous notion that democracy might be something other than a mere consideration of geo-strategic factors out of the heads of the Portuguese. Force Portugal back into the [Western—E.K.] club.'

By this time Frank Carlucci had a considerable reputation as a master of subversive operations. The leftist weekly *Sempre Fixe*, which was popular at that time in Portugal, wrote of him: Frank Carlucci was born in 1930. He attended Princeton University and graduated in 1952. He served in the Navy from 1954-56, then joined the State Department and was sent to Johannesburg; in March 1960 he was transferred to Leopoldville (the Belgian Congo), where the CIA was conducting a fierce battle against Patrice Lumumba. In February 1964 Carlucci was sent to Zanzibar as Consul-General. He was deported from that country as *persona non grata*.

In July 1965 Carlucci received another diplomatic post abroad: US Embassy political advisor to Rio de Janeiro. There he established close ties with the local military. After returning to the US in July 1969, he held a number of high positions in the Nixon Administration.

Carlucci arrived in Lisbon on January 17, 1975, and immediately got down to business. Following his appointment as the new Ambassador, the Embassy personnel was reshuffled. Among the new officials were several experienced CIA agents—personal acquaintances of Carlucci. Here are only two: the chief CIA resident in Lisbon, John Morgan, was 'employed' earlier in Venezuela and Brazil. Former CIA agent Philip Agee (who has devoted his life to exposing his former 'colleagues') said that Morgan gained experience there in terrorist subversion; particularly in forming 'death squads' from among right extremists in Brazil. Diplomatic envoy Herbert Okun became a close advisor to the new Ambassador. The East German newspaper, *Bauernecho*, wrote: 'Okun speaks Portuguese, Russian and German. He has had a curious career: in 1955 he served as liaison officer between the CIA and the secret service of former Nazi General Gehlen; at the beginning of the sixties, Okun was posted at the US Embassy in Moscow; in March 1964, working under CIA orders in Brazil, he assisted the military in overthrowing Goulart's left nationalist government; before his appointment to Portugal, Okun worked as 'special advisor' in Naples at NATO Military Command Headquarters in Southern Europe.'

Exposing Carlucci's role as 'ambassador', Agee wrote in 1975: 'The CIA is only one of the various US agencies working against the revolution, under the guidance of Ambassador Carlucci. Although Carlucci is not a CIA man, he must carefully direct and coordinate all US counter-revolutionary operations.' The 'quiet Americans' under Carlucci's leadership eagerly got down to business.

What specifically did the CIA men do in Portugal during the time of Carlucci and Morgan?

Philip Agee answered this question in his well-known 'A Letter to the Portuguese People', which he published in August 1975 at the height of Portugal's critical political struggle: 'The first priority [of the CIA] is to penetrate the Armed Forces Movement in order to collect information on its plans, its weaknesses, and its internal struggles; to identify the so-called moderates and others who would be favorable to western strategic interests.' As events showed, the CIA put to active use the information received from sources in the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) for propaganda purposes inside and outside Portugal designed to divide and weaken, and eventually paralyse the MFA.

Other assignments of CIA men in Lisbon included: instigation

of subversive counter-revolutionary actions, sabotage, and political assassinations; spreading provocative rumours, fanning discord, rivalry and conflicts; and finally, encouragement and direct aid to underground counter-revolutionary organisations, right extremists and terrorists.

To accomplish its mission, the CIA activated its moles and recruited naive political supporters of a 'multiparty' democracy from political and military figures active in the Portuguese Revolution at that time. These people were often inadvertently deluded and swayed by the CIA's ideological subversive activity. From 1975-77 the CIA was active in Portugal among politicians and the military, in various political parties, public and trade-union organisations, among the intelligentsia and the middle and petty bourgeoisie in city and village. The Catholic Church became one of the CIA's most powerful allies.

Right Terror After an Abortive Coup

In March 1975 one of the most critical moments in the development of the Portuguese Revolution took place. On March 11, the reactionary top brass led by former President Spínola made an abortive attempt to overthrow the government. When recalling these events one concludes that already several weeks before the attempted coup there were signs of the coming crisis. One such sign was the sharp increase in anti-communist propaganda. It wasn't the usual anti-communist rhetoric from reactionaries and their rightist accomplices, who tried as always to portray Communists as 'enemies of the nation, the family and the average Portuguese'. This was a new variety of anti-communism, the source of which was the so-called liberal and democratic circles, and even representatives from the right wing of the Socialist Party. The hand of an experienced director was perceptible in this coordination of anti-communist activities. Everything pointed to the US embassy in Lisbon, more exactly the 'psychological warfare specialists' from the CIA, entrenched there as 'diplomats and political analysts'. Experts in ideological subversion worked hand in glove with specialists in sabotage and terrorism.

The extensive anti-communist campaign gave new strength to Portuguese fascism. Everywhere tension was mounting, rumours about an 'inevitable communist take-over' and 'civil war' were being spread. NATO warships appeared off the Portugal coast to conduct what were supposed to be long planned manoeuvres. Everything was done as if by the CIA school manuals which stipulate definite, precisely given parameters for military and political operations in 'saving' this or that Western country from the 'threat of communist dictatorship'.

Ambassador Carlucci, however, rushed to give the usual interview: he insisted that all these reports about CIA activity in Portugal were unfounded rumours. What was important, he declared, was for Portugal to fulfil the obligations it took upon itself when it became a member of NATO. If these obligations were fulfilled, Carlucci emphasised, there would be no problem. Thus the American threat was definitely and clearly formulated.

Skirmishes and acts of violence provoked by the rightists at their gatherings, the spreading of panic causing rumours and inflammatory appeals in the rightist press—all were telltale signs of the CIA. And as a consequence, an alarming situation arose in Portugal. The French journalist Alain Echegut of *Témoignage Chrétien* wrote in the beginning of March that Spínola was engineering a coup. And he added later: 'The former president received the 'go ahead' from American Ambassador Carlucci to try and check the revolutionary process in Portugal.' At that time the Lisbon newspaper *A Capital* published a sensational article taken from the West German magazine *Extra*. The article openly affirmed that 'the CIA planned to overthrow the Portuguese government before the end of March'. An anxious Carlucci made a statement to another Lisbon newspaper, *Diário de Notícias*, characterizing the report in *Extra* as a fantastic fabrication and a barefaced lie. Carlucci had something to be anxious about! *Extra* reported that 'according to reliable sources in Portugal, the American Ambassador in Lisbon, CIA man Frank Carlucci, would direct the operation planned by the CIA to overthrow the government'. *Extra* went on to report that after a recent meeting with Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves, 'the Ambassador guaranteed not to discuss the situation in Portugal in the future so as not to be accused of interfering in the internal affairs of that country; judging by Carlucci's stand, well-informed circles concluded that preparations for the coup were already underway'.

We know today that despite the American Ambassador's refuting remarks, on March 11, 1975, a military coup was attempted under the leadership of Spínola. The coup was crushed by the military units loyal to the revolutionary government and supported by the masses.

The events of March 11 demonstrated the obvious complicity of the CIA in subversive activities against the Portuguese Revolution. And it was discovered that this was not an isolated incident in the long history of American secret service warfare against democratic and anti-fascist forces in Portugal. Proof to this effect came several days later.

On the evening of March 23, Portuguese television broadcasted a press conference held by the Chief of Staff of the Northern Military District, Colonel Eurico Corvacho. He described in detail how the MFA security service had discovered an underground coun-

ter-revolutionary terrorist organisation, the Portuguese Liberation Army (*Exército de Libertação Portuguesa—ELP*). According to Corvacho, some well-known right political figures of the Salazar regime, reactionary-minded officers dismissed from the Portuguese army after the April 25 Revolution and former PIDE agents were among the founders of ELP. But the most interesting thing, Corvacho stressed, was that two foreigners were leaders in ELP. One was known by the name of 'Morgan' and was a 'director' who carried out ELP's counter-revolutionary activities. The other foreigner was called 'Castor' but carried a passport with the name Hugh Franklin—a 'Guatemalan engineer'. Both Morgan and Castor admitted to taking part in operations to establish several extreme right regimes in Latin America. The two of them had 'worked' in Chile, Guatemala, Bolivia and other Latin American countries. Corvacho's story had the impact of an exploding bomb. For the next few weeks the Portuguese, Spanish and other European press carried exposures concerning the ELP affair.

The investigation, which was begun by the MFA, established that a thoroughly clandestine and well-funded underground terrorist organisation had been operating since the beginning of 1975 inside Portugal and neighboring Spain. The organisation was connected with extreme right circles in Portugal and imperialist secret services, particularly the CIA.

The names of four of the conspirators were established quickly: they were representatives of right military and civil forces in Portugal and closely connected with the previous fascist regime. It took a considerably longer period of time to establish the identities of two others—'Morgan' and 'Castor'. The 'technical director' of ELP, 'Morgan' turned out to be a well-known fascist—Yves Guérin-Sérac, who for twelve years had headed the secret terrorist headquarters of the fascist 'Black International', which had been set up in Lisbon by Aginter Press. Franklin, the 'Guatemalan' was found to be none other than the American from Philadelphia, Sablosky. Before the fascist dictatorship was overthrown in Portugal, he had worked as the Director of the American Branch of that same Aginter Press. As a matter of fact, it was discovered that Sablosky was in Lisbon only a week before the right attempted to overthrow the government on March 11. He traveled a great deal around the country; while keeping in mind Portugal's short distances, the speedometer in his rented car showed that he had driven thousands of kilometers within several days. The night of the abortive coup Sablosky hastily left Portugal.

The 'ELP affair' immediately took on serious meaning. The terrorist organisation was financed by influential Portuguese monopolists from the Melo and Quino families and headed by important people who were influential political figures when Salazar was in power.

Further investigation, which was also conducted in Spain, disclosed that ELP also had very curious ties with West European fascists. It should be remembered that Hugh Franklin (alias—Sablosky) was listed as an employee of Tecnomotor, the controlling shares of which were held by Banco de Ávila. This bank was a financial monopoly belonging to the Spanish Duke of Valencia. For his part, this Spanish fascist aristocrat was a friend and patron of two of the most notorious figures of West European fascism—SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny (who saved the deposed Mussolini from the advancing allied forces) and the 'Black Prince' Valerio Borghese, the leader of the Italian neofascists. There was yet another cover for ELP people in Spain—the Mariano Company, which was owned by Mariano Sanchez Covisa. Covisa was the leader of the so-called Soldiers of Christ, an ultra-right fascist organisation in Spain. It was precisely through these channels that ELP was financed.

Yves Guérin-Sérac personally handled the supply of arms and the recruitment of terrorists for ELP. This became clear after the security service of the MFA ascertained that members of ELP were armed with Scorpion submachine-guns which another neofascist firm, the Paladine, was supplying to their contractors. The Paladine, which was controlled by the same Guérin-Sérac, purchased these arms through the World Arm Co—a firm which buys and sells arms all over the world in accordance with CIA instructions.

ELP Terrorists

Just what kind of organisation was this ELP (the Portuguese Liberation Army) that we've been discussing? This right extremist neofascist organisation declared in 1975 that its purpose was to 'free Portugal from Marxism by means of political assassinations, terrorism, sabotage and psychological warfare'. According to the press, ELP was subdivided into separate 'fighting cells'. For conspiracy reasons, each cell had no more than seven members (it should be mentioned, however, that ELP at that time had a few thousand members). There were five sections among the staff: political, intelligence (military and political), security, psychological warfare (i.e., ideological subversion) and maintenance. ELP members were supposed to have a reliable cover for their illegal activities; they were to take every opportunity to penetrate Portugal's armed forces, political parties and public organisations, particularly the extreme left. There they were to act in ELP's interest, to inflict as much harm as possible on the revolutionary regime.

In leaflets and underground publication ELP named the Communist Party and the Armed Forces Movement as its primary enemy. But at the same time it announced that it would wage unmer-

ciful war against everyone who was 'responsible for the treason' enacted on April 25, 1974.

In the spring and summer of 1975, especially in the first few months after Spínola's abortive coup on March 11, reactionary forces quickly regrouped, concentrating their efforts on promoting widespread subversive and terrorist activities in Portugal. They sought to undermine the country's democratic system. At the same time, underground strike groups were formed in ELP which were to infiltrate Portugal from Spain in order to perpetrate terrorist and subversive activities. The coordinating center for anti-Portuguese, subversive activities was situated at that time in Madrid. The ELP training camps were located on some large private estates in the Spanish provinces of Badajoz, Seville, Huelva and Salamanca. Here future 'Elpists' were trained.

ELP hit-men were recruited from an assorted rabble: former Salazar secret police agents fleeing Portugal, officials of the fascist regime, outright criminals and mercenaries from different countries: Portuguese settlers from Angola and other former Portuguese colonies, Brazilians, former OAS members from France, Germans, Italians and even Swedes.

To conduct its subversive propaganda, ELP established two radio stations, which continuously broadcast in Portuguese from the vicinity of two Spanish border towns—Olivenza and Huelva.

All this required a lot of money. Money which was found. According to reports from the informed Italian magazine *Europeo*, the Portuguese neofascists were generously supported through ex-president Spínola. In 1975 Spínola met in Switzerland former CIA Director John McCone. At that time McCone was one of the deputy directors of the well-known multinational corporation ITT (International Telephone and Telegraph). Spínola received money from McCone collected by 'friends of Portuguese democracy' struggling against the 'Marxist regime' in Lisbon. The first payment was almost three hundred thousand dollars.

Such was the behind-the-scene activity of ELP. As we see, here, as well as in many other situations, the CIA and paramilitary and military organisations formed with CIA assistance were active. Multinational corporations also had a hand in the affair, including ITT, which is known for its involvement in subversive activities against many democratic governments.

* * *

In the summer of 1975 the situation in Portugal reached a level of 'record' tension. The first few weeks of that famous 'hot summer' were marked by a sharp political crisis. All reactionary forces were mobilised to undermine the unity of the Armed Forces Movement, to remove from the government the left and the pro-

gressive military headed by Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves, to arouse the people's suspicions concerning the Communists and representatives of other democratic forces. While increasing political tension (something the right Socialist leaders were especially noted for, having established permanent contact with the American embassy in Lisbon), the reactionaries also simultaneously provoked an anti-communist campaign of terror. Participating in the campaign were paid agents from imperialist secret services, especially the CIA, and those deceived, uneducated and backward people who were incited by skilled subversion specialists to take part in anti-communist demonstrations. The reactionaries were trying to prevent any further democratic reforms in Portugal; moreover, they were waiting for the right moment when they could undo what had already been accomplished.

The Crusade Against the Revolution —with Cross and Torch

While working in Portugal I had occasion to visit the northern section of the country several times. I stayed in the small, incredibly beautiful, ancient city of Braga, which is often referred to as 'Portugal's Rome.' The city has many Catholic monasteries, churches and holy places. But several times in the 'hot summer' of 1975, this 'God-fearing city' was turned into a veritable hell: houses burned, bonfires of books went up in flames, the sounds of shooting, exploding bombs and the cries of the wounded could be heard. Gangs of neofascists set fire to and stormed buildings where Communist and other democratic parties' organisations were located. They also attacked trade-union centre Intersindical and other progressive public organisations.

The real inspirer and organiser of 'St. Bartholomew massacres', which were unleashed in the city by these gangs of cutthroats, was the local Archbishop Francisco Maria da Silva, known for his support of Salazar's dictatorship. Of course, when saying mass that evening as the raging congregation stormed the Communist party offices, which were located in the centre of the city, the Archbishop did not resort to coarse appeals. Quite the opposite! The Most Reverend Archbishop proclaimed: 'Communism threatens our property and our churches; it is time to say "no" to the Communists. We must oppose them with the power of love!' That was all the Archbishop said. But the meaning behind his hypocritical speech about 'brotherly love' was understood by his flock as he hoped it would. The French newspaper *Le Monde* reported that Archbishop da Silva had thrown the faithful into an attack on the local branch of the Communist Party with cross and torch. An acquaintance of mine, the Associated Press correspondent

in Lisbon, was even more frank: 'Under the guidance of the Archbishop of Braga "the power of love offensive" turned into a real attack against the April 25 Revolution.'

We will fight—don Francisco da Silva repeated again and again in the many interviews he held with Western journalists. And he added that if a crusade were necessary, he himself would march in the first row.

Counterrevolutionaries in Lisbon were waiting anxiously for news from the north. They hoped that the 'restoration' of a Salazar-type regime, of course, would begin there, just as the military fascist dictatorship originated in Braga in 1926. Employees of the US Embassy in Lisbon—more accurately, CIA men—read with no less interest the reports coming from the north (and not just those in newspaper articles and commentaries, but those delivered by their own agents). In 1975 US Embassy employees often visited the northern provinces of Portugal 'for reconnaissance purposes'. Ambassador Carlucci himself visited the north several times.

The attack on the local offices of the Communist Party was carried out in bandit-like fashion. The people participating were unknown to the local residents. They began by travelling around the nearby villages in trucks and buses, inviting those who 'wanted to put an end to the Reds' to join them. The fitting conclusion to this long planned campaign occurred when the Archbishop, the spiritual leader of these 'latter-day crusaders', gave his blessing to the bandits who set fire to the building where the local Communist Party organisation was located.

It was already known by the summer of 1975 that the action taken by these fanatics was instigated by mercenaries hired by reactionary forces. This was reported by many Western correspondents. One of US newspapers noted that this was not a spontaneous demonstration by the public. The raids were carried out by small groups, directed from the outside. It is now known that the Archbishop had connections with the so-called Portuguese Liberation Army—the notorious ELP. At that time the organisers of ELP were working out of Spain and had very close ties with the CIA.

From the Ambassador's Office to the Seat of Deputy Director of the CIA

There is still left to tell how the 'chief coordinator' of the subversive action against the Portuguese Revolution was rewarded.

Frank Carlucci's busy career in Portugal concluded with a political scandal. Rumours were being spread around Lisbon at the end of 1977 about the inevitable departure of the American Ambassador. However, many Portuguese were dumbfounded when it was officially announced by the US government on December 23 that

the Portuguese Ambassador was being transferred to the Washington suburb of Langley where he would serve as Deputy Director of the CIA. Thus were Carlucci's services duly taken note of, and appropriately rewarded. Commenting on these events the Lisbon newspaper *O Diário* wrote: 'Acting with a callousness characteristic of CIA veterans, Frank Carlucci succeeded in placing numerous Portuguese politicians, who had publically maintained ties of friendship with him, in a very difficult situation. It will hardly be pleasant for them now to recall how often they discussed confidential matters and exchanged information with one of the CIA's deputy directors.'

Artur Portela Jr., a well-known Portuguese journalist, characterised what happened: 'This appointment was made either out of chauvinistic arrogance or out of extreme political naiveté. Is the American Administration so unconcerned about what a small, poor and weak country might think? And does it mean nothing to the American Administration that due to their actions those politicians who maintained friendly relations with the American Ambassador were now morally and politically compromised? And does it mean nothing to the American Administration that the presidents of our republic, the members of the Revolutionary Council, the ministers of our government, the leaders of our political parties and the deputies of our parliament are today certain that everything they discussed in open, frank and friendly conversations with the US Ambassador is now to be found in the archives of the memory of No. 2 man in the CIA? What are we supposed to think about the head of a government who sends as his representative to other heads of government, a man who within several months time will be appointed a director of a spy agency? What are we to think about the foreign policy of a government which sends as ambassadors to countries in critical situations the future directors of spy agencies?'

However, the American administration did not pay the slightest attention to these views. After President Reagan came into office, Carlucci was appointed to serve as the Under Secretary of Defense, no less!

These are just a few isolated incidents from the lives of the 'quiet Americans' and their accomplices. These people are an 'anachronistic' rabble of reactionaries in Portugal and other countries who belong in the garbage dump of history.



VADIM KASSIS,
LEONID KOLOSOV

VADIM KASSIS—has worked as a foreign correspondent for Soviet newspapers in China, India and Japan. He is the author of 30 books, which include *Chrysanthemums at the Prison Wall*, *Top Secret* and *The Corridors of Subversion*.

Kassis holds the USSR Journalists' Union Award.



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Kolosov holds the USSR Journalists' Union Award.

SABOTEURS ON THE AIR: A CLOSE-UP VIEW

Munich. Here, a city suburb with the romantic name of Englisher Garten (English park) serves as the headquarters for one of the most vicious centres of ideological subversion. We speak of it in the singular, because the year 1975 saw a formal merger of the subversive radio stations Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, which, as was loudly proclaimed, thus added a new dimension to their work. But nothing was changed. Their purpose remained the same: adding to their already great quantity of lies, slander and misinformation. These two radio stations have broadcast programmes in sixteen languages to the Soviet Union, as well as in six other languages, to Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia since the early 1950s.

These 'sister-stations' are sometimes referred to as twins, although their birthdates are different. In a sense, however, they are twins since they were spawned and blessed by the same 'godfather', the US Central Intelligence Agency.

Radio Free Europe (RFE) made its appearance in early 1949.

Originally, it was a 'committee', not a radio station. This was, in any case, the original concept of that anti-Soviet organisation. Incidentally, the CIA, during the cold war period in which it was 'easy' for it to operate, did not make any secret of it. Under American laws, any new organisation must be registered. Without much ado, the CIA entered its brainchild in the official register as a 'private anti-communist society'. In 1950, again on a 'private' initiative of the 'committee', RFE began its broadcasts. Its short-wave transmitter called 'Barbara', installed in a car in Lampertheimer Wald forest near Frankfurt am Main, went on the air for the first time on July 4. Back in his day, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, one of the initiators of the establishment of anti-communist centres, said in so many words that Radio Free Europe was necessary for weakening the socialist countries in every possible way. That is why RFE serves both as a centre for ideological subversion and as a front for CIA covert espionage activities in Europe. In fact, besides collecting information for the radio station's 'ideological' work, RFE representatives engage in intelligence activities pure and simple, including recruiting agents from among the citizens of the socialist countries on business or tourist trips to the West European countries.

As early as 1951, at an RFE leaders' conference in Munich, Mr. Jackson, one of President Eisenhower's aides, said that Radio Free Europe was a weapon for waging psychological warfare. He made it plain that the radio station's objective was to generate internal strife and disorders in the countries to which its programmes were beamed.

The same principles guided the establishment—also in Munich—of another CIA subsidiary, Radio Liberty (RL), with the sole difference that this new creation specialised in fake information and slander against the Soviet Union. It began its operations in the buildings at a former nazi airfield spared by bombings. The American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism officially inaugurated Radio Liberation in 1951, and it first went on the air in 1953.

Already at that time the chief declared purpose of the radio station was to wage a limited war behind the 'Iron Curtain'. The means for this and other similar aims included strikes, sabotaging transport, organising jailbreaks, fomenting disobedience on a large scale and other forms of mass unrest.

The radio war began with the gunfire bursts from one radio transmitter, while now their number is over twenty. In 1964 the label 'Liberation' was replaced by 'Liberty'. The radio station's methods also changed. Dyed-in-the-wool anti-Sovietism was replaced by glib talk about the need for 'objective' information and 'true' facts. But this hypocritical mask cannot hide the real face of Radio Liberty.

Joseph G. Whelan, a former CIA official working in the Foreign

Affairs Division of the Library of Congress, obtained access to Radio Liberty archives. He also spent several weeks in Munich to see how programmes are prepared and beamed to the USSR. He then drew up a report entitled 'Radio Liberty—a Study of Its Origins, Structure, Policy Programming and Effectiveness'. The report's summary contains especially many revelations. Whelan has no doubt that RL is a government department, a link in the US foreign policy apparatus.

In their book *The Invisible Government*, American newsmen David Wise and Thomas Ross have detailed various aspects of CIA activities, demonstrating that the activities of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, passed off as non-governmental broadcasting networks, constitute the largest secret operation run by the American intelligence service. Incidentally, the 'radio sisters' learned the tricks of their trade from the same ABC books marked 'classified', 'top secret' and 'restricted', produced by the various divisions of the US secret service. Instructions to the stations set out sowing discord between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the peoples of other socialist countries, undermining confidence in the USSR, spreading false information, fomenting nationalist sentiments, and playing up the 'advantages' of the Western way of life.

Numerous revelations in the press, as well as those by former radio station officials provide a very clear idea of the respective structures of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, and of those who exercise 'supreme leadership' there. These are CIA agents assigned from overseas. Let us enumerate some of the old and new bosses in Munich: Howland Sargeant, Robert B. Redlich, Kenneth W. Scott, Richard Cook, Ralph E. Walter, Hans Fischer, Russel Poole, Max Ralis. Naturally, they wear no uniforms and their visiting-cards are quite innocent-looking. But when they employ a new, unscrupulous writer or news analyst, they obtain from him a signed statement that the undersigned knows that Radio Liberty was set up by the CIA and is financed by it. Should he pass this information to a third person, he will be liable to a fine of over 10,000 dollars and a prison term of up to ten years.

It must be said that inside the United States one hears voices calling into question the feasibility of maintaining ideological subversion centres in West Germany. Several years ago Senator William Fulbright described Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty as cold war relics whose place is in the dustbin of history. His colleague Mike Mansfield demanded that these harmful remnants of the cold war be liquidated.

Referring to the activities of the above radio stations, the prominent West German public figure Josef Weber said they blatantly interfered in the internal affairs of the socialist countries, distorted the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and slandered the accomplishments of socialism. These activities were in a flagrant contra-

diction with the Helsinki Final Act, and aimed at preventing West Germany from developing its relations with the European socialist countries in the spirit of good-neighbourliness, mutual understanding, peace and cooperation.

US Congressman Herbert Burke suggested that further US appropriations to finance the American radio centres outside the United States ran counter to the interests of the United States and US tax payers, and that easing international tensions would be of greater benefit to the American people and the world.

Good wishes! But the American bosses in Munich are trying to pass the radio stations off as independent entities which have nothing to do with either the secret services or US government departments. Although the financing of Radio Liberty has been transferred from the CIA to the Board of International Broadcasting, an organ set up specifically for this purpose, this Board is subordinated to the US Department of State. Can there be another instance in the history of international relations when a government agency of one state daily interferes, in peace time, in the most blatant manner in the internal affairs of another state with which it maintains official diplomatic relations? Brazen anti-Soviet slander, crude innuendoes, and false information spawned by the American radio stations Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, which employ former nazis, criminals and other rabble, constitute an unprecedented violation of the foundations of international law.

Let us take a closer look at Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. The present writers have visited these stations. To be frank, we saw to it that we prepared very carefully for this trip. We decided to get a first-hand knowledge of our enemy, to get a better look at it, since imperialism is expanding its 'psychological warfare' against the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and the developing nations that have opted for an independent path towards a new life.

General Reinhardt Gehlen, former head of the West German federal intelligence service, often said that a pinch of potassium cyanide tossed into a well can poison a whole village, while a lie broadcast over the radio can poison millions. A White House report to US Congress stressed that foreign broadcasting constitutes one of the key elements in US foreign policy. We are not drawing any parallels, but we know that the main target of this broadcasting, as is clear from the report, has always been the Soviet Union. Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe are the chief mouthpiece for this broadcasting and their antennas face the East.

The building housing Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe appeared before us from the back. We saw a moat and a high mesh fence behind it. A bird's eyeview of the stations' headquarters shows it to be shaped like a cabbalistic sign. When viewed from the ground, it is a serpentine building with individual sections in seven

three-storey outbuildings.

Without phoning in advance, we were at the radio station by ten in the morning.

We were received by Robert B. Redlich, Director of Public Affairs. This is the title on his visiting card, but that is only official. Unofficially, Redlich goes by another title, but let us start from the beginning.

Since 1957, Robert B. Redlich has been director of the Information Department and chief adviser for press liaison at both RL and RFE. Those Western journalists who knew him told us that at RL and RFE it was impossible, without Redlich's authorisation, to meet anyone or even obtain the most elementary information about the stations' activities. The explanation lies partly in the adviser's background and his political convictions, but in the final analysis it lies in his job.

Redlich was born into a well-to-do family in Vienna. He studied in Austria and Switzerland. Then, together with his parents, he moved to the United States and entered Columbia University. In 1943 he was drafted into the US Army. When he talked to us he claimed to have taken part in military operations in Normandy. Although this may be the case, the real martial exploits of Sergeant Redlich are unknown. What we do know for sure, however, is that when he stayed in Western Europe after the fall of Nazi Germany, Redlich soon found himself in the front trenches of the cold war. Anti-communism and anti-Sovietism became an obsession with him. Allen Dulles himself became aware of Redlich's zeal in the political field, and in 1952 he was assigned to Radio Liberty.

... Redlich's look is alert and searching, veiled in a thin smile, as he greets us.

'Well, ask your questions, I am ready to answer them.'

The first thing that interests us is who finances RL and RFE, which have a combined staff of 1,750 in Munich and Washington, and powerful transmitters in West Germany, Portugal and Spain. We have heard from some previous employees of RL and RFE that the stations' correspondents draw monthly salaries ranging from 6,000 to 9,000 West German marks. Some money!

'The US Congress earmarks appropriations for us,' says Redlich.

Translated from German, the word 'Redlich' means 'honest'. Does this grey-haired chief of one of the leading RL-RFE departments believe what he says?

'Aren't these stations financed by the CIA?'

Redlich is ready for such questions. He remains unperturbed.

'Gentlemen, I wish to stress again that the Voice of America is a government enterprise, while we are a private firm. Our name is "The RL-RFE Corporation". What has the CIA got to do with all this? Personally, I never met Allen Dulles, and I do not have an office in New York.'

Another question from us:

'How do you account for the fact that at a time when many sober-minded people are trying to preserve detente in Europe and the whole world, RL and RFE are going on the air to poison it with slanderous and provocative anti-Soviet and anti-communist broadcasts designed to heighten international tensions?'

Mr. Redlich denies outright that this is so. In this case, Mr. Redlich should consult the opinion of Americans themselves. Senator William J. Fulbright, already mentioned by us, pointed out that the US radio stations that have settled in Munich were busy spoiling the chances for improved relations with the Soviet Union.

'Mr. Redlich, could we ask about the principles underlying the hiring of your personnel?'

'Firstly, an RL-RFE employee must know what he is writing about. He or she must have an idea about the situation in the Soviet Union and outside it.'

'Are you not, Mr. Redlich, aware of the fact that the RL-RFE has settled in a city where there are still many war criminals out of whom you recruit your personnel? Some Munich residents themselves are outraged about this.'

At this point, Redlich questions our use of the term 'war criminals', in a clear bid to evade a straightforward answer. He is visibly annoyed and nervous, trying to hide his tension behind an affable smile. But we have done our homework for this interview well, and so we tick off the names of the traitors, thugs and criminals that have at some time or another been employed by the RL-RFE: Kromiadi, Dudin, Tibina, the Kabanov brothers, Chai-kovsky, Abramova, Krasovsky.... Our interlocutor tries another, rather absurd, ploy: he starts pretending to not know or not regard some of them as 'criminal elements', while the only thing he can say about the others is that they worked with the RL-RFE some time in the past, long ago.

We could see Mr. Redlich was clearly embarrassed and knew we were aware of it.

'We have different social systems, and a different view of politics. We shall never come to terms with each other from the viewpoint of ideology,' Redlich says, giving free rein to his frankness. 'We are a private radio station, and we think we can give anyone who wishes the chance to express his opinion about the Soviet Union before the microphone.'

'In this case, Mr. Redlich, could you explain to us how you prepare your programmes beamed to the Soviet Union?'

'The RL-RFE is an American firm. And the Russian-language service is also headed by an American. I personally do not participate in preparing those programmes,' says our interlocutor, hastily dissociating himself from his colleagues.

'And could we meet the man directly responsible for working out the Russian-language programmes? We are very interested because the past five or six broadcasts we have heard contained not a single word of truth about the Soviet Union. Why is it, for instance, that you allow that criminal Bukovsky to poison air time with his lies? Why is your radio station interfering in other countries' internal affairs, Poland, for example?'

Here, Mr. Redlich again resorts to murky arguments about 'freedom of speech' and 'human rights'. Not a single question on our part is answered directly. It is true that, on our insistence, Redlich promises to arrange 'the next day' a meeting with the head of the Russian-language service, but whether by omission or by design he eventually fails to arrange it. Redlich then 'recalls' that the man in question 'does not know Russian' (?) and thus does not monitor broadcasts to Russia and has no idea what the Russian-language service is beaming to Russia.

On leaving the radio station, we decided to drop in on the neighbours of the RL-RFE, the archive of *samizdat* on Euringerstrasse. *Unsere Zeit*, the West German Communist newspaper, wrote about the centre in 1977.

The newspaper then reported that the archive's task was preparing and spreading counter-revolutionary booklets, compiling catalogues of clandestine anti-socialist publications and devising methods for illegally taking these publications into the socialist countries.

In an instruction book published in 1954, which serves as reference material for the US special services, career CIA officer Ladislav Farago supplied an accurate definition of the notion of *black propaganda*. Spreading it, Farago wrote, is one of the chief functions of the secret services not only because, as its weapons, it uses exclusively espionage material, but also because it is independent and operates secretly. Black propaganda must always create the impression that the material it is spreading comes from enemy territory or contiguous areas, or directly from anti-government elements inside enemy territory.

Now let us try and see how this CIA recipe is being applied by the Munich centre. Firstly, the *samizdat* archive's staff includes specialists in ideological subversion from the following NATO countries: the USA, Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, Norway and the Netherlands. Other 'strange bedfellows' include specialists in subversion from Japan, Israel and some trigger-happy anti-communist groups in neutral Switzerland. The arrangement is that the radio stations, controlled and maintained by the CIA, are to provide the centre with their espionage materials, manuscripts and the radio broadcasts monitored. The head of the black propaganda centre is Martin Dewhearst, a Briton, known as a specialist in Russian and Soviet literature. However, he is better known as a

man of fanatical anti-Soviet beliefs. He was expelled from the Soviet Union for his unseemly activities in 1962. During his visits to the USSR he had repeatedly sought contacts with Soviet citizens with the purpose of collecting intelligence information of an economic and political nature, and had attempted to spread anti-Soviet publications.

The Munich centre's open hostility with respect to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is beyond any doubt. The West German press has justly noted that the governments that established the centre are signatories to the Helsinki Final Act and solemnly stated therein that they would 'refrain from direct or indirect assistance to... subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State'. And what is happening in reality?

We decide to discuss this with the black propaganda specialists, and set out for Euringerstrasse, a quiet, desolate street lined with sturdy, tightly shuttered houses. As we searched for the house number, we noticed something was amiss. The spot which recently bore a plaque stating the official name of the centre was nothing but a dark rectangular patch with four holes left by removed screws. We entered a telephone booth and dialed the number. A male voice answered and said that the occupants had changed. 'And where are the former tenants of the flat?' 'No idea,' said the voice. 'They did not tell us'.

A journalistic quest led us to the hypothesis, later substantiated, that in the wake of press exposures (even Springer's *Die Welt* wrote about it) those in charge of *samizdat*, fearing public wrath and to avoid a scandal, decided to go even deeper underground and hide in the RL-RFE radio station. There they probably feel more secure and the necessary materials were now all within easy reach. That was how the two kindred agencies united.

New Names For Old Turncoats

It is 10 a.m. in Munich. At both radio stations, the work day begins at this time. Directors of different language services and the American directors take their places at the desks. The posts are similar but there is a difference in status. The former are servants, the latter—the masters.

Who is employed by the radio stations? CIA career officers, on the one hand, and World War II criminals and postwar traitors to the Soviet Union, on the other. Special zeal is shown by former henchmen of the nazis, people with blood on their hands. They have no alternatives in their choice of career. They have changed their names many times and tried to do everything possible to make people forget them. They have erased any recollections of their

homes, betrayed their relatives, friends, and their country of birth. But their countrymen have not forgotten them. People never forget traitors. The true names of butchers, traitors and criminals are known.

Take the case of Dmitry Chaikovsky from Minsk Region. From the first days of the nazi occupation of Minsk in 1941, Chaikovsky offered his services to the fascist executioners. He drew up lists of party members, activists and other Soviet patriots, and placed himself at the head of the nationalistic organisation 'Belorusskaya sluzhba batkovshchine' (BSB) established by the nazi intelligence service, obtaining the rank of a senior lieutenant of the German army for his services as a lackey. His career as a traitor was on the rise. In 1943 he was appointed deputy head of a BSB training centre in the town of Slonim, and then sent to Berlin. He recruited candidates for the Dahlwitz subversion and intelligence school and for some time taught specialised disciplines there. In January 1945, several months before the rout of the Third Reich, nazi military intelligence assigned Chaikovsky, now a captain, to the so-called First Grenadier Storm-Trooper Brigade made up of traitors and criminals. It was US military intelligence which saved the criminal from the noose awaiting him for the atrocities he had committed. He was saved not from altruistic motives but with a definite objective in mind: to use Chaikovsky for putting together nationalistic anti-Soviet groups. In 1954, he was assigned to a 'quieter' place as a staff member of Radio Liberty.

For two people to meet in Minsk, especially in wartime, was not a simple thing. But as they say, birds of a feather flock together. It was only inevitable that Nadezhda Abramova should meet Dmitry Chaikovsky. They got acquainted in the SD, the Hitler counter-intelligence, joined by Abramova immediately following the fascist occupation of Minsk. Using her skills of a doctor as a cover (before the war she had actually worked as a district doctor in Minsk), Abramova showed special zeal in betraying Soviet people who had aided the partisans to the fascist authorities. Her conscience is haunted by many murdered countrymen. Like Chaikovsky, Abramova participated in establishing a nationalistic organisation in Byelorussia. It is true that she was assigned to 'work' with youth. She called for a total struggle against the Soviet Army and, resorting to blackmail, persuaded some immature youngsters to seek out Soviet patriots working in the underground and to betray them to the nazis. Abramova's bloody 'services' were highly appreciated. Wilhelm Kube, the fascist butcher of Byelorussia, personally presented Abramova with a medal. She could not, of course, count on even the mercy of the allies if she fell into their hands. It was for this reason that Nadezhda Abramova 'died'—but only on paper, of course. She then became 'Maria Teodorovich'. It was under this new name that the war criminal was recruited by

US military intelligence in Munich where Abramova-Teodorovich found herself after the war. The anti-Soviet zeal of this new CIA agent proved to the liking of her masters. Teodorovich worked with Chaikovsky to unite the nationalist rabble, and then she was assigned to the Institute for the Study of the USSR, a subsidiary of Radio Liberty.

Following the liquidation of the 'institute', Teodorovich was transferred to the Radio Liberty research department, which engages in planning subversive and other actions against the Soviet Union. Now elderly, this accessory to Nazi war crimes is engaged, on orders from the CIA and using some literary establishment as a front, in spreading anti-Soviet literature among USSR nationals travelling abroad, as well as organising illegal transportation of this literature to the USSR.

These are two specimens of the personnel whom the American administration describes as the voice of former Soviet citizens and the mouthpiece of the people of the USSR.

What is there left to say about the voice of traitors and butchers, people without a homeland or conscience, with such biographies? It is true that there are other 'voices' belonging to former Soviet citizens who, having left the USSR under various pretexts (usually under the pretext of 're-uniting with relatives' in Israel), have settled in Munich where Radio Liberty is located.

The biographies of the 'new generation' of anti-Sovietists are as a rule brief. Take, for instance, the Makhlis family. Leonid Makhlis was born in 1945. In 1971 he graduated from the journalism department of Moscow University and left for Israel, naturally, to re-unite.... His wife is Ilonna Alexandrovich, daughter of the singer Mikhail Alexandrovich. In his time, the father was a voguish crooner of Neapolitan songs. After he left the USSR, he was employed as a singer of religious psalms in a Toronto synagogue. It took Ilonna some time to get to Radio Liberty. First, she worked with her husband at an Israeli radio station where the couple became involved in some shady undertaking, after which, naturally, they found their salvation in Radio Liberty. People must have blemishes on their record or they just don't have a chance to be admitted.

Lev Roitman has such a blemish—not from the very beginning, it appeared later. At the beginning everything was quite normal. In 1967, upon completing his law degree, Roitman began to work with the Kiev Regional Bar Association. It was at that stage that he blotted his copybook, in trying to persuade a rape victim to drop the charges and give false evidence, naturally for a handsome payoff. Roitman was dismissed from his job. After some time, he applied to emigrate to Israel to be 'reunited' with his mother's aunt. With permission to emigrate, Roitman then headed not for Israel, but for New York. There, he divorced his first wife who

accompanied him, and leaving his wife and child to fend for themselves in an alien country, Roitman married a second time. His new spouse, Sheron Goller, turned out to be a member of the notorious Jewish Defence League. And she took her husband to Radio Liberty, where Roitman, changing his name to Leonid Borisovich Rostov, became an analyst with a regular access to the microphone on the 'Soviet juridical system'. Judging by his background, one may well imagine the contents of his programmes.

These are specimens of the new personnel working in Radio Liberty. They say the old bosses are quite pleased with the new servants.

The True Face of Radio Liberty

We met journalist Yuri Marin in Moscow after a 'business trip' to the West that lasted many years. He taught at a US Army institute which trains personnel for centres engaged in ideological subversion and espionage against the socialist countries, as well as holding various jobs with Radio Liberty.

Sometimes a man's looks belie his character. Sullen-looking, our interlocutor turned out to be loquacious and witty.

We spoke to Yuri Marin for several hours. One could, of course, give literary form to his narration about his life and work, about himself and others, but we deemed it better to present everything the way it was, in the same question and answer sequence. It is quite natural that questions took less time than the answers. And so...

Question. Thus, you said that Radio Liberty had given you a job, bearing in mind that you were not a man 'from the street' but a specialist with a previous record of having worked for a certain US institute.

Answer. Yes, you are right. I have taught there.

Q. You taught there? What subjects? Incidentally, it would be interesting to know what students study at that 'institute'?

A. My course was called 'Soviet Society'. The students? As a rule, they are all too old to be called students. Some had military ranks like captain or major, and others had diplomatic rank, not very high but quite enough to fill different posts in embassies in socialist countries. They took an odd interest in those countries. People motivated by idle curiosity did not belong to that 'institute'.

Q. So what were all those trainees?

A. Those were officers from the US military intelligence, agents from special services, diplomats or diplomats only in name.

Q. In what language did you conduct your course?

A. Russian, of course. Before employment, all the trainees graduate from higher or specialised education establishments in

the United States and already have a good command of Russian. At receptions, they and their instructors sing Russian folk songs. Their interest in the Soviet Union (and my enrolment consisted of future 'specialists on Russia') boiled down to a range of issues having a direct relationship to intelligence work in the USSR. The institute's teaching staff consisted mainly of traitors to their country and war criminals who during the Second World War collaborated with the nazis, i.e. 'eligible' persons recruited by the US intelligence service. Incidentally, the worse the biography of a traitor, the greater was the confidence placed in them at the institute and the higher the post he held.

Thus, for instance, the Chair of Soviet History is headed by Avtorkhanov, a Chechen by nationality. He deserted from the Soviet Army at the very beginning of the war and began to publish a vile tabloid in nazi-occupied territory with an epigraph as follows: 'Allah above us, Hitler with us'. He then served in nazi counter-intelligence, betraying to Gestapo fighters of the Soviet underground, Communists, Young Communist League members, and other activists. At present, while working in an American intelligence school, Avtorkhanov is 'successfully' part-timing with Radio Liberty.

There is another character, Artemyev, who teaches military subjects at the institute. Having deserted to the nazis during the Second World War, he then joined the army of the traitor Vlasov. After the war he evaded retribution by hiding behind the protection offered by the US intelligence and became a 'teacher'. There was yet someone else who may be described as the ultimate in terms of surprises. This was a certain V. Paunovich, a woman with no higher and, judging by all appearances, even no secondary education, who taught literature at the institute. The low general culture of this tongue-tied 'junior instructor' bewildered her colleagues and the trainees. The bosses liked Paunovich, however, as she was an active member of the anti-Soviet organisation, the Popular Labour Union (NTS), her 'political reliability' was above suspicion.

Q. Who recommended you for work with Radio Liberty?

A. It was Dr. Bill West, alias Edwards—an influential figure in US intelligence services. And my immediate employer was Jon Lodeesen, a 'student' of mine, expelled from the Soviet Union for activities incompatible with his diplomatic status, who later became manager of the Russian-language service at Radio Liberty. So my 'students' kept in touch with me... The radio station's close contacts with the institute continue to this very day.

Incidentally, I should like to tell you more about the time during which I lectured to the overgrown American students. What is important is the substance of the problem. And this substance can well be illustrated by the annual publication, that I have preserved in my papers, of the institute's graduates—a kind of a pock-

et-size amateur newspaper published in a somewhat coarse Russian, which, besides the obligatory photograph of the bosses and teachers of the institute with a new enrollement, and a routine collection of flat anti-Soviet jokes, carried candid information about some of the activities of this uncharitable institution. Here is, for instance, a note by a certain Alan Parker: 'The graduates will, in the future, occupy a number of posts.... Lieutenant-colonel Baxter will continue his study of the Soviet problems at Kansas State University. Major Lajoie will also continue his studies, including, in the field of Soviet affairs, at the history department at Colorado University of Boulder.... Mr. Tarr, Mrs. Hensley, Mr. Mador and Major Stevens will return to the Department of Defense in Washington. Major Stevens will join the personnel of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence. Messrs. Liden, Porter, Semakis, Parker and Raimi are to go to Moscow to work as American embassy officials. Liden will be but in charge of cultural affairs in Moscow. Porter and Semakis will work in the consular section of the embassy.'

Also of interest is the choice of 'guests' delivering lectures and reports at the institute on the various aspects of Soviet policies and economy. Among them, for instance, is Peter Reddaway from the London School of Economics and Political Science, the above-mentioned representative Jon Lodeesen of Radio Liberty and others.

Radio Liberty and the institute are situated very close to each other, in the territory of a sovereign state—the Federal Republic of Germany. Neighbours, one may say.... Incidentally, there are other anti-communist fellow-accomplices in the same territory. You have probably guessed that I am talking about the Popular Labour Union (NTS), an avowedly anti-Soviet organisation.

There was a time when the NTS headquarters was a foot-loose entity that long wandered about Europe before finding a permanent refuge in Frankfurt am Main. The city, situated near West Germany's western borders, hosted war criminals, defectors, deserters, a large American camp for 'displaced' persons named King, and a host of smaller camps. At that time, jobs were difficult to get, and food even more so. That was why the 'displaced' ones tenaciously clung to their beds in the camps, which meant a guarantee against possible arrest and death from starvation.

The first employer appeared later in the camps: a short little fellow with shrewd eyes. He was Vladimir Rudin, an NTS member and a CIA agent, whose assignment on behalf of the US intelligence service was to recruit people for radio Liberation which was being established at that time. Rudin proved successful at his assignment. In any case, his American bosses felt content and graciously bestowed upon him a favour in the form of a permanent sinecure—the post of senior editor at the radio station without any

writing duties. In fact, he has precious little time for his 'creative' work. Rudin is still doing his recruiting, this time among Radio Liberty staff for NTS.

Q. But as far as we know, in the early 1970s the management of Radio Liberty ostensibly gave up collaborating with the NTS members? This was reported in Western news media.

A. You are quite right. Liberty and NTS have their own programmes. Radio Liberty adjusts its programmes according to changes in the international political situation while NTS remains true to its old heritage. Radio Liberty's aim is to persuade Soviet listeners that there are practical, democratic and political alternatives to what is presented as an authoritarian system, and to encourage them to work towards that end. The NTS rules express the same idea with the subtlety of a drill sergeant: 'The active forces of the revolution, mobilising opposition reserves of society and the people and relying on contributing and concomitant factors, shall develop purposefully and consistently the revolutionary struggle against the dictatorship of the proletariat....' This is the whole difference.

The US management of Radio Liberty strives to prove that the radio station has no contacts with émigré anti-Soviet or other political organisations. That is why that ploy with NTS was no more than a red herring.

Q. And what are the relations between NTS and representatives of Zionist circles which have lately become especially active in adding their cadres to Radio Liberty and other ideological subversion centres?

A. I can see the rationale behind your question. If one takes a moment to recall the history of the NTS programme, one will find in it provisions which, in so many words, spell out total restrictions on the civil rights of the Jewish population in a 'future Russia'. Setting the record straight, it must be said that something more sinister was in store for the Jews than just the Jewish pale of tsarist times, this attitude according to NTS leaders, was conceived under pressure from ideologists of the Third Reich. However, even after the rout of nazi Germany, this provision continued to figure in the NTS programme. And then, all of a sudden, it disappeared. This coincided with the appearance of new guests who began to attend the 'theoretical' conferences of the NTS magazine *Posev*, which I also attended. Just imagine this idyllic picture: Zionists from Israel sitting side by side with NTS members of nazi years as conference participants. Former officials of Goebbels' Reich propaganda department, like Poremsky, an NTS boss, who had called for a total destruction of the Jews, now welcome them as close relatives. So what's up? The answer is simple. It ran through the speech of every speaker who had come from Israel to Frankfurt am Main. Anti-Sovietism and anti-communism are the two things

that have reconciled NTS members with Zionists and made them forget the past—trenches with corpses of Jews killed by the nazis near Odessa and the Oswiecim ovens.

The Radio Liberty bosses have stepped up recruitment of persons of Jewish origin since they are regarded as the most up-to-date and informed, and they could go on the air as people who are 'concerned'. But these 'concerned' individuals have never had, or long lost, any links with the Soviet people. Under the pseudonym of Inna Svetlova, a certain Molly Gordin broadcasts 'for youth'. Semyon Mirsky, alias Mayevsky, composes daily commentaries. Getting his inspiration from his quarters in a New York sky-scraper, Victor Kabachnik scribbles his weekly notes 'through the eyes of a recent Muscovite'. Rakhil Fedoseyeva is in charge of *samizdat* affairs. When there is no influx of fresh information, Rakhil flies on an urgent 'leave' to Israel to meet with Jewish emigrants from the USSR, to interview them, and to rapidly concoct a fresh opus in the guise of *samizdat*. Incidentally, of late an increasing number of Radio Liberty broadcasts have been devoted to the so-called 'Jewish problem in the USSR'. This subject-area already accounts for nearly one third of the total broadcasting time to the Soviet Union. Add here NTS propaganda, the ideology of the White Guards, monarchists and aristocrats (Radio Liberty employs about a dozen former barons, princes and descendants of other nobility), and the CIA misinformation materials taking precedence over all other materials—and you will get a complete idea of the 'inner workings' of Radio Liberty.

Q. Reports have surfaced in the Western press about links between Radio Liberty and NATO. What can you tell us on this score?

A. Radio Liberty has a so-called research department. This department supplies NATO with the current information about life in the Soviet Union received from agents, and with generalised information about Soviet military construction and economy.

For its part, NATO also supports the radio station.

Q. And what was the security service's attitude towards you?

A. It was more or less complacent. The then service chief, James Griffin, had no suspicions on my account. My previous work in a top-secret US establishment like a US Army Institute, the high standing of the persons who had recommended me.... Not many could boast such a previous record before coming to join Radio Liberty. But I had to pass another test with my first immediate boss. Leonid Mikhailovich Savemark, a Russian émigré from Sweden, was at that time the manager, i.e. head of the news service at Radio Liberty. Outwardly, he was the very picture of civility and courteousness. Later on, one of the service officials, in a private conversation, gave a description in a nutshell of this man. 'Nobody,' he said, 'used to shake my hand so warmly nor stab me in

the back more frequently than this provocateur Savemark.' In actual fact, he was a provocateur closely connected with the security service.

Q. And where is he now?

A. Working as a Liberty staff correspondent in Washington, under the name of Leonid Mikhailov.... But back to the security service. It is a must that it should be headed by an American. His two deputies are also Americans. All of them are, of course, closely connected with the CIA. Ordinary service officials, or the *polizeis*, as they are referred to behind their backs, have mainly been recruited from traitors to their country and nazi henchmen with blood-stained records. These officials show special zeal in performing their duties. People are getting old, and it is not an easy thing to get a retirement pension at Radio Liberty. That is why Liberty's officials are shadowed both at work and at home.

Q. Does the security service attend only to internal matters or may it be used for other actions under assignments from the CIA? Who carries out provocations against Soviet citizens going abroad, and against officials of Soviet organisations and missions abroad?

A. On the whole, the service engages in internal matters. What you imply, i.e. some 'sensitive' affairs having to do with purely espionage work, is concentrated in, among others, the hands of 'the Ralis office', which is in Paris.

Once, in a heart-to-heart talk over a cup of coffee, a leading Liberty official who had a liaison with Ralis's personal secretary Ninel Kostomarova, a Russian émigré's daughter, told me some curious details about that CIA official and his 'office'. Ralis (whose real name is Mark Israel and who was born in Russia and taken by his parents abroad in the 1920s), to hide his intelligence connections, poses as professor of sociology and philosophy. To gather espionage information about the USSR, he relies on Zionist organisations in France, White Guard émigrés (especially NTS members), and some recently-emigrated renegades, as well as individual French nationals. Thus, for instance, Ralis repeatedly sent to the Soviet Union Jean-Pierre Bonamour, professor of Russian language and literature at the Sorbonne. Also collaborating with Ralis are Russian language professor Wladimir Weidle of the same university and Michel Tatu, a *Le Monde* correspondent, who was once accredited in Moscow. Incidentally, at present Tatu is regarded as a leading Sovietologist by the local experts in ideological subversion against the socialist countries. Ralis's active assistants also include Kirill Yelchaninov, the son of a White Guard émigré, and Mikhail Geller, a former Soviet citizen who fled to the West and is now a prolific writer of dirty anti-Soviet lampoons for *Kultura*, a reactionary Polish émigré magazine. There is no need to continue this list. The subversive activity waged by the 'Ralis office' against the Soviet Union is obvious. What I repeatedly won-

dered about is what keeps the French government from expelling this espionage nest from the country.

Mr. Ralis is a frequent guest at Radio Liberty, where he wields great influence, for exchanging information or holding secret consultations with the station's leadership. But once again I make a point of the fact that the bosses of Max Ralis are not in Munich, they are in Washington, or in Langley, to be precise.

We had a chance of meeting with Mr. Ralis in his 'office' in Paris. But that is a separate story in its own right.

Visiting Mr. Ralis

There is no end to what can be said or written about Paris, in verse or in prose, in endless detail or with packed precision. But one can hardly give a briefer description of this great city than does the French popular saying: "Paris will always be Paris". It is fine in any season. Of course, the great city of Paris has its own enemies. The endless flood of cars destroys the marble masterpieces of antiquity and poisons the lungs of the Parisians. Free enterprise is killing all that still lives in the now murky waters of the Seine, and the chaotic housing construction blights the image of the capital.

There is, however, yet another enemy of the Parisians, and of all French people, for that matter. The enemy is not smog, but anti-Soviet mould: all kinds of organisations set up by the NATO secret services with their headquarters in the French territory. We Soviet people are not afraid of the pitiful handful of former White Guards, Zionists and criminals. The French public, for its part, too, takes a correct attitude to them. It understands that they poison the atmosphere, hatch schemes and engage in shady affairs.

Similar dirty work is being pursued in France by the CIA agent Ralis who has set up an office in Paris. It is called The Audience Response Evaluation Division. This office is in reality a recruitment centre for all kinds of anti-Soviet rabble sent, following a relevant clearance and processing, to work in different ideological subversion centres.

It proved relatively easy for us to find the house where the Paris RL-RFE subsidiary was supposed to be, but then an involved search for the office itself began. Through a darkened arch, doors lead somewhere, one, then another, still another. The fourth, which is locked, is supposed to lead to glass-panelled entrance hall with the cage for an old lift. We decided to press all the door bells one by one, to inquire and apologise. It was noon, and the flats kept cold silence. Presently, an old Frenchwoman turned into the arch from the street. We rushed forward to meet her.

'Oh, that Ralis!' the woman grumbled angrily. 'Are you from Israel by any chance? We are really fed up with all this....' But, softening, she responded: 'If a green Citroen is parked in the yard, he's at home. I'll open the door, while you ring the lift and go up to the fifth floor. He lives there.'

The Citroen was there in the yard. The number plate read 115-BCK-75.

We may safely say that we have never seen anywhere such a curious entrance to a flat. The lift stops smoothly before a tiny landing about 4 metres square. Directly next to the left shaft, on the right, is a door leading to Ralis's office. There are no more entrances or exits out of here. There is no staircase. A trap, pure and simple. If there is some secret exit, it must be in the flat itself.

Grey-haired, lean and ordinarily posing as a melancholic, Ralis is unpleasantly surprised:

'What have you come here for and how did you manage to get in?'

'Believe us, we operate without a master-key.'

'Well, come in then,' Ralis speaks through set teeth. 'Make yourselves comfortable.'

Ralis is a career intelligence officer, a close friend of Mr. Redlich and of other special service officials in RL-RFE. That was why, after we had told him deliberately about having visited the headquarters of the Munich specialists in radio subversion, Mr. Ralis immediately told his secretary to get in touch with Mr. Redlich in Munich.

He checked and was satisfied that we had told the truth. For us it was another chance to see Ralis's professional suspiciousness.

'So you see, Mr. Ralis, your hair has turned grey but you still behave like a doubting Thomas. Of course, it is clear that one's profession forms one's character.'

'I don't know what you're talking about. I am professor of sociology, and I study, so to say, your market for our broadcasting.'

'Have you any published works? If so, we would like to familiarise ourselves with them.'

'No, I stopped writing in the forties. As the saying goes, I preferred "to stop writing in order to live",' Ralis grins. It takes him a long time to puff at his pipe to make it draw. The room fills up with a heavy tobacco smell.

Yet we know that our interlocutor is a person who writes. Mr. Ralis's ready pen has produced many directives, drafts and instructions. He considers himself to be a gifted psychologist and even physiognomist, and very frequently he draws up letters of instructions for his agents.

As was pointed out by Howland Sargeant, a former Liberty boss, the findings of the Ralis office are fit not only for preparing

the radio station's programmes but are also of interest for specialists. What specialists? We know the answer.

'You are connected with RL-RFE on a permanent basis?'

'Yes, naturally....'

'Then you must know the CIA agent and the RL-RFE official Jon Lodeesen, as well as Robert Tack, the current chief of the RL-RFE Russian-language service. If memory does not fail us, these gentlemen are graduates of the US intelligence school in Garmisch Partenkirchen. And then Lodeesen worked at the US embassy in Moscow and was declared persona non grata and expelled from the Soviet Union.'

Mr. Ralis is not in the mood to discuss such delicate topics.

'Gentlemen, let us change the subject.'

Mr. Ralis tries to prove that in recruiting personnel for RL-RFE he is guided exclusively by the candidate's 'literary gifts'. It is clear that he does not wish to admit that what he needs in the first place are self-interested individuals, persons with criminal records and those with loose morals. But the main thing is that they all should be unscrupulous, rabidly anti-Soviet, and be able to concoct slander against the Soviet Union.

'Mr. Ralis, we have visited the Russian cemetery in Sainte Genevieve and saw the grave of Alexander Galich, a former Soviet national. We have heard different versions about the cause of his strange death.'

'Yes, yes. Such a gifted poet and died so early.... And why do you think, gentlemen, that he died a strange death? I do not know for sure, but I've heard that he died touching a TV antenna that had mistakenly been plugged into an electric socket, or something....'

Correct, Mr. Ralis. This was the version offered by the Voice of America. But there were other versions as well. Let us take ourselves several years back when the singer and song-writer Galich, who had left the Soviet Union, was still alive. At first he received red carpet treatment at Radio Liberty, and was appointed adviser to the Radio Liberty director of cultural relations. But they said that the bard, all of a sudden, broke down, took to drinking and ceased 'working well'. That was why he was demoted to Paris as head of the radio station's 'cultural' section. It was then that Galich decided to revenge himself upon the Radio leadership. Through his lawyer, he filed a suit demanding that Liberty make good, to the tune of 50,000 marks, the 'material and moral damage' done to him. The damage was that Radio Liberty, without the knowledge and consent of Galich when he was still in the Soviet Union, had played his songs and this, according to Galich, finally led to his expulsion from the Writers' Union and his 'forced' departure from the USSR.

Was it not, Mr. Ralis, because they consider you a big specialist

on 'the Russian soul', that they made you boss of the 'rebellious bard' in Paris? And was it not you, as we have been told, who constantly expressed discontent over Galich's work in Paris, accusing him of indecision and inability to engage in serious affairs?

The circumstances of Galich's death, which we learned in Paris, produced great discussion. Within the Russian émigré community, one part considered the CIA responsible for Galich's death, while another asserted that Galich had committed suicide, since several weeks before his death he allegedly felt depressed, saying that he was prepared to leave everything behind and even go to the Far North. A suicide? That was certainly a very strange way to commit suicide.

Of course, nobody is asserting anything, but you, Mr. Ralis, it would seem, know more about Galich's death than you said in our conversation.

Again, Ralis preferred to change the subject.

MELOR STURUA



MELOR STURUA—writer and journalist. During his more than 30 years as correspondent for the newspaper *Izvestia*, Sturua travelled widely around the world. He is the author of books about the FRG, the USA and other countries. Sturua holds the Vorovsky Journalists' Award.

THE CIA CHIEF AFFAIR

Events unfurled themselves with the speed of a detective film. The story began in Queens, a borough of New York City, then moved to Zurich, the capital of the banking world; from thence it continued to New Orleans in Louisiana, paused briefly in Chicago, and finally burst into Washington where, having become a nationwide sensation, it appeared in newspapers and magazines and penetrated the villas of Georgetown and Maclean, ministerial offices, the corridors of Congress, CIA headquarters in Langley, the Pentagon and even the White House. The situation was reminiscent of the tale about an old woman who swallowed a fly. This 'fly' finally became a political scandal of such dimensions that it was christened 'Caseygate' after William Casey, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

On June 1, 1981, one Dennis McNell, Vice-President of the sales division of Triad Energy Corporation, died suddenly on returning home from his usual jogging session. He was hastily buried without a post mortem, although there were serious grounds for suspecting that the businessman from Queens had been assisted in his departure from this world (he had twice been abducted and beaten up). The brothers of the deceased demanded that the district attorney obtain from the chief pathologist of New York permission to exhume the body of McNell for a post mortem examination. However, they then hurriedly departed for Zurich without waiting for decision. The brothers' names were Samuel and Thomas and, like their deceased (or murdered?) brother, they were also vice-presidents of the Triad Energy Corporation. At the beginning of July, the McNell brothers turned up, just as unexpectedly, in Washing-

ton and, more precisely, in the office of the all-powerful Executive Editor of *The Washington Post*, Benjamin Bradlee. They had not come empty-handed. They placed on the editor's desk a fat dossier containing irrefutable evidence of illegal financial deals by the former head of Brother International Corporation, multimillionaire Max Hugel, the newly appointed CIA's deputy director of covert operations. (The occupant of this post is usually nicknamed 'spy No. 1'). In addition to the documents in the dossier, the brothers handed over to *The Washington Post* 16 cassette tapes with recordings of their conversations with Hugel. The secretly recorded contents of these tapes was unusual and curious. Hugel threatened to murder rival businessmen and lawyers, and admitted to being 'a liar, an informer and a trickster'. (Later, David Wise, author of *Spectrum*, the sensational book about the power struggle within the CIA, ironically remarked that with such a 'record', Hugel was the 'ideal candidate' for the post of 'spy No. 1'.)

The Washington Post generously gave over several pages to the McNells' disclosures, and their publication on July 14, 1981, caused the first tremors of the approaching political earthquake to ripple through the Washington corridors of power. It was quite obvious that the material published by *The Washington Post* was only the tip of the iceberg, and that Hugel was not the target but the bait. While the scandal was unfolding in the capital, the McNell brothers disappeared without trace, taking with them about three million dollars from the funds of Triad Energy Corporation. The last that was heard of them was a telephone call to *The Washington Post* saying they had had to go into hiding as a result of the disclosures. Where they are now no one knows. Indeed, no one knows whether they are still alive, or whether they have already departed this world, leaving behind only their corpses to await the next exhumation.

Meanwhile, Max Hugel, his back against the wall, was obliged to 'resign'. However, the departure of 'spy No. 1' did not put an end to the scandal but, on the contrary, added fuel to the flames. A minor piece had been removed from the political chess board, but now a more important piece was threatened—the Director of the CIA, William Casey. Casey had previously been general manager of Reagan's election campaign, a member of his intimate circle, and the first ever head of the 'cloak-and-dagger' department to receive ministerial rank, that is, to become a member of the government.

Casey was under attack from two directions. He was accused of filling the CIA with politicians rather than professionals. The appointment of a businessman with no experience in intelligence work to the post of 'spy No. 1' was described as 'unheard of irresponsibility and favouritism'. (Hugel had headed Reagan's election machine in New Hampshire and had attracted Casey with

his energy and drive for the Reagan bandwagon.) In addition, some of Casey's own past sins had floated to the surface, sins similar to those of Hugel and about which he had remained silent during the process of his confirmation in the Senate. These sins had also escaped the notice of the FBI, which usually checks every candidate for top-ranking government positions very carefully in order to ensure that there are no 'skeletons in the cupboard'.

Casey, it seems, had more than enough skeletons in his cupboard. In 1968, for example, he set up the Multiponics Corporation Agribusiness, which went bankrupt in 1971. In his evidence to a Senate hearing on his confirmation as Director of the CIA, Casey declared that the bankruptcy of Multiponics had cost him about 150 thousand dollars. In fact, by means of illegal financial operation, Casey had made about 1 million dollars profit. It is worth noting in this connection that Casey is a very wealthy man, and the wealthiest ever to head the CIA. On his own evidence presented before the Senate, his assets amount to 9,652,089 dollars, that is, almost ten million dollars.

According to Senator Proxmire, Mr. Casey stepped beyond the mark when he thought this necessary to make a profit. His wealth had been accumulated by devious means, sometimes at the cost of his clients, and his evidence before Congress had been far from complete or accurate. This statement by Senator Proxmire was made ten years ago, when Congress was preparing to confirm Casey in the post of Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Nixon government, i.e. in the post of chief defender of interests of shareholders against such 'devious' businessmen as himself! The Senate, however, or more precisely the Senate Intelligence Committee, appeared to be suffering from an acute attack of amnesia. No one remembered other findings when Casey was chosen from the ranks of the previous Republican administration for the post of Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and President of the Export-Import Bank. More than this, it was claimed on the Capitol that no one knew of the 'memorandum decision' of the Federal Appeals Court of New York dated May 19, 1981, concerning illegal activities of Multiponics which took place with Casey's knowledge. A similar situation was revealed at court proceedings in New Orleans. Casey concealed this information both from the FBI and the Senate Committee, whose members first learned about the proceedings in which the head of the CIA had been involved from the newspaper articles written by the economic observer Dan Dorfman and published in the middle of July 1981.

As time passed, more information came to light. It was discovered that Casey and his barristers office had links with organised crime! For example, Casey represented the interests of SCA

Services Incorporated, whose president was on the mafia payroll. This was revealed by an FBI informant who had been tracking mafia underground activities in New Jersey. Disconcerted congressmen were to discover a suspicious omission in the seemingly detailed and exhaustive list supplied by Casey of private individuals and companies that employed his services: SCA Services was not mentioned. This could not be mere coincidence, but was obviously an attempt on the part of Casey to cover his tracks and conceal his compromising links with criminal syndicates.

President Eisenhower had once remarked that the Director of the CIA must be 'cleaner than a hound's tooth'. In the light of even this scant information cited above, Casey's fitness for this post would appear extremely dubious. However, neither this, nor the machinations of the 'liar, informant and trickster' Hugel were the cause of 'Caseygate', but merely the pretext for a frontal attack on the head of the CIA, which was being secretly prepared deep inside the labyrinth of US intelligence and closely associated political groups.

The expression 'old boy network' is common in American intelligence jargon. It refers to the close community that unites professional agents, both those still in active service and those who have already retired. The 'old boy network' constitutes a kind of privileged pretorian guard jealous of its privileges. The history of ancient Rome shows that the emperors were ever fearful of their pretorian guards, and American presidents are equally unwilling to put complete trust in theirs, and therefore they strive to fill key positions within the CIA not with candidates from the 'old boy network' who would not think twice before carrying through a coup d'état, but with people loyal to them. (Indeed, there is a law which officially declares that the posts of Director of the CIA and his first deputy cannot be occupied simultaneously by professional military intelligence officers. One post must be occupied by a civilian.)

The history of relations between the White House and the CIA is full of examples of a bitter, albeit usually covert struggle among various political groupings for control over the 'cloak-and-dagger' department. When, in 1965, President Johnson appointed Admiral William Raborn Junior—the 'father' of the Polaris missile—to the post of Director of the CIA, the admiral was immediately subjected to attack. Articles began to appear in the press declaring that at CIA sessions the admiral had revealed total ignorance of international politics, and that he even did not know the names of a number of capital cities and certain heads of state. Finally, after six months, the admiral was obliged to 'put into port', and his place was taken by 'old boy' Richard Helms. There was also bitter rivalry between 'outsider' James Schlesinger and the CIA 'old guard'. President Carter's attempt to get Professor Theodore So-

rensen accepted as Director of the CIA collapsed in failure, and Admiral Turner, a compromise figure, managed with difficulty to maintain 'armed peace' in his department, while the 'old boy network' referred to him as 'that sham admiral'.

Having won the presidential election, Reagan made it understood that he intended to appoint as Director of the CIA the leader of his election campaign, William Casey. Although Casey had served for a while with military intelligence during the Second World War, he was never 'one of the family'. This was a typically 'political' appointment, by means of which the President was sending his 'Trojan horse' into the CIA. The CIA's own favourite for the post was Admiral Inman. In contrast to Raborn and Turner, Inman was not so much a 'sea wolf' as a 'bloodhound'. Suffice it to point out that he had for many years been the head of the National Security Agency, the US Armed Forces electronic espionage service. Inman's candidature was supported by Senator Barry Goldwater, who had been appointed to the influential post of Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee after the Republicans had obtained the majority in the Senate. Goldwater became the undisputed 'godfather' of the 'old boy network' on the Capitol, a zealous defender of their interests and trying to save face. However, Reagan insisted on his candidate and Casey became Director of the CIA, with Inman appointed to the post of first deputy as a compromise solution.

For a while it seemed that the 'old boys' had accepted, or at least resigned themselves to the situation. They were giving their new director a 'trial period', as it were. However, on May 11, 1981, Casey appointed Max Hugel to the post of 'spy No. 1', (in official CIA terminology 'DDO' or 'Deputy Director of Operations'). Like Casey, Hugel was a businessman involved in politics, a 'cog' in Reagan's election machine. On May 15, Casey's decision was openly attacked in the press, which severely criticised Casey for admitting a rank amateur into the CIA's inner sanctum.

This criticism seemed to be inspired by somebody; at least it served as the signal for an attack upon both Casey and Hugel. Nor can it be pure coincidence that a few days later—May 19—the Federal Appeals Court in New York wrote its memorandum decision on the illegal operations of the Multiponics Corporation. The significance of this document lay in the fact that Casey had been aware of these operations. Finally, it is around this time that the McNell brothers paid their first visit to Zurich, which was followed a few days later by the mysterious death of the third brother. From then on, there was a kaleidoscopic rush of events—another trip to Switzerland by the McNells, their appearance in the office of the Executive Editor of *The Washington Post* with their explosive tape recordings, the sensational article in the press, the resignation of Hugel and the disappearance of the McNell brothers. (The

FBI is still unable to track down the two on-the-run vice-presidents of the Triad Energy Corporation!)

From this moment onwards the battle raging around the director of the CIA shifts to the Capitol, and 'Caseygate' becomes an open secret...

On Thursday, July 24, Senator Goldwater called a press conference in his office on the Capitol. According to preliminary information, the 'godfather' of the CIA was to deny a report on CBS News that he, Goldwater, had allegedly advised Casey to quit, a report which he refuted as a 'malicious lie'. So many people turned up at the press conference that it was transferred to the Senate broadcasting studio. The studio lights and the television cameras obviously acted like spurs on the old war horse. Thrusting forward his famous 'determined' chin, Goldwater first denied the CBS report, and then went on in the same breath to state the exact opposite. Speaking about the head of the CIA he said: 'That he appointed an inexperienced man to be, in effect, the nation's top spy was bad enough', 'Hugel's appointment is ... sufficient ... for Mr. Casey to retire or the President to have him retire.'

This announcement by the 'godfather' came as a shock to everyone, and none more than Casey himself. He phoned the Senator at 3 o'clock in the morning to express his disbelief that Goldwater had spoken of his (Casey's) retiring. 'Well, Bill, you better believe it, because that's what I said,' was the Senator's reply. Both parties to the conversation agree that it was far from friendly.

It was only after this body blow from Goldwater that Casey really staggered for the first time. The following morning two more senators, Ted Stevens from Alaska and William Roth from Delaware jumped onto the Goldwater bandwagon. This move was ominous in that both these senators were Republicans and also members of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Stevens declared that 'Mr. Casey would be wise to accept Mr. Goldwater's advice,' while Roth said emphatically, 'He should go—now.' Senator Biden said that unless Casey and the Administration came forward with 'a plausible and legal explanation' of the matter under review, 'then Mr. Casey should be asked to do what is best for the agency and the country and step aside'.

In this situation, only the direct and decisive intervention of the President could save Casey, but the White House continued its policy of wait-and-see. Its aid to the floundering CIA Director limited to hindering Senate investigations. (At this point it is worth noting one detail not devoid of irony. Goldwater himself, who now heads the Senate Intelligence Committee, once demanded that it be disbanded because, in his opinion, it was 'none of our business to interfere in CIA affairs'.)

If even the Republicans were demanding Casey's head, one can

imagine the uproar created by the Democratic opposition. Particularly vociferous protests came from Senator Daniel Moynihan, Goldwater's deputy. This wily and impetuous Irishman aimed not so much at Casey as at his bosses in the hope of making political capital out of the affair. According to Moynihan, telephone calls had been made to both the White House and William Smith, the Attorney General, without success. If they continue to behave in this way, continued Moynihan, who had acquired his rhetorical skills as US representative at the UN, they risked ending up without their CIA Director.

Finally the White House realised that further delay could well be fatal for Casey. The President, as usual, decided to act through his alter ego on the Capitol, his personal friend and close advisor, Paul Laxalt, a Senator from Nevada. Laxalt called a press conference in the Mayflower Hotel, a favourite of the late head of the FBI, Edgar Hoover, and announced the beginning of a 'Save Casey' campaign. Other speakers at the press conference included Leonard Marks, former director of the US Information Agency, and Stanley Sporkin, CIA general counsel. The press conference was followed by two dinners, one in Washington and the other in New York, held in honour of Casey, while President Reagan, with the help of Howard Baker, leader of the Republican majority in the Senate, persuaded the members of the Intelligence Committee to drop the unseemly affair.

The CIA Director stood to win. During the charges on the Capitol he was surrounded by a solid wall of bodyguards and lawyers, and he was preceded into the courtroom by twenty cardboard boxes full of documents which were supposed to 'rehabilitate' the defendant and show the world that, despite the noisy scandal that had broken out around him, the CIA director was indeed 'cleaner than a hound's tooth'.

'The bottom of the barrel has been scraped,' Casey declared after the first day of the hearing. 'There's nothing there.' After the second day he felt bold enough to tell reporters: 'You know, fellas, I'm not concerned about anything. My life is an open book, I'm ready to discuss any phase of it—but,' he hastened to add, 'not here, at this time.'

The activities of the CIA and its directors is a top secret. To open it up would be like prising open Pandora's Box. However, one day—but not here, at this time—it will be done, and then the 'cloak-and-dagger' department will reveal its fangs of bellicose imperialism, rather than 'clean hound teeth'. Indeed, even the information we possess today is enough to build up the picture of this wasps' nest of terrorism and violence.

On July 29, after a five-hour marathon, the Senate Intelligence Committee made a sharp about-turn again and voted unanimously that 'no basis has been found for concluding that Mr. Casey is

unfit to serve'. This decision was announced to the waiting reporters by none other than Senator Goldwater, who spoke in a terse voice, as if against his own will. The 'godfather' clearly felt uncomfortable. In an attempt to save face, the Senator from Arizona argued that if Casey had warned him in time about the sensational articles about to appear in *The Washington Post*, then all the rumpus could have been avoided. Subsequently, in an attempt to substantiate the version that it was this failure on his part that had angered the touchy Senator and provoked Goldwater into demanding his resignation, Casey spread the rumour that he (Casey) had tried in vain for two days to get in touch with Goldwater in order to tell him about the Hugel affair. This no one believed. It is indeed hard to imagine that the Director of the CIA could spend two days trying to get in touch with the Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee in Washington without success. If such were the case, then that alone would be enough for removing Casey from his post.

The change in climate on the Capitol was, of course, not simply the result of the fact that Casey had 'cleared the air' between himself and Goldwater, who, according to his own colleagues, believed that the 'CIA belonged to Barry'. The causes of the change were far more complex and went far deeper than just the collision of two inflated egos.

First of all, the 'old boy network' had lost this round to the forces around the White House. Goldwater and his 'old boys' had been given to understand that, even if Casey had to leave Langley, his place would not go to Bobby Inman. More-Inman himself would go the same way as his chief. He would follow him, but not succeed him! This had been arranged as follows. The White House had organised a 'leak' about the President's choice of a replacement for Casey. Three candidates were named: Vernon Walters, former CIA deputy director and Ambassador-at-Large; Daniel Graham, a well-known 'ultra' and former director of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency; and Samuel Wilson, who had also once headed Pentagon intelligence and also been deputy director of the CIA. The appointment of any one of these three to the post of director of the CIA would automatically exclude Inman since, as has already been pointed out, US law prohibits the appointment of military men to both the post of director and that of first deputy.

However, this formal impediment was not the only point at issue. The three candidates for Casey's post were all well-known as ultras who, amongst other things, believed that the CIA should be autonomous of Congress and who desired a return to the 'imperial style' presidency of Nixon. Indeed, Vernon Walters had been involved in the Watergate scandal. As Nixon's personal military interpreter and then deputy director of the CIA, Walters had put

pressure on the FBI to block investigations into the break-in at Democratic Party's headquarters in the Watergate Hotel. Thus, writing about the 'leak' arranged by the White House, the press commented caustically that the President was, in effect, blackmailing the senators—if you reject Casey, you will get 'Jack the Ripper'.

In order to calm public opinion, disturbed by the defeat of US aggression in Vietnam, the Watergate scandal and the exposure of the 'dirty tricks' and assassination plots of the CIA, the American administration took certain measures to control intelligence activity during the mid 1970s. However, when Washington began to pursue a reckless foreign policy, escalate the arms race and tighten the screws at home, evoking shades of McCarthyism, the executive power is successfully recovering its lost positions. Clear evidence of this is provided by the new 'code of behaviour' for the CIA, which in fact gives the intelligence service carte blanche, freeing it from even the nominal constitutional control exercised by Congress.

It is only 'fair' to point out that Casey, judging by his as yet brief period in office, fully adheres to the views of Walters, Graham and Wilson. According to Senator Patrick Leahy, the new Director of the CIA fails to keep the Senate informed, ignores it and even deliberately misleads it. As examples he cited the Israeli raid on Baghdad (the bombing of the atomic reactor), CIA plans to destabilise Libya, Mauritania and other countries, and the planned removal by force of certain heads of state, including Muammar Gaddafi. In contrast to Admiral Turner, Chief of the CIA under Carter, who was at least outwardly respectful towards Congress, personally went to the Capitol for briefings and gave the appearance of consulting with the legislative organs, Casey was arrogant and off-hand towards Senators and Congressmen, and failed to attend briefings 'on the hill', sending instead his deputies, including the ill-fated Max Hugel.

When President Reagan was told of the Senate decision in the Casey affair, he was obviously well pleased and even laughed heartily when one staffer joked: 'You know why they cleared him? They had five hours of his mumbling and they didn't want to have to listen to it any longer.' However, the 'mumbling' of Bill Casey screened the clear will of the President and his entourage, including the Pentagon, and this the Senators had to accept. However, they did so extremely unwillingly and with fairly considerable reservations. Casey's statement that the hearing would be 'a cakewalk' proved far from the truth. The hearing turned out to be more like a minefield. The reader has no doubt noticed the way the Senate formulated its decision—'no basis has been found for concluding that Mr. Casey is unfit'.... Attempts by Casey supporters within the committee, including Senator Jackson, to get the Senate to accept a resolution expressing 'full confidence'

in Casey failed when put to the vote. Moreover, Senator Moynihan declined to describe the committee's finding as 'a clean bill of health' for Casey. The committee appointed Nashville lawyer Fred Thompson as its special counsel to investigate the 'loose ends' in the Casey affair. Thompson had taken part in the investigations into Watergate, and had also been assigned by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as its consultant on General Haig's involvement in the scandal when Haig was being confirmed—not without difficulty—in the post of Secretary of State.

Finally, having turned Casey into something of a hostage, the 'old boy network' and its associates on the Capitol moved to the defence of their favourite, Admiral Inman. They let the White House know that they regarded the leadership of the CIA as 'the tandem Casey-Inman', and that if the latter was forced out, Casey would be once more brought under fire. Unprecedented arrangements were made for Admiral Inman to speak on television. The first deputy Director of the CIA began his broadcast by denying rumours that he had attempted to lead a 'putsch' against the chief, and finished by delivering a fairly obvious broadside aimed ostensibly at the danger of 'politicising' the operations directorate. For example. When, in its reports, the CIA was obliged to note that the Soviet Union was not involved in international terrorism, that no ill-starred 'Soviet penetration' into Africa, and Latin America (and in particular El Salvador) had been observed, and that the Pentagon was clearly exaggerating the data on the deployment of Soviet missiles, Casey, acting on orders from above, brushed aside these reports and called for 'additional investigation'. When it also failed to produce the desired results, Casey again brushed aside the unsuitable information. He even began to nurture plans for the creation of a special directorate which would have exclusive 'competence' as regards questions involving the Soviet Union. The elaboration of these plans was entrusted to none other than Max Hugel.

Announcing the bitter-sweet decision on the Casey affair, Senator Goldwater commented significantly that he was not objective in this matter and continued to believe that Bobby Inman was the best intelligence officer in the world. As for Casey, he was the President's creature, and until the President continued to trust him, Casey would remain in his post....

Thus, for the moment, ended the Caseygate affair. Political commentators are of the opinion that in this particular battle for power and influence both sides came out losers, for this new scandal around the 'cloak-and-dagger' department had once again attracted the close and concerned interest of the general public, and after the preceding scandals such interest was something Washington could well do without.

ERRATUM

Footnote on p. 55 refers to p. 70
and footnote on p. 70 refers to p. 55